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iGLOSSARY
Irrespective  of their historical  and cultural  or Ideologia origins,  the following  terms are used In this
paper with the definition  given  below:
Co.2ectlve  Farm: A farm  jointly  owned  and operated  under a single management  for the benefit  of
and with work input  from the owners  of the collective.
CommuWa  Cwnershp System:  A system  of land  ownership  in which  specific  plots of land are
assigned  temporarily  or permanently  to members  for family  cultivation,  while  other areas are held in
common  for pasture,  forestry,  and collection  of wild  plants and gamo. Individual  plots mayor may
not be inheritable  or tradeable  in internal  rental  or sales markets. But sales to nonmembers  are
always  forbidden  or subject  to community  approval.
Contract  Fannlng. A contract  between  a farmer  and a p-archr  'er in advance  of the growing  season
for a specific  quantity,  quality  and date of delivery  of an agricultural  output  at a price or price
formula  fixed  in advance.  The contract  provides  the farmer an assured  sale of the crop and sometimes
provides  for technical  assistance,  credit, servicca,  or inputs  from the purchaser.
Cori*:  Unpaid  labor and sometimes  the service  of draft animal  provided  by serfs, tenants,  or
usufruct  right holder  to the owner  of the manorlal  estate.
Debt Peonage,  Bonded Labor  Series:  A tribute  payment  or labor service  originating  in a defaulted
loan.
Family Fanm:  A farm operated  primarily  with family  labor, with  some  hiring in or out of labor.
Family  farming  systems  may  be socially  stratified,  with wide  dispersion  in farm  sizes and technology
levels.
Radenda. A manorial  estate in which  part of the land is cultivated  as the home  harm of t'e owner
and part as the family  farms  of serfs, usufrctuaury  right holders,  or tenants.
Home Farm: That part of the manorial  estate  or large ownership  holding  culdvated  'Jy the lord,
landlord  or owner  under  his own management  using corvde  and sometimes  partly remunerated  labor.
Landlord Eftate:  A manorial  estate  in which  all of the land is cultivated  by tenants  or usufructuary
right  holders.
Junker Estate: A large ownership  holding  producing  a diversified  set of commodities  operated  under
a single  management  with hired labor. Laborers  do not receive  a plot of land  to use for their own
culdtivation  as pant  of their remuneraton, except  perhaps  for a house and a garden  plot.
Large Commerdcal  Farm:  A large ownership  holding  producing  several  different  commodities
operating  under a single  management  with a high degree  of mechanization  using a few long term
hired workers  who may reside  on the farm and seasonally  hired workers  who do not reside
permanentI)  on the farm.
Manodl  Estate: An area of land allocated  temporarily  or as a permanent  ownership  holding  to a
manorial  lord who has the right to tribute, taxes, or rent in cash,  in kind or in corvde  labor of the
peasant residing  on the estate. ITis paper uses the sme  term whether  the peasants  are there by
1choice  or are bound  by restrictions  on their mobility. Manorial  estates  can be organized  as ha,<indas
or as landlord  estates.
Rcat is used in several  ways:
*  Rsudrfa  t  'hTe  residual  payment  to a productive  factor in inelastic  supply  afier all factors  have
been renumerated  at their respective  market  rates, whether  the other markets  are competitive  or not.
*  Rent-secing rent. The additional  reward received  as a result of regul-tions  and restrictions  that
raise the level of rewards  above its undistorted  level. Where  markets  are thin or uncompetitive,
measuring  rent-seeking  rent may  be very difficult.
* Land rent: A tenant's  payment  to a landowner  in a voluntary  contractual  relationship. Rent  may
be paid as a fixed  or share  payment  in cash, kind,  or iabor sarvices. It may  or may  not be equal  to
residual  ren  If the reservation  utility  of tenants  has been  reduced  by distortions  associated  with rent
seeking, the land  rent includes  a component  of rent seeking.
Reservraon udiky  or reserwtion wage.  The level of utility (including  the risk ataibutes)  or the wage
which  is available  outside  the manorial  estate  to a potential  tenant  or worker  on a manorial  estate.
Share  contract:  A rental  contract  in which  the tenant  is paying  a portion  or all of his rent by
delivering  a certain  proportion  of the output,  the crop share, to the landowner.
SatJbnws: A farm belonging  to the state and  operated  like a Junker estate  or a large commercial
farm under a single  management  with a largely resident  labor force  paid in wages,  and sometimes,
profit shares in cash or in kind. Laborers  may  be allocated  a small  garden  plot.
Swplhw:  Output  or labor available  over and above  that required  to reconstitute  and maintain  the
energy  and life of peasants,  serfs or slaves.
bsa.e:  A payment  in cash, kind or labor services  to a landlord  based  on restrictions  on mobility
and/or other forms of state-sanctioned  coercion. Tribute  may also be called  rent or corv6e.
U  qtfauatVuarj  ,fghi  . Rights  to use the land. May be temporary,  long-term,  lifetime,  or inheritable,
but always  exclude  the right to unrestricted  sale of the land.
Wage,  aanton:  A large ownership  holCing  specializing  in a single crop under a single  management
using wage  labor, a large share of which  resides  on the plantation  but does not receive  more than a
garden  plot for self cultivation  as part
of the remunion.
2INTRODUCTION
This paper began  as an inquiry  into the efficiency  and equity  consequences  of rental
and sales markets  for agricultural  land In the developing  world.  Most  of the work  on the relationship
between  farm size and productivity  strongly  suggests  that  farms that  rely mostly  on family  labor have
higher  productivity  levels  than large farms  operated  primarily  with hired labor. If that Is so, why  have
markets  for the rental and sale of agricultural  land frequently  not reallocated  land to famUy  farmers?
Why do extraordinarily  unequal  distributions  of ownership  and operational  holdings  persist in many
parts of the world?  Why has land reform  seemed  to be necessary  to change  these  land ownership
distributions?
What began  to emerge  from this study  was the clear sense that the great variations  in
land  relations  found across  the world and over time cannot  be understood  in a simple  property  rights
and markets  paradigm.  Section  2 explains  the idealized  sequence  of the emergence  and definition  of
property  rights  which  occurred  in only few areas  of the developing  world.  As that paradigm  would
have it, increasing  land scarcity  leads  to better  definition  of rights, which  are then traded in sales and
rental markets  that are equally  accessible  to all players.  The outcome  should  be the allocation  of land
to the most efficient  uses and users. Yet  this often  did not happen,  as great observed  deviations  from
efficiency  demonstrate.
An examination  of the historical  evolution  of land rights  shows  the reason  for the
deviations:  rights over land and the concentration  of ownership  observed  in most developing  countries
at the end of World  War II are outgrowts of power  relationships.  Landowning  groups  used coercion
and distortions  in land, labor, credit, and commodity  markets  to extract  economic  rents from the land,
from peasants  and workers, and more recently  from urban consumer  groups  or taxpayers.  Such rent-
seeking  activities  reduced  the efficiency  of resource  use, retarded  growth,  and increased  the poverty
of the rural population.  How these power  relations  emerged  and what legal meens  enabled  relatively
few landowners  to accumulate  and hold on to large landholdings.  The terminology  describing
agricultural  production  relations  varies as much  as the relations  themselves  do. We use a consistent
set of terminology  and provide  a glossary  of definitions.'
A lag  litete  eaborats  the  imi",*on  of  paa  model  of land  ue follwing  the  utcad  of v.
Thuen for th optimal  u# of land  . aociad  problems  of localied  monopolies  (Fujita  and  Thib
3BIecse  land ownership  distribution  has often been  determined  by power  relationships
and disortions, and becuse land  sales markets  do not distribute  land to the poor (the key point  of
secton 5), land reform  has often  been necessary  to get land Into the hands of efficient  small fazily
owners  (section  4 shows  that  they are indeed  efficient).  The successes  and failures  of reform in
market  and socialist  economies  and the perversior of reforms  In both these systems,  manifested  in
large commercial  farms  or collectives,  are discuss&  ;3 section  3. The social cost of failing  to
undertake  reform-peasant  revolt and civil war-are  also considered.
But land  reform would  not be necessary  if there were economies  of scale in
agriculture  beyond  those  that a family  could  take advantage  of with a given  level of technology.  In
that case it would  not have been necessary  to use power  to aggregate  large holdings  or coercion  and
distortions  to recruit  workers. And in modem  times  it would  not  have beun necessary  to subsidiza
lage  commercial  farms  so heavily  through  credit  subsidies  and other distortions.  Voluntary
tasactions  in undistorted  markets  would  have  achieved  these  ends, and small  peasants  might  have
found it attractive  to join collectives.  Section  4 examines  the work  that hits  been done on the
presence-or  not- of economies  of scale in agriculture,  Plnding  in measurenients  of the relative
effcienc  of small versus  large farmis  only exceptional  cases  which  are consistent  with the myth  of
the efficient  large farm.
Similarly,  if land sales markets  could  alloczwe  land from inefficient  large owners  to
small family  farmers, lana reform  would  not be necessary.  Abolishing  the special  subsidies  to lage
fas  and the conditions  that permit coercion  would  be all that would  be required to lead  to the
brekup  of large farms through  sales to small farmers. Showing  why  sles  markets  are often  not
capable  of facilitating  these efflciency-twhancing  transfers  - covariance  of risks, imperfections  In
credit markets,  distortions  in commodity  market  and subsidies  to large farms are among  the reasons  -
is the topic of Section  5.
Section  6 then shows  that tenacy  and sharecropping  are not as ineffAcient  as often
assumed.  They are second  best adaptations  to incomplete  or distorted  markets  for labor, credit, and
risk diffulsion.  Such rental agreements  are also necessary  to allow  large ownership  holdings  to be
I (...oa  _ned
1986),  rgi  and  urbon  plniig,  and  the dorminant of lad values  (Rndall  and  Castle  1985).  7he
rifarmis  cited  provide  a good  oveview  of this  litratr
4oprated by tent  as small  family  farm units. Regulating  tenancy  or outlawing  it has perverse
efficiency  and equity  effects  for the poor.
The sections  of the paper are grouped  in k  ee  parts. Part I covers  the history  of land
relations  and the legacies  it leaves  today. Part II covers  the whree  analytical  controversies  surrounding
economies  of scale, and the efficiency  of the land  rental and the land  sales market.  Part m discusses
the major land policy  issues  left behind  by the various  distortions  and successful  and unsuccessful
reforms  in the developing  world. These iniclude  land  registration  and titling, lar.d  taxation,  regulations
limiting  land sales and land rentals,  fragmentation  of land, redcstributive  land  reform and
decollectivization.  Policy implications  are discussed  using the insights  gained  in the previous  sections.
Finally,  the methodological  epilogue  examines  how  var:ous  strands  of economic
theory have contributed,  or failed  to contribute,  to the explanation  of variations  in policies,  distortions
and land relations  over space  and  time.
PART I:  THE HIS  RICAL LEGACY
1.  The energence of property rights In lhnd
7Te critical issue  in land-ablndant  settings  is access  to labor, not lancd.  At low
population  densities,  there is no incentive  to invest  in soil fertility, and because  fertility  is restored  by
long-tree  fallow,  ownership  security  is not required  to induce  investment.  When  population  densities
rise, fallow  periods are gradually  shortened  until the lRnd  is continually  cultivated.  Then plows,
maure,  artificial  fertilizers,  and other invesments  and labor-intensive  methods  are required  to
maintain  soil fertlity (Boserup  1965,  Ruthenberg  1980,  Pingali  et a.,  1986).  Marginal  lands  are also
brought  under cultvation requiring  higher investments  still to make  them productive.  Now ownership
security  becomes  an important  incentive  for making  the required investments.  As the demand  for
credit  to finance  inputs and investments  in land improvements  rises, the issue  of land  as collateral
becomes  important.
lTus as population  density  increases  private  rights  to land  emerge  in a slow  and
gradual  process that exhibits  great regularity  (figure  1, arrows  1 to 4). Boserup's  (1965)  discussion
of this proces  is unsurpassed  and so is quoted  here at length:
SVirtually  all the systems  of land  tenure  found to exist  before the emergency  of private
property in land seem  to have  ihis one feature in common:  certain  families  are
recognized  as having  cultivation  rigihts  within  a given  area of land while  other families
are excluded  ....  'Free'  land disappears  already  before the agricultural  stage is
reached.  Tribes of food collectors  and hunters  consider  that they have exclusive  rights
to collect  food and to hunt in a particular  area....
Under the system  of forest fallow,  all the men,bers  of a tribe .... have a general  right
to cultivate  plots of land.... Tbis gerera' right to take part in the cultivation  of the
land which  the group dominates  - or imagines  to dominate  - can never be lost for any
member  of the cultivator  families.  They may  voluntarily  leave  the territory  for a time,
but they can then reclaim  their right when  they return ....
.a distinction  must be made between  the general  cultivation  riZht  - as described
above  - and the more specific  right a family  may  have  to cultivate  a par,cular plot of
land. Under all systems  of fallow  a family  will retain the exclusive  right to the plot it
has cleared  and cultivated  until the harvest  has been reaped  .... But if, after the lapse
of the normal  period  of fallow,  the family  does not re-cultivate  a given  plot, it may
lose its right to this particular  plo; .... Thus,  the general cultivation  right is an
inseparable  element  of the status  as member  of the tribe and, therefore,  in principle
inalienable,  while  the specific  right to cultivate  an individual  plot is lost by desuetude
,... As long as a tribe of forest-fallow  cultivators  has abundant  land at its disposal,  a
family  would  have no particular  interest  in returning  to precisely  that  plot which it
cultivated  on an earlier occasion.  Under  these  conditions  a family  which needed  to
shift to a new plot would  find  a suitable  plot, or have  it allocated  by the chief  of the
tribe....
But the situation  is apt to change  with increasing  population,  as good plots become
somewhat  scarce. Under  such conditions,  a family  is likely  to become  more attached
to the plots they have  been cultivating  on earlier occasions....
6Hunter-gatherer  T e r r i t o r i a I  r i g h t s  t o  h u n t  a n d  g a t h e r
3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Emergence  of  agriculture  - external  market
land  grants
0~~~~~~  1
Forest  fallow I  S~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~lavery  External tabt Forest  fallow  1enera  I1h  t  a  t o  o  I  t  I  v  a  t  *  a n d  9  r  a  Z  a  reservrla 9 n 9 r  a I  6~~~~  U 
2
Em  eroen  ce  o I  rIghts  to  apeaIf  Ic  pI0t0
Bush  fallow  R  3  n  9 h  t  a  t  o  I  f  I b  tz  I  e  a  n d  I  o *  I  a  a  d  Slave  Indenturt,
15
Family  Farm  . Plantatlabor
________  ________  _______  ________  _____Plaantatio
communal tenure  Manorial systemns  Plantatlo
tonants.  corvee  labor
self-cultivation  of  the  home farm
I grater  'rigl to  4  to efol  il"|o [*
Permanent  t  15
unrestricted  greater  rlghtJ  to  overlords
cropping  right  to  sell  Abolition  ol
I  ~~~~~~~slavir  y
Family Farm  Landlord Estate  Hacienda  I  L
owner-operated  entirely  ten  nt  plus  Plntatior tenant-operated  owner-operated
home farm  Contract  FarmingPermanent  Family Farm  Landlord  Estate  Hacienda.  Wage
cropping  ... mamas.Isauve  11  *eaamu-.p.rmd  *  @waer.sparatsd  Plantation
croppingLndroorrr  . _  .
Land  reformTen1
Junker Estate
*am.s3vI@Iei  I  lowner-operated\
r*eht  is s@el  12|
4  Land reform  \
7_____________6_________  subsldlde
ol ectlve an  Contract
Contemporary  Family  Farm  Large mechanize 
Systems  *,.-prld13  State Farans  14  commercial  farm  Farming
Titilng  and Land RKegletrlom  Dooollooltlwhallea  Eliminatlio  of  subslidie  ReodltrlbutlI  Lead Note,
POLICY  aegulatlsa  of  Land  S01e  s  RedlelilbatlvO  Land Retori  Land  Ta:atleu
Resulallef  e* Laud  R1at1le  Teneasy regatatlos  c"*.sol  l
QUESTIONS  Flagmemtltloead  Co  aoollidmtis  land  ait  iloa
Land TaxatlsnAt this stage, when  the attachment  of individual  familles  to Individual  plots becomes
more permanent,  the custom  of pledging  land is also likely  to emerge.  If a family
does not need  to use a given  plot for a certain  period It may  pledge  it to another
family .... subject  to the condit:on  that  the land  must be returned,  upon  request....
This  custom  o; pledging  ....  must be distinguished  sharply  from the  sale of land
where the former  occupier  of the land loses  all rights  in it.
Thus, the attachme  At  of individual  families  to particular  plots becomes  more and more
important.... As more  and more land is subject  to specific  cultivation  rights, little
land will be available  for redistribution  by the chief....
As long as the general  right of cultivation  has not lost all its importance  a sharp social
distinction  exists  in rural communities  between  cultivator  families  on one hand and
families  without  cultivation  rights  on the other, the latter  group consisting  of
strangers,  whether  they  be slaves  or free... even  those  strangers,  who are not slaves  in
a legal sense, are nevertheloss  left with no other choice  than  to do menial  work for
chiefs  or for ordinary  members  of the dominating  tribe....
Under  both long- and short-fallow  systems  the land lying  fallow  at any given  time is
at the free disposal  for grazing  by domestic  animals  belonging  to families  with
cultivation  rights....h. Ile  cultivaors' communal  rights  to use fallow  land  for grazing
will usually  survive  long after the general  right to clear new forest  land has
dsappeared....  (Boserup  1965, pp 79-80
Boserup's  discussion  makes  clear that property  rights in land are not simple  and are
arely unresticted. As land becomes  more scarce,  general  and Inheritable  cultivation  and grazing
rights are complemented  by rights  to resume  cultivating  specific  plots after  fillow (srrow 2), to
inherit  specific  plots rather than  just general  cultivaion rights, to pledge  or rent out the plots, to use
them as coilateral  in informal  credit  transactions,  and to sell them within  the community  (arow  3).
When the right to sell Includes  sales to members  outside  tta community  (arrow 4), the last vestiges
of general cultivation  rights  are lost amd  private  property  rights  are complete.  General  rights  survive
only as grazing  and collection  rights on communal  grazing  areas  and forests,  whc-e soils are usually
unsuitale  for crop or intensive  pasture  production.
9Even where  communal  land rights  and management  systems  prevail, as in indigenous
communities  of the Americas,  or tribal communities  in Asia and Africa, families  have  strong specific
laud rights. These rights  p;ovide  substantial  'ownership' security  as long as the plots are farmed  by
individual  family  units (Noronha  1985;  Downs  and Reyna 1988).  Land rental and sales usually  occur
withiln  the community, especially among close kin.
While  the internal  rules and structures  of these systems  exhibit  a bewildering  variety,
all communal  systems  have  one thing in common:  Sales  to outsiders  are either forbidden  or subject  to
approval  by the whole  community.
The right  to sell is often  proscribed  by laws that assign  ultimate  ownership  to the state
or that regulate  the land tenure  of tribal or indigenous  communities.  Colonial  powers  often legislated
a uniform  system  of communal  tenure to be applied  to all land  held by indigenous  populations
(although  tribal  societies  have  often  circumvented  formal  prohibition  of land sales; Noronha  1985).
Under communal  tenure  family-owned  plots can be used only for pledging  in informal  credit markets
and not as collateral  in formal credit  markets.
2.  Extracting tribute and rent from peasants
History  has few examples  of the uninterrupted  transformation  of general  cultivation
rights to land into owner-operated  family  farms (along  arrows 1 to 4 in figure  1). Nearly  always,
there has been an intervening  period under a class of rulers who  exacted  tribute, taxes or rent from
cultivator  families  (arrow 5). The landholdings  of these  overlords  (referred  to here, for expositional
simplicity,  as manortal estates, whatever the cultural or historic setting) were allocated temporarily or
as permanent  patrimony  or ownership  holding, along  with  the right  to tribute, taxes, or rent (in cash,
kind, or corvee  labor) from the peasants  residing  on the estate. Frequendy,  peasants'  freedom  to
move  was restricted  by bondage  or by prior claims  to land  by members  of the ruling  group. The
rights of the ruling  group were acquired  and enforced  by violence  or the threat of violence  and
institutionalized  in tradition, custom,  and the law and order  forces of the state. 2 The rights took
2  For Westan  Europe,  North  and  Ihomas  (1971)  intepret  te  rig  to triute as the  emergence  of a
contract  between  peasts  nd maoril  lords,  with  the lords  provding  protecon and  other  public  goods  i
exchange  for tribute.  Ihis view  ipore  the asymmety  in the  possesdon  of the means  for  violence  and  judicial
pow.
10numerous  forms and left historical  legacies  in the distribution  of land once  land rights  became  fully
private.  Again,  Boserup  (1965)  says it best:
Above  the group of families  with cultivation  rights is usually  found an upper class of
tribal chiefs  or feudal  land who receive  tribute  from the cultivators.... The emergence
of a kind of nobility  or aristocracy  often  seems  to follow  the introduction  of short-
fellow  cultivation  with animal  draft  power....  Usually  the position  of a cultivator  with
regard to his rights in land does not change  because  a feudal  government  imposes
itself and levies  taxes and labor services.  The cultivator  families  continue  to have  their
hereditary  cultivation  rights, both  general  and specific,  and redistribution  of land  by
village  chiefs  may continue  without  interference  from the feudal  landlords.  Nor does
land  become  alienable  by sale; grants  of land by overlords  to members  of the nobility
and others are simply  grants  of the right  to levy  taxes, and do not interfere  with the
hereditary  cultivation  rights of the peasants.  In other words, the beneficiaries  of such
grants do not become  owners  of the land in a modem  sense.... (pp. 82-84)
An analytical structure for the evolution  of agrarian relations
For an analysis  of the evolution  of agrarian  relations  and the associated  land
ownership  distribution,  several  points  are key. The first is that favorable  agricultural  conditions
generate  the potential  for rent-seeking  rent or surplus  and provide  an incentive  for groups  with
political  and military  power  to try to capture  the rents or surpluses.  The second  is that under simple
technology  there are no economies  of scale in farming  and that independent  family  farms are
economically  the most efficient  mode  of production  except  for a very limited  set of plantation  crops,
(see section  4). Compared  to large farms  based  on hired or tenant  labor, owner-operated  family  farms
save on supervision  costs of labor or eliminate  the inefficiencies  and supervision  cost constraints
associated  with tenancy.
Therefore,  where  population  density  is very low, peasants  will establish  their own
farms in the bush and thereby  escape  paying  tribute, taxes  or rent to the overlord.  Extracting  tribute
under these conditions  requires  coercion. Or the utility  of the free peasant  must be sufficiently
reduced  so that they will offer themselves  voluntarily  as workers  or tenants  to holders  of large tracts
of land at wages, rents or crop shares  that provide  the same  level of utility as would  independent  self-
11cultivation. 3 Coercion  is no longer necessary.  Utility  can be reduced  by changing  the free peasants
access  to high quality  land. Large landowners  can also try to increase  the supply  of labor or tenants  to
their holdings  by Influencing  governments  to intervene  through  differential  taxation  of owners  and
workers  in large and small  holdings,  or by limitations  on market  access  that drive down  prnfitabillty
for independent  peasants  and thus reduce  the reservation  price of labor. Such economic  distortions
increase  the rent that goes to large-scale  farmers  at a cost to the economy  of lower  productive
efficiency.
When  peasants  can freely  establish  their own farms, It becomes  very difficult  to
operate  large farms  with hired labor under  a single  management.  With simple  technology,  there are
usually  no technical  economies  of scale (section  4). Lumpy  inputs  such as draft animals  provide  for
declining  economies  of scale at very small farm sizes.  For larger farms the same  draft-animal  and
driver combination  has to be repeated  several  times over, leading  to constant  technical  rets.
Disincentives  associated  with hired labor give  the family-operated  farm a cost advantage  over large
farms: for family  members,  there are no hiring costs, they  have greater incentives  to work than do
hired wage  labor because  they receive  a share of profits, and third, site-specific  learning  costs are
lower.
Renting  out entire  small farms  to sharecropper  families  (share  tenancy)  or granting
usufructuary  rights to peasants  in exchange  for tribute  allows  large landowners  to circumvent  many  of
the disincentive  effects  inherent  in large wage-based  faming and take advantage  of the tenant fmily's
labor. Share  tenancy  has some  incentive  costs of its own,  however,  (section  6) and even  under fixed-
rent tenancy  there are problems  of supervision  and moral  hazard.
Once  a labor supply  becomes  available,  large landowners  can organize  their
operations  either as landlord  esmas, with the entire  estate  culivated by tenanted  peasants,  or as
hacendas, with workers cultivating  portions  of the hacienda  for their own subsistence  as tenants  or
holders of usufructuary  rights  and providing  unpaid  cornie or labor services  to cultivate  the home-
farm of the owner  (see glossary).  Since  share  teonats  do not receive  their full marginal  product,
landlord estes  based on a lump-sum  rent payment  would  be the most efficient  form of operation,
followed  by landlord  estates  based  on share rents. The hacienda  would  be less efficient  since labor
3  Taking  into  acount any  risk  tduction t  lanoner  may  be able  to provide  as pat of the  barin.
12tenants  have few incentives  to invest, and landowners'  cultivation  of the home farm  entails  labor
supervision  cost. These  points  are more fully elaborated  now.
Coercion: As Boserup  (1965)  points  out, 'Bonded labor is a characteristic  feature  of
communities  with hierarchic  structure,  but surrounded  by so much  uncontrolled  land suitable  for
cultivation  by long fallow  methods  that it is impossible  to prevent  the members  of the lower  class
from finding  alternative  means  of subsistence  unless  they are made  personally  unfree' (p.73).  Four
ways  have  traditionally  been  used to tie labor to large farms: slavery,  serfdom,  indentured  labor
contracts,  and debt peonage.
Meillassoux  1981,  shows  that for merchant  slavery  in which  the slaveholders
purchase,  rather than capture  slaves,  they must  produce  for the market  to finance  the slaves.'  In areas
with sparse  populations  of hunters and gatherers  and with ties to external  markets,  such as in the
United  States'  Southeast,  the East Coast  of Brazil, and  the South  African  Cape, large  farms had to
import  slaves  as workers  (arrow 6)  The native  hunter-gatherers  were too few to provide  a steady
labor supply,  or simply  moved  away.  Large farms  in areas  with access to abundant  labor reservoirs
such as the sugar islands  of the Caribbean  and Mauritius,  Ceylonesfe  (Sri  Lankan)  and Assamese  tea
plantations,  Malaysia,  Sumatra,  and South  Africa  were able to rely on indentured  labor instead  of
slaves (arrow 7). lhe  workers  had to be indentured  to prevent  them for the period of indenture  at
least from establishing  plots of their own or going  into mining.  Laws and police  forces  were used to
enforce indentured  labor contract and to ensure  the recapture  and return  of escaped  slaves.  The
capital  cost of slaves, the cash  requirements  for recruiting  indentured  labor  frOm  distant  lands, and the
4  Mesailloux  also shows  that these systems  of merchant  slaery  were dependent  on systems
of aistocratic skvery which engaged  in the reproduction  of the slave  population  through
raids and warfare on widely  dispersed  subsistence-oriented  peasant  populations.  Domar
(1970) relates ownership rights in people - slavery and serfdom - to land abundance, which
makes  extrating residual  land rents impossible.  What he did not distinguish  is that slavery,
the purchase  of the labor force, requires  high levels  of capital, which can be financed  only if
there is a market, while serfdom  involve ex  tracting  tribute without  a purchase  transaction,
and so no market is needed.
5  For a discussion  of the transition  from slavery  to serfdom,  see Mesailloux  1991.
13absence  of cash markets  for food in fact implied  that these systems  could  be used only for crops that
bad an export market.'
Serfdom  or bendage  could  be used in somewhat  more densely  populated  regions  with
a settled  peasant  population  and production  primarily  for only local consumption  (arrow 5).7
Peasants  would  have had to move  to more marginal  lands  to escape  bondage. Slaves  could  not be
imported  because  there were no export earnings  with which  to purchase  them. Overlords  obtained  the
right to tie subsistence-oriented  populations  to the land and to extract  tribute  or labor services.  This
pattern arose  during feudal  periods  in Western  Europe,  China, and Japan, and pre- and post
columbian  America,  and survived  in Eastern  Europe  until the late nineteenth  century (Blum  1977).
Debt peonage  or bonded  labor, another  form of coercion,  survived  in many  areas
even under high population  densities.  Where  manorial  estates  had to compete  with mines  for labor
and therefore  faced acute  labor shortage,  as in Guatemala  and Mexico  in the nineteenth  century  or in
South Africa in the twentieth  century,  vagrancy  laws kept  a pool of potential  workers  in prison for a
variety of petty offenses  (see  table 1). In South  Africa farmers  could  invest in prisons  in exchange  for
rights to prison labor; these rights could  even  be traded.
Economic  distortions
Where  coercion  was no longer  possible,  or sufficient,  influential  groups  were able to
get governments  to intervene  to create  economic  distortions  that would  generate  a labor supply  for
their farms. Once  population  density  was  high enough  for long falow agriculture  to replace  hunting
and gathering,  peasants  would  establish  independent  farming  operations  in areas without  slavery  and
6  nTo temperate  zrn  of the AMericas  (Canada,  North  Estern  US,  Southern  Brazil,  and  Argentina)
ecwapd  slavey because  their producs  could  not be exportd  competitively  to temperate  zon Europe  unil the
advent  of the s  itmshp  and  the railroad  at a time  when  davery  had  gone out  of dyle. The  tropical  and
sbtopical crops  sugar,  cotton,  and  tobacco  facd no competition  in Europe  mankets.
7  Mesailloux (1991) also shows that these systems of merchan  slavery were dependent on
slaves for systems of aristocratic slaveiy which engaged in the reproduction of the slave
populbaon  through  raids and warfire on widely  dispersed  subsistence-onented  peasant
populapions.
14bondage.  With identical  technology  and a competitive  output market,  cultivation  of the home farm
with wage  labor would  not be competitive  with the free family  farm  because  of incentive
disadvantages  and labor supervision  costs.
To get free peasants  to move  to the manorial  estate  required  lowering  expected  utility
or profits in the free peasant  sector  in order to reduce  peasants'  reservation  utility  - expected  utility
from family  farming,  including  the risk attributes  of the corresponding  income  stream  - or shift their
labor supply  curve  to the right. This was achieved  through  four mechanisms:
Reducing  the land availablefor  peasant  cultivation  by allocating  rights to
"unoccupied'  lands  so that they  went to members  of the ruling class only and thus
confining  free peasant  cultivation  to infertile  or remote  areas with poor infrastructure
and market  access.  (rable 1 lists a variety  of cases  from all continents  in which  access
to high quality  land was restricted).  Farm  profits  or utility  on free peasant  lands  were
thus reduced  by the higher labor requirements  for producing  a unit of output  on poor
land, by increased  transport  and marketing  costs, and by increased  prices for
consumer  goods imported  to the region.
*  ItImposing  d5iferendoJ  taxation  by requiring  free peasants  to pay tribute, hut, head or
poil taxes (i  cash,  kind, or labor services)  while  often  exempting  workers  or tenats
in manorial  estates  or taxing  them at much  lower  rates. Such  systems  were used
widely  in Western  Europe  during the feudal  period,  in ancient  Japan, China, India and
the Ottoman  Empire,  and by all colonial  powers  (table  1). Tribute  systems  in Eastern
Europe  and Japan  survived  into the second  half of the nineteenth  century.  As long as
free peasants  can pay tribute  or taxes in kind or cash and have equal  access  to output
markets,  taxation  alone  may  be insufficient  to bring  forth a supply  of workers  or
tenants.  They were therefore  often  complemented  by output market  inventicas.
*  RestrIcting  market  access, by commonly  setting  up cooperative  or monopoly
marketing  schemes  that buy only from the farms  of the rulers. The  prazo system  in
Mozambique  combined  rights  to labor and tribute from peasants  with monopolies  on
inputs  and outputs.  In Kenya  the production  of coffee  by Africans  was prohibited
15Table 1:  Intervention to Establish and Suort  LargIe  Farms.
COUNTRY  LAND MARPT  VVENTIONS  TAXS  AND  TBRVENTIONS  IN LABOR AND
IOUTUIr  MA1S  , 
ASLA
Idia  (Norah)  LAnd rans fin  lot  entuy  Haced  system; 4th  cne  WC
Corece labor, from 2nd contr
Chin. (South)  LImitations  on pea  n  mobility;  caSO
Tax eneption  for swves; ca 300
Gentry exemption  from  es & labor srvices;  ea
1400
Jap  Ecludve  lnd  rights to developed wsteland; 723  Tribute exemption  for cleared and temple land; 700
Io  and Sumata  Ad  grant  to companies; 1870  Indentued labor. 19th cenuy
Culivation System; 19th century
iwpimnes  Lan  grSts to mostic  ler;  16th ce_y  Encomienda
Rimioato
Tax exemption  for hacienda  woren  ;  16th  cenatry
Sdri  Lhan  Land appropdration;  1840  aunation tax eonyt,  1818
Indenture  labor  19th century
EUROPE.
Pnusa  Land  rams; from 13th conuy  Monopoes  on millig  and alcobol
Retorictions  on hbor mobility, 1530
Land  form legisations; 17S0-180S
Ruwsa  lAnd  grAs;  from 14th  century  Resictions  on pe  mobility:
Service tem  ; IS65  - Exit fees;  1400/50
- Pobidden yea;  1588
- Bnerfwnt-  1597
- Tndabiliy  of secr  1661
Hoan farm w  pt from  taxata  1580
De  btpompge;  1597
Monopoly  on commee;  until  1830
S. AMERICA:
Chai  Land grant  (ereda  de  m);  16th ceouy  Eionends;  16th century
Labor  ervic  (Wt);  17th centy
bIport  dutis  on beef; 1890
Subidies to mechanizstiom 19S50i6
El Salvdor  Gra  of public land; 18S7  Vesnay  lws;  182S
dli  of commu  nd;  1882  Exenption from public an  miitary smo  for
___  ___  ___  ___  __  ___  __  _lu__  _l bandm  s end  thi  workers;  1647
uah  te  mala  Retlmen  of  dln  16t  centr  Cal  trute;  1540
Manmiento; ea 1600
Debtpeonago; 1877
Mexico  t  t  of lodis;  IS40  i  ;  1490
propratio  of com  _nal luand;  1  Trt  exemption for hacienda  worke  17th  c.
Dobt peongp;  1790
Rctu  of debtorn  to haciendas; 1843
Vagncy  lws  1877
Viceryai  of  Lad  gSant; 1540  Encomianda;  1530
hay  Resettlement  of Inian  (consr_gacla);  1570  Mhu:  Exemption  for hacienda  wokear, ISS0
rift  ad  expropriation of Inian  lad;  17dh  ceumry  Slavery of Africa;  1580
16AICAs
A  a  MMng;  co  1840  Tax  oxemption  fo worker on Eluopen fm;  1849
Land  gru  under ettlment  progms;  1871  Credit  proviskin  fow  vLP  -|"t  settlerc
'Sealers' law' 1873
Atoag  ndM  concesIons  to  uropeans;  1838,  1865  Slavery;  until 1880
Vaganq law;  1875
Egypt  (Ottoma)  Land  grns;  1840  Corve.  hbor, from 16th  centwy
Corv. exemption  for farm-workers;  1840.
Lan tax oxemption  for  lage badlords; 1856
Credit  and  mrketing ubsidie,  1920 ad  1930.
K|uR  Land  conwesions  to Europea; ca 1900  Hut nd  poll  tues; from 190S
No African  land  purchaus  outside  rcsot;  1926  labor Pase; 1908
Squatter  laws;  1918,  1926  and 1939
Restritions  on Africans'  maket acces; from 1930:
-Dual  price  sydem  for maize
- Quanine  and for" dstackig  for livestock
- Monopoly  markeoing  acato
- Prohibition  of African  export  crop  civation
Subsidies  to mechanizaton; 1940c
Sokotho  Caliphate  Ln  gmuns  to settler; 1804  Slavery;  19th  century
Malawi  Lan allotmen to Europea;  1894  Tax eduction fr  fam-wore;  ca 1910
Mozambique  Comprhendve  rights  to lse  under  prmo; 19th  Labor  tribute;  1880
csorry  Vagnucy  law; 1899
Aboiion of African  trade;  1892
Forced  cultivation;  1930
Sou  Africa  Native  rserve;  19th  ceonury  Slavery  and indentured  hbor, 19th  cenury
Pasud-commu  tenure  in eaves  1894  Resrooe  on Africn  mnobiii; 1911,  1951
Native  Lads Ac; 1912  Mono"  maren,  from 1930
-Demarcof  r  Prion labor.  ea 1950
- E_imion  of tenancy  Dirct and indirct subsid;  20th  cenuy
- Prohibition  of African  lnd purcase  outside
Tanayia  Lan gat  to setles,  1890  Hut  tax and corve requirements;  1896
Comnpulsory  cotton  production;  1902
Vagrancy  lw  (work  card); 20th  cenury
Exchlson  of Africans  from  cedit; 1931
.___  _  __  __  _  __  _  _  Markei  coops  to deprs  Africn  price; 1940
Zimbao  Roeerve; 1896  and 1931  Pdb  and  hut ta;  1896
Dscrimatinm again tnan_ ,  1909
M_oy  mar et  boards,  fiom 1924
- Dua price  systm in maime;
- Faced detockin  in livestock;  1939
outright  until the 1950s.  European  monopolies  on sales of tobacco  in Zimbabwe  and
Malawi  were directly  transferred  to large farms  after the countries  gained
independence.
17Coipning  agrlcidturalpublic  goods  and  services  (roads,  extension,  credit)  jo the
fawms  of the ruders  or subsidizing  these  farms directly  was another  means  of incaeasing
their profitability  relative  to peasant  farms.'
Sometimes  the four types  of distortions  were supplemented  by coercive  interventions
in the labor market - vagrancy  laws, debt  peonage,  and rural slavery  are examples  - to make it easier
to retain workers  or tenants  on manorial  estates.
Since  these four mechanisms  involved  legal or customary  rules backed  by the state,
they required  a coalition  between  the overlords  and the state. The combinations  of distortions  used to
establish  manorial  estates  under  conditions  of low population  density  have  been remarkably  similar
across  continents  and over time (table  1). The earliest  recorded  incidence  we found  was in the
Arthasastra  in the fourth  century  B.C. Once  members  of the ruling  group began  to establish  viable
aricultural production  geting enough  workers  for their estates  required  interventions  in more than
one market.  The most common  pattern  was to combine  restrictions  on land use with differential
taxaion. Groups with widely  different  cultures,  religions,  and ethnic  backgrounds  - Ottomans,  the
Hausa  and Fulani in Africa, the Fujiwara  in Japan, and all European  colonial  powers  - imposed  such
systems  on people  of the same or different  ethnic  backgrounds  when  faced with similar material
conditions. Material  conditions  of production  rather than culture  seem to have  led to the emergence
of the distortions.
Production relations on the manorial  estate
On both landlord  estates  and haciendas,  corvee,  all of part of the land is cultivated  by
peasants  under tenancy  contracts  or usufructuary  rights. In the hacienda,  the unpaid  labor  services  of
peasants  who hold usufruct  rights  to some  plots on the estate  is used to cultivate  the home  farm of the
owner. Corvee  may include  the services  of their draft animals  and plows. The labor services  of
tenants  constitute  all or a part of their rental  payments  for the use of the land.  Peasants  may  be free
to leave  the manorial  estate  or may  be bound  to it. Sometimes  peasants  receive  a wage  payment  in
In Zimbabwe,  Aficans had been  encouraged  to cultivate  maize  through  the  Master  Farmr Ptogrammi
h  lat 1920s  when  European  farmer  found  it more  profitable  to grown  tobacco  and cotton.  When  those
m  coliapsed  monopoly matketing  and dual  price  systems  were  introduced  and the Master  Farmer  Program
was  abandoned,  with  responsible  officials  publicly  declaring  that  they  had  never  intended  to "teach  the  Natives
to grw maiz in compedtion  with  European  producers  (Phimister  1988:235).
18addition  as part payment  for their labor. Often, the resident  labor force is complemented  by
seasonally  hired wage  workers.
The extreme  variation  in the names  and details  of these arrangements  and in their
local evolution  over time has long stood in the way  of comparative  analysis  in a single  theoretical
framework.  Yet common  elements  seem  clear.
Landlord  estates  were prevalent  in China,  Korea,  Japan, Eastern  India, Pakistan,  Iran,
Egypt and Ethiopia.  In many  colonial  environments,  it was easy for landlords  to restrict  peasants'
alternatives  and maintain  control  over land and labor and sometimes  over output  mark-ets.  Haciendas
emerged  as the predominant  form of manorial  estates  in Algeria,  Egypt, Kenya, South  Africa,
Zimbabwe,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Peru, and other countries  in Latin
America,  in the Philippines,  in Prussia  and other parts of Eastern  Europe.
The home  farm of the landlord  often  vastly  exceeded  the area actually  cultivated.  A
major  purpose  of the huge landholdings  was to restrict  the indigenous  population's  possibitities  for
independent  cultivation,  and much  of the land  remained  under  forest or fallow  or was devoted  to
extensive  livestock  grazing. At the height  of the feudal  period in Western  Europe  between  one-quarter
and one-half  of the total area on manorial  estates  was cultivated  by the owner  in the home farm. On
Latin American  and African  haciendas,  that share  was initially  a much  lower, one-tenth  (Palmer  1979;
Chevalier  1963).
Many historical  accounts  have  noted  the lack of competitiveness  and limited
profitability  of large-scale  cultivation  of home  farms  relative  to landlord  estates  in which  all land is
rented  out. Tbat relative  disadvantage  Is also confirmed  by a range  of quantitative  studies.  Records
for the eighteenth  and early nineteenth  centuries  show  that in all of the cases  investigated  hacienda
owners  in Mexico  would  have  been better  off by renting  out all of their land  at rents actually  paid by
tenants  rather than cultivating  their home  farms (Brading  1978).  Many  overlords  survived
economically  against  competition  from independent  producers  only because  of their access  to capital
markets  and large-scale  storage  of maize  which could  be sold at high prices in poor years (Florescano
1969).  The same  applies  to many  Chilean  and Peruvian  haciendas  in the sixteenth  and seventeenth
centuries  which  yielded  a return on capital  of about  4.5 percent,  considerably  below  the market  rate at
which  the overlords  borrowed  funds  to keep  up their living  standards.  They were able  to repay
mortgages  only because  of a rapidly  devaluing  currency  and the appreciation  of their land (Moerner
191973:204).  Labor productivity  and total production  on the patrons' plots were about  half that on
tenants' plots in Peru and one quarter  in Ecuador (Pearse 1975:91).
What explains  the total amount  of tribute, surplus,  or rent that could  be extracted
from the peasants  on the manorial  estate?  The predominant  explanation  for European  estates  was a
demographic-economic  model  based  on Malthus  and Ricardo  (see, for example,  Postan 1973;  Le Roy
Ladurie  1966, and 1985;  North and Thomas  1971;  Brenner  1985;  Holton 1977)  that relates  tribute
burdens  to relative  scarcities  of land and labor. Before  ruling groups  controlled  most of the land or
were able to coerce labor, attracting  or retaining  peasants  to manorial  estates  in areas  of low
population  density  required  that  peasants'  utility on the manorial  estate exceeded  their reservation
utility for subsistence  farming  in the bush or in areas  from which  they had to be induced  to emigrate.
In Europe  east of the river Elbe such terms usually  included  a grant of hereditary  usufruct  rights.
Initially,  most corvee  labor was devoted  to the construction  and maintenance  of infrastructure.
As long as population  densities  were low, corvee  requirements  had to be regulated
and enforced  by the state. But as rising  population  densities  and increased  land scarcity  reduced
peasant  mobility,  it became  possible  to increase  the amount  of tribute extracted  and to increasingly
rnsform that tribute into obligations  to work  on the landlord's  home farm Labor requirements,  of
two to three days a week  in feudal  Europe, nineteenth  century  Russia, Kenya  in 1918, and Central
and South  America,  began to rise with growing  land scarcity.  In Kenya,  corvde  requirements  for
squatters  and their families  had risen to five days a week  by the end of the colonial  period (Resident
Labor Ordinance  of Kenya, 1939).
This simple  demographic-economic  model  falls  to explain,  however,  why  European
regions reacted  so differently  to the plague-induced  declines  in population  in the fourteenth  century.
The associated  drop in tribute contrbuted  to the erosion  of serfdom  in Western  Europe, but led to the
reimposition  of serfdom  in Eastern  Europe. In the debate  over the demise  of feudalism  in Europe,
Bremner  (1976, 1982)  clearly  established  that economic  factors  such as population  density  and market
access alone are insufficient  to determine  the income  distribution  between  peasants  and lords in the
manorial  estate. At best, they determine  not the actual  amount  of tribute  or surplus  that could  be
extracted  from peasants  but rather the maximum  potential  amount The lords' success  in extracting
tribute depended  on their political  power  to claim  the land, monopolize  markets,  and control  the
movement  of peasants  relative  to the power  of peasants  to resist these efforts.
20Barganing  between peasants and  lords and  the distribution  of Income
The amount  of rent extracted  thus depended  on the outcome  of a bargaining  game, the
political  confli^t,  or the class struggle  over the definition  of 'property rights" in the widest  sense.
That means  that the cohesiveness  of the landlords  relative  to that of the peasants  and the success  of
the alliances  they could  forge - with the King, the bureaucrac),  other  production  sectors,  the fnancial
sector, and external  interests  - are central  to an analysis  of change  in the instruments  of surplus
extraction  to landed  classes.
In the bargaining  over the terms of income  distribution  between  peasants  and
landlords  on the manorial  estate,  two sets of issues  must be dealt with. One is to define  the admissible
set of property  rights and of coercive  or voluntary  exchange  relationships,  including  the instruments
used to enforce  such relationships.  ITis problem  includes  the ability  of overlords  to impose
restrictions  on peasant  mobility  and output  markets,  the broad  terms of legitimate  leases  (inheritable
usufruct,  long-term  leases, short-term  rental),  the forms  of rental  payment  available  (cash,  kind,
labor, fixed  rent, crop share)  and the sanctions  (eviction,  physical  punishment,  fines)  or instruments
that ca  be used to enforce  such changes.  The other is to determine  optimal  mix and level of use of
each  intrument for maximizing  surplus  extraction,  taking  the available  options  as given. Although
this question  is more amenable  to economic  analysis  than is the problem  of the admissible  set of
instuments, there has been little formal  modeling  of it, even  for environments  without  coercion  (see,
for example,  Carter  and Kalfayan  1990;  Carter and Zimmerman  1992;  and Sadoulet  1992).'
This second  problem  could  be set up as a bargaining  process  between  landlord  and
potential  tenants. The landlord  who maximizes  his income  or utility subject  to the tenant's reservation
utility consaint,  determines  the terms  of the tenancy,  the size of the tenant's plot, and the size of his
own  home farm according  to the following  considerations:  he can set the overall  rent burden  of the
tenat.  He can partition  the rent into corvde,  fixed  rent payments  in cash or kind, and crop shares,
9  Cintr and Kalfayam  (1990)  show  that the  combtion  of a labor  supevion  constrint and a wordng
capital  constaint can rsault  in the emergence  of tied labor  contracts.  Carter  and Zimmerman  (1992)  provide  a
dynamic  extension  of this  model  and demonsbta the emergence  of a number  of the salient  charateristics of
dual  agrian  societia aS  a conquace  of credit and labor  sipervion  problems.  Sadoulet  (X992)  explains  the
emergec  of labor  sorvice  teancy as  a device  adopted  by the ladlord in order to enfore an optimal  level of
nsurance  agpinst  deft  by te  tenant  in the case  of crop failure. Covaiance  of yields  between  the landlord's
hnorn  fatm and tenants'  plots is igored howevr. But in yar  of crop failure  the tenants'  labor  has no value on
tIe hom  faram  ether, and forcing  him to provide  it only leads  to extra supervision  costs. Sadoulet's  explanation
hereo  fails.
21each having  its own  incentive  problems.  He can choose  the amununt  of land allocated  to home farm
cultivation,  knowing  that incentives  are required  to bring for,"%  effort  and that supervision  is costly.
He can choose  the size of the plot allocated  to the tenants, knowling  that family  farms  provide  high
incentives  to produce  but may  lead tenants  to concentrate  on dt'wr  own  plot and not supply  sufficient
effort  for home  farm cultivation.
With peasants  free to leave,  the major constraint  faced by the landlord  is that he
cannot  drive the utility received  by his tenants  below  their reservation  utility  - the utility  they could
receive  working  in the free peasant  sector  outside  the manorial  estate  or in an urban labor market.
ITe tenant, for his part, can vary the labor effort  on his own farm  or leave  for frontier  areas,
indigenous  reserves,  or urban labor markets.  So even without  coercion  or the ability  to affect  the
reservation  utility, the landlord  seems  to have  an abundance  of instruments  for driving  the tenant
down  to his reservation  utility.  Without  further  restrictions  on the bargaining  problem, its solution
may  be indeterminate.
Constraints  on the bargaining  problem  imposed  by the state - restrictions  on peasant
mobility,  on the size of parcel  to be allocated  to peasants  in inheritable  usufruct,  or on the tribute,
rent and corvde  requirements,  for example  - can simplify  the structure  of the bargaining  problem  for
specific  historical  settings.  But  these outside  regulations  did change,  albeit  slowly,  in response  to such
forces  as population  densities  and political  conflict,  so,  they can not truly be regarded  as exogenous.
Thus the complexity  of the problem  remains.
Rent seeking, coaUtions  and conflict
The analytical  problem  becomes  even more complex  if it incorporates  rent seeking  or
surplus  extraction  through  efforts  to change  the set of instruments  available  to landlords.  A coalition
or class of landlords  can try to induce  the state  to manipulate  the reservation  utility of peasants  and
may succeed  if peasants  or workers  are poorly  organized  to resist the change.  We have  not found any
models  addressing  these choices  or game theory  problems  formally,  but the literature  is rich in
discussions  of changes  in the degree  of coerciveness  of the systems  and of changes  in other
instruments.  North and Thomas  (1971), for example,  in an informally  stated  bargaining  model,
analyze  thd choice  between  tribute in cash or kind and corvee  labor, suggesting  that corvee  was
preferred  over tribute in kind where  output  markets  were limited,  and the relative  prices of goods
22were highly  variable.  There are many other examples,  however,  of frontier  societies  without  external
markets  in which  tribute  was collected  in kind.
While  the bargaining  problem  has received  little formal  analysis,  manorial  systems
have sometimes  been interpreted  as the outcome  of an efficiency-enhancing  contract  between  peasants
and landlords:  the landlords  provide  protection  and other  public  goods  (which  are produced  with
economies  of scale and require  some  specialization)  in exchange  for tribute or rent (North  and
Thomas  1971, for example).  This is a plausible  interpretation  for land-abundant  settings,  where
tribute  rates or labor rents have  to be set low enough  to attract  immigrants.  However,  there are two
major problems  with this view.
First, it ignores  the asymmetry  between  contracting  parties  in access  to weapons,
laws, and public  investment  budgets.  The systematic  use of these instruments  throughout  history  has
depressed  the utility  of peasants  and workers  to far below  the reservation  utility  that would  obtain  in a
system  without  such symmetric  access.  Moreover,  there is little  doubt  that substantial  deadweight
losses  and dynamic  inefficiencies  have  been associated  with taxes and tribute, with inequalities  in
factor  ratios between  farming  sectors,  and with restrictions  on access  to credit  and output markets.
Second,  the contract  view ignores  the likely  competition  in rent seeking  between
landlords,  which  would  add to the deadweight  loss associated  with restrictions.  Competitive  rent
seeking,  the literature  shows,  is likely  to result in the dissipation  of the rent into such rent-seeking
costs  as competitive  armies, arsenals,  and fortiScations,  which  provide  no consumption  value.
Brenner  (1985)  argues  that at the height  of the feudal  period,  rents were completely  dissipated  into the
costs of competing  in the system.  Periodic  conflicts  over the right to extract  rent have  caused
destruction  and decline  in many  flourishing  kingdoms  and empires,  so the efficiency  characteristics  of
the contractual  system  are only third  or fourth best.
Conclusion
The major issue  in land  relations,  then, is the evolution  of the relationship  between
peasants  and landlords  over time. The best developed  literature  in this area relates  to the demise  of
the manorial  estate, corv6e,  and bondage  and the emergence  of capitalism  in Europe. Dobb (1976)
23interprets  the emergence  of capitalist  farming  and the loss of rights to tribute  as the consequence  of
increased  population  density  alone, while  Sweeney  (1976)  emphasizes  the role of increased  access  to
markets.  Brenner  (1985)  shows  that  these explanations  alone are inadequate,  arguing  the need to
introduce  the cohesiveness  of the two groups  and the strength  of the coalitions  they can form witk
lings or urban groups.  Holton  (1977)  also discusses  these  issues, as well  as broader non-economic
theories).  In particular,  Brenner  stresses  the importance  of the cohesiveness  of the peasant  community
in resisting  attempts  by the lords to increase  the instruments  available  to them or the intensity  of their
use.
3.  Success  and failure  in reform
How does the manorial  estate  disappear?  Again  Boserup  (1965)  explains  succinctly:
"Ibe process  by which  the feudal  landlord  tenure  [the manorial  estate]  is abandoned  may  take
different  forms: sometimes  the position  of the feudal  landlords  in relation  to the cultivators  is
weakened;  they  lose their power  over all or most of the peasants  and they end up as private  owners  of
their home farms only [figures  1 and 2, arrows 8, 10, and 11]. In other cases, the feudal  landlords
succeed  in their efforts  to completely  eliminate  the customary  rights  of the culdvators,  and they end
up as private  owners  of all the land  over which  they  had feudal  rights, whilst the cultivators  have
sunk to the status  of tenants-at-will.  England,  of course, is the classical  example  of this last kind of
development'  pp 79-87.  In transitions  of the first kind the peasants  end up with the land rent, while in
those  of the second  kind, the landlords  retain the rent.
Since land reform  involves  the transfer  of land rents from a ruling class to tenant  workers, it
is not surprising  that most largescale land reforms  were associated  with revolts  (Bolivia),  revolution
(Mexico,  Chile, China, Cuba, El Salvador,  Nicaragua,  Russia)  conquest  (Japan  and Taiwan),  or the
demise  of colonial  rule (Eastern  India, Kenya, Mozambique,  Vietnam,  Zimbabwe).  Attempts  at land
reform without  massive  political  upheaval  have  rarely succeeded  in transferring  much  of a country's
24land'° (Brazil,  Costa  Rica, Honduras)  or have done so very slowly  because  of a lack  of political
commitment  to provide  the funding  to compensate  owners  (see section  5).
The outcome  of land  reforms  has been conditioned  by three factors:  whether  the
system  was a landlord  estate  or a hacienda  system,  whether  reforms  was gradualist  with compensation
or took place all at once, and whether  the reform  was undertaken  in a market  or a socialist  economy.
We consider  the first two factors  in the context  of the third, the type  of economy.
Reform In market-based economies
Rapid  transition  from landlord  estates  tofamiyfaims  in a market  economy  (figure  2,
arrow 7) has led to stable systems  of productions  relations.  The organization  of production  remains
the same  family  farm system.  The only change  is that ownership  is transferred  from large landlords  to
tenants  who  already farm  the land and have  the skills  and implements  necessary  to cultivate  their
fields. Government  involvement  in the transition  has often  been  substantial  from a ceiling  on the size
of landholdings  and the amounts  to be paid for the land, to the establishment  of financial  obligations
of beneficiaries.  Many reforms,  that followed  this pate  provided  stronger  incentives  for tenant-
owners  to work and invest  in their farms  and led to increases  in output and productivity.  The
10  Horowitz  (1993)  models  land  reform  as the  outcome  of a Nash  bargaining  betwe  to  agents
representing  landed  elites and  the  poor. Eh  party  can  either  agree  to a reform  propoul  or iniiate 'revolt',
defined  as a lottery  over  the thr  outcomes  *victory  for te  rich', 'victory  for the  poor', and 'maintemane  of
the status  quo'.  The  power-stucture  which,  in the  cas of revolt,  determines  the  probabilities  for each  of hse
events  i  take to be exogenous  and  time-invariant.  his leads  to the  definiton  of a safe  rform  plan as tho
evolution  of landholdins  over  time  which  consitus a Nash  equilibum  in tie bargaing pm  betwee
lbdlord  and  pests  which,  at any  t  in tim, pvides  each  party  with  a level  of utility  at least  equal  to
teir expetod  udtliy  i  th  case  of revolt Horwitz  shows  that  in the  cas of risk  neuality (i) th  exdst  a
unique  safe  reform  juan  for every  initial  distrbution  of lanoldings whih can  entail  either  rediutionu  from
the rich  to the  J io or accum atio of land  by the rich;  (ii) for  any  given  power  st  r,  tho  extent  of land
asfer is tho  greatr of the  higher  of the  initial  imbalances  in landholdings;  (iii)  except  in pcial cases,  the
sfe  land  reform  plan  is a prolonged  process  con  sing of a sequence  of individual  reform  events rather  than  a
one-tme  rdistnbution. This  approach  is the first  formal  model  in which  the  depedence  of the  equilibrum
ladholding  pattemn  on the  power  stucture  is clearly  elaborated.  Ihe determinants  of power,  such  as coalitions
wi  third  groups  and  intemal  cohesiveness  are not  modeled,  however,  but  from  the model  it is clear  that
changes  in the  power  strcture (such  as the  changes  taing place  in many  parts  of the  world  after  1945)  and  the
insumets  available  to landlords  to reduce  peasants'  reservation  utility  will  have  major  implications  for th
stdbe land  distbutiao
25resulting  systems  have  had great stability.  Since  the end of World  War II, landlord  estates  in Bolivia,
large areas  of China, Eastern  India, Ethiopia,  Iran, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan  have been transferred
to tenants  in the course  of successful  land reforms.
Theoretically,  the productivity  gains  associated  with such reforms  come about  because
of improved  work and investment  incentives  associated  with increased  security  of tenure. These gains
may  be modest  if tenants  had to compensate  landowners  at near-market  prices, if security  of tenure
had already  been high, if cash-rent  contracts  had prevailed,  or if the disincentive  effects  associated
with share-tenancy  had been low as suggested  by Otsuka  and Hayami  (1988). Empirical  evidence
shows  that the reform  of landlord  estates  led to considerable  investment,  adoption  of new  technology
and increases  in productivity  (Callison  1983;  Koo 1968;  King 1977;  Dorner and Thiesenhusen  1990)
and that costs  to the government  of complementary  investments  supporting  the transition  in ownership
structure,  such as infrastructure,  housing,  training  in management  skills, were low because  the
structure  of the smallholder  production  system  was already  in place.
By contrast  with the relatively  smooth  transition  from landlord  estates  to family  farms,
reform  of hacienda  systems  has been very slow and difficult.  The outcome  has frequently  been the
emergence  of large owner-operated  Junker  estates  with greatly  increased  home  farm cultivation
(arrow 10). Junker estates  produce  a wide variety  of crops and livestock  products  using a hierarchy
of supervisors,  permanent  workers  who sometimes  are given  a house and garden  plot, and external
workers  hired on a seasonal  or daily basis. Junker  estates  are less specialized  than  plantations,  which
produce  and process a narrow  range  of crops (discussed  in section  4 on economies  of scale), and less
capital-intensive  than  large-scale  commercial  farms.
Expansion  of the landlord's  home  farm at the cost of land cultivated  by tenants  for
their own  use would  be associated  with losses  in efficiency.  Therefore,  rational  landowners  would  not
establish  Junker estates  unless  induced  to do so by such external  constraints  as the threat  of land
reform  or restrictions  on tenancy  designed  to protect tenants'  rights. Anticipating  such reforms,
landowners  often tried to reduce  their exposure  to expropriation  by evicting  tenants  who usually  are
the beneficiaries  of land reform. The lack of competitiveness  of Junker estates  with  the more efficient
smallholder  sector made Junker  estates  an unstable  form of production  relations  and led to intensive
lobbying  for protection  and for subsidies  to introduce  and expand  mechanization.
26By substituting  subsidized  capital  for labor, the Junker  estate  was transformed  into a
large-scale  mechanized  commercialfarn  (arrow 11) that no longer depended  on large amounts  of
labor. Intensive  mechanization  of large commercial  farms  reduces  the potential  for land reform  since
there are not enough  families  with farming  skills  and implements  available  on these capital  intensive
farms  to result in the establishment  of efficient  small  farms able  to rely on low-cost  family  labor. A
similar  result can be achieved  by converting  haciendas  or junker farms  to livestock  ranches,  which
requires  very little labor.
The early rounds  of land  reform  in Prussia  gave  freehold  property  rights  to hereditary
tenants, requiring  them  to services  give up one-half  to one-third  of their hereditary  land to the Junkers
r s compensation  for the loss of their corvee  services.  Fearing  that  further land  reform  would  include
tenants  at will or holders  of nonhereditary  usufruct  rights  the Junkers  evicted  many  of the remaining
tenants  and reverted  to cultivation  with hired labor.
In Latin America,  ever since  the Mexican  Revolution  in 1910, land reform
movements  have legally  enshrined  the principle  that land  belongs  to the tiller and that indirect
exploitation  of the land  through  tenants  constitutes  a cause  for expropriation.  The Brazilian  Land Law
of 1964  puts a low ceiling  on rental  rates and crop shares  and conveys  permanent  usufruct  rights to
tenants  after a few years  of tenancy  by protecting  them  from eviction.  Similar  provisions  exist in
some  land laws in Asia (Chuma  and associates  1990).  Restrictions  on tenant  cultivation  in South
Africa  had different  roots - they were imposed  to make tenancy  less attractive  to Africans  who were
needed  as workers  in the mines. Whatever  the motivation,  these legal restrictions  on tenancy  induced
owners  of haciendas  to evict their tenants  and to expand  home farm cultivation  with hired labor, or
shift to ranching,  which  requires  little labor, or to adopt  mechanization.' 1
That Junker estates  emerged  only in response  to pending  land  reform  and tenancy
restrictions  supports  the view that there are no technical  economies  of scale in unmechanized
"  deJanvry  and  Sadoulet  (1989)  argue  that  the  threat  of land  reform  and  their  ability  to lobby  in coition
with  the  urban  sector  for subsidies  and  provision  of public  goods  led  large  landowners  to mechanize  and  make
the transition from  haciendas  to large  mechaized  commercial  farms  in Colombia  (1961-68),  Ecuador  (1936-
57),  Peru  (1964-69),  Venezuela  (1959-70),  and  in Chile  (after  1972).  In  Ecuador,  two  separt  stages  can  be
distinguished.  Widespread  eviction  of tenants  and  the  formation  of Junker  estates,  until  1957  was  folowed  by a
period  of increased  emphasis  on the  family-farm  sector  together  with  widespread  mechanization  (1958-73).
27agriculture  and that the incentive  problems  associated  with supervising  hired or corvde  labor far
exceed  the efficiency  losses  associated  with long-term  whole-farm  tenancy  contracts.  To compete
successfully  with family  farms, Junker estates  had to find ways  to reduce  their labor costs or to
increase  their revenues.  Having  lost their rights to rent or labor services  from tenants  or workers,
landowners  often sought  to secure  rents from the expanding  urban and inJustrial  sectors  through  trade
barriers  and subsidies  for mechanizing  production  (de Janvry 1981).  Trade barriers, by banning  or
reducing  foreign  agricultural  competition  forced consumers  to subsidize  Junker estates  or commercial
farms. Examples  include  the German  Zollverein  at the end of the nineteenth  century  (Gerschenkron
1965),  tariffs  on beef imports  in Chile in 1987  (Kay 1992),  and selective  price support  to products
from large-scale  units in Kenya,  Zimbabwe,  and South  Africa (Deininger  and Binswanger  1993).
Subsidies  for mechanization  led to the transformation  of nearly  all Junker  estates  into mechanized
commercialfarms  (arrow 11). Huge sums were provided  either  through  direct mechanization
subsidies,  as in Kenya,  or through  cheap  credit, as in South  Africa,  Zimbabwe,  and virtually  all of
South  America,  where  real interest  rates were even  negative  (Abercrombie  1972).  Mechanization
eliminated  the need  to rely on hired labor and resulted  in widespread  tenant evictions  even in
countries  with cheap  labor - hardly an optimal  transformation  from a social  point of view.
In some  market  economies  baciendas  were converted  to communalfamiyfarm systems
(arrow 11). Communal  tenure was adopted  first in Mexico's  ejido system  and later, under land
reforms in Bolivia,  Zimbabwe,  and elsewhere.  Beneficiaries  were granted  inheritable  usufrucuary
rights, but constraints  on land sales and rentals  often prevented  using  the land  as cottateral  for credit.
Attempts  to provide  alternative  sources  of credit  tirough special  bansl or credit programs  proved
ineffective  (eath  1992;  World  Bank 15991).  In Mexico,  recent constitutional  amendment  legalizes
land rental and sales within all ejidos  and allows  each ejido  to remove  restriction  on sales to
outsiders, by a majority  vote, effectively  converting  the ejidatarios  to owner-operated  family  farms.
Reforms In sodalast economies
Reform  in socialist  economies  (figure  2, arrows 10, 11, and 12) has followed
different  paths. Landlord  estates  in the former  Soviet  Union, Vietnam,  and China were initially
converted  intofamilyfarms (arrow 10), in much  the same way as in market  economies.  Ihe
redistrnbuted  farmlands  were later consolidated  into single management  units or collectives  (arrow
2813), In which  land is owned  and operated  jointly, under a single  management.  Families  do not operate
their own  plots as they do in systems  of communal  ownership.
In Algeria,  Chile,  East Germany,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua,  and Peru, Junker  estates
or large  commercialfanns  were converted  directly  into state  farms (arrows 14 and 15). In most
cases, workers  continued  as employees  under  a single  management,  with no change  in internal
production  relations.  Over time, the organizational  differences  between  collectives  and state farms
tended  to disappear.
A desire  to maintain  presumed  economies  of scale in production  and related  activities
(input  supply,  marketing)  or to educate  the beneficiaries  of reform  during  a limited  transitional  period
(Chile),  motivated  the establishment  of collective  and state farms. But to achieve  efficient  production
collecives have  to deal with  two incentives  problems.  One is to provide  incentives  to workers,  a
problem  addressed  by the adoption  of piece-rate  remuneration  systems  designed  to reward  labor at
least  partially  on the basis  of effort.  Even  where members  of collectives  were not able  to divert effort
to private  plots, lack of incentives  and of disciplinary  measures  by central  management  led to serious
labor shortages  following  the transformation  of private  into collectively  owned  farms in Cuba
(MacEwan  1981)  and Nicaragua  (Enriquez  1992).
The other incentive  problem  concerns  investment  and savings  decisions,  which  are
made  jointly by the colective. Bonin  (1985)  shows  that as long as equity  financing  is precluded  and
members  cannot  market  their share  in the cooperative,  the representative  worker  will not make
efficient  investment  decisions.  Mitchell  (1990)  also examines  problems  associated  with  the
intertemporalallocation  of consumption  and shows  that the distribution  of decision-making  power
between  old (who  would  rather consume)  and young  (who  prefer  to invest)  determines  the rate of
growth  for a cooperative  enterprise.  Successfil  collectives  tend to degenerate  into capitalist  enterprises
(or wage-labor-operated  state farms)  by successively  substituting  cheaper  wage  laborers  for more
expensive  members  (Ben Ner 1984).  McGregor  (1977)  provides  a theoretical  justification  and
empirical  examples  of the tendency  of cooperative  enterprises  to disinvest  and to reduce  membership
in order to increase  current  consumption  by members. Barham  and Childress  (1992)  showed  that
Honduran  collectives  decreased  their membership  over time by about  one fifth.  Thus, the problems
associated  with prvision of workers' effort  and intertemporal  consumption  proved at least as serious
29in collectives  as in haciendas  (Bonin  and Putterman  1986;  Putterman  1989).  The poor performance  of
agriculture  under a collective  mode  of production  is well documented  and It is not surprising  that  the
expected  increases  in production  from economies  of scale were not usually  realized  (see, for example,
Colburn 1990  for Nicaragua;  Ghai,  Kay, and Peek 1988  for Cuba;  Ghose 1985,  Wuyts 1982, and
Griffin  and Hay 1985  for Ethiopia  and Mozambique,  Lin, 1990  for China). Once  given  the chance  to
do so, members  of collective  farms often  voted  to redistribute  plots to family-szed  farms.' 2 True
economies  of scale would  induce  economically  rational  farmers  to establish  collective  forms of
production  (Putterman  and Giorgio  1985). In the absence  of other  possibilities  of insurance,
collective  forms of production  would  be chosen,  due to the implicit  insurance  they  provide against
noncovariate  risks, even  in the absence  of economies  of scale (Carter 1987). However,  cooperative
production  does not insure  against  covariate  risks. Empirical  evidence  indicates  that social  ties may
be a less costly  way  to insure  against  risks that are not covariate  (Walker  and Ryan 1990).
In China, agricultural  output in the first six years  after decollectivization  in 1978  grew
by 42 percent, with most of the growth  attributable  to the change  in production  organization  (Lin
1992, Fan 1991, McMillan  et al. 1989,  Nolan 1988).  Vietnam  experienced  similar  productivity  gains
from breaking  up large unmechanized  collective  farms into tiny family  units (Pingali  and Xuan 1992).
The small family  farms in these densely  populated  countries  expanded  the labor input and were able
to reduce  machinery  and ferdlizer  use. Clearly,  the incentive  advantages  of individual  farming
outweighed  any efficiency  losses due to the exremely small size and fragmentation  of farms
(Wenfang  and Makeham  1992).
Under different  conditions,  as in Algeria  and Peru (Melmed-Sanjak  and Carter 1991),
the privadzation  and breakup  of mechanized  state farms  or collectives  has been less successful.
12  Ortega (1990) offers  quantitative  evidence  for the decline  of the collective  sector  dtoughout Latin
America. In Pemu,  tho absence  of economies  of scale led reform  bendiciaes  to effectively  subdivide  reform
colloctives  by cncentaing  effort  on their private  plots and to ptess for legal subdivisions  and individual  land
titles (Kay 1983;  Horton 1972; McClntock 1981).  Collctivas failed  in Zimbabwe  and were soon  abandoned  in
favor of a smallholder-oriented  strategy  (Weiner  1985).  Similrly, colectives  failed in the Dominicam  Republic
and were replaced  by cooperatives,  with individually  owned  plots (Meyer  1991).  Land  reform  cooperatives  in
Panama  are highly  indebted  and use labor  far below  profit-maximing lvels  (ie  1987).  Algerian
production  cooperatives  experienced  low  pductivity  membership  dsertion, high ue  of mnion,  and
cnderable  underemployment  of the workforce  (Pfeiffer  1985;  Trtman  1985).  The same  patten of declinig
output  and transformation  into a 'collective  Junker  estate' has been  observed  in Mozambique  (Wuyts  1985).
30Mechanization  of these large farms  had occurred  and had reduced  the number  of workers  or tenan
before their collectivization.  When these  collectives  were turned  over to their relatively  few remaining
workers,  the resulting  family  farms were relatively  large and unlike  in China and Vietnam  could  ant
be operated  efficiently  without  additional  hired workers  or high levels  of mechanization.  But hiring
additional  workers  dilutes  the incentives  advantage  of the family  farm, and the farms  had neither  the
access  to subsidized  credit  nor the large amounts  of equity  needed  to finance  hired labor or the
mechanization.  To make reform  work  under these  capital-constrained  conditions  and reap the
efficiency  benefits  of family  farming  may  require including  more  beneficiary  families  in the reform
program  than those  employed  on the highly  mechanized  farms, by resettling  landless  or near landless
workers  from outside  the farms  (Part III).
The social cost of delayed  reform: revolts and dvil wars
Maintaining  an agricultural  structure  based  on relatively  inefficient  hacienda  systems
is cosdy.  In addidon  to the static  efficiency  losses"  there are dynamic  efficiency  losses  associated
with the reduced  profitability  of free peasant  cultivation  and the accompanying  lack of incentives  to
invest  in physical  and human  capital  in the sector. Ihen there are the resource  costs  used in rent-
seeking  to create and maintain  the distortions  that support  the large farms  and contribute  to rural
poverty  and inequality.  In a competitive  rent-seeking  equilibrium  these costs  are equal  to the rents.
The distortions  reduce  employment  in the sector, imposing  an equity  cost. Finally,  the social  costs of
failing  to reform  have  often included  peasant  uprisings  and civil war.
Consider  Brazil, where  the social costs  of continued  massive  distortions  in favor  of
large farms have  been substantial  (Binswanger  1991)  even  without  violence.  Between  1950  and 1980,
agricultural  output  grew at a remarkable  4.5 percent  a year, land area expanded  at 1.5 percent  a year,
but agricultural  employment  grew at only 0.7 percent  a year. Over that period, the large-scale  farms
evicted  most of their internal  tenants  and workers,  many  of whom  migrated  to urban slums or ended
up as highly insecure  seasonal  workers  without  farming  skills.  An alternative  growth  path based  on
13  Quantitaive  estimates  of this  efficiency  los amr  scare,  but Loveman  (1976)  estimate  that Chile  could
have  saved  roughly  $100  million  a year in agricultual  imports  during 1949-64  had the  40 percet of land left
Ucutiva  byw  l  ndlords  be  cutimVated
31smaller  family  farms could  have  provided  rural employment  and self-employment  opportunities  for
many of these  people  and gainfully  absorbed  a substantial  share  of the rapidly  growing  population.
In most cases,  protracted  and violent  struggles  have  significantly  reduced  the
performance  of the agricultural  sector and the economy  as a whole. While  peasants  have rarely been
the initial  protagonists  in radical  class struggles  or revolutionary  movements  many revolutionary
movements  took refuge in remote areas  of limited  agricultural  potential  - sometimes  designated
"communal  areas", "reserves",  or "homelands"-  where  peasants  have provided  both active and passive
support  for guerrilla  fighters.  Many analysts  have emphasized  the important  role of peasant  discontent
in incidents  of regional  and national  violence  (Moore 1966;  Wolff  1968;  Huizer 1972;  Migdal 1974;
Scopol  and Scott 1976;  Christodoulou  1990;  and Kriger 1991).  The losses from such conflicts  are, of
course,  difficult  to measure,  but some  notion  of their magnitude  can be gauged  from the duration  and
intensity  of such struggles  as these cases  show:
*  In Mozambique,  peasants  escaped  from forced  cultivation,  vagrancy  laws, and forced labor to
inaccessible  rural areas, which  were the main centers  of support  for the Frelimo  guerrillas
from 1961  until independence  in 1975. (Isaacman  & Isaacman  1983).  Land reforms  which
were initiated  after independence,  however,  resulted  in highly mechanized  collective  farms
and did not address  the problems  of the freehold  sector. Violence  continues  to this day.
e  In Zimbabwe  large scale eviction  of some  85,000  families  from European-owned  farmlands
during 1945-51,  led to a general  strike among  Africans  in 1948  and provided  the basis for
peasants'  support  of ZANU (Zimbabwean  African  National  Union)  guerrillas  in 1964,
(Mosley  1983;  Ranger 1985;  Scarritt 1991  and Kriger 1991).  Guerrilla  fighters  took up the
peasants'  grievances  over unequal  distribution  of land and state interference  with production
and used the TIbal Trust Areas as bases to attack European  farms. While  a substantial
settlement  program after independence  provided  land to Africans,  a number  of shortcomings
limited  the success  of this program  (see Binswanger  and Deininger  1993). Policy  distortions
remained  in place  despite evidence  that large farms are not more efficient  than small holder
farmers  (Masters  1991)  and land  reform continues  to be a major political  issue.
32*  In Guatemala,  communal  lands  were In effect  expropriated  in 1879  by a law giving
proprietors  three months  to register  land titles after which  the land would  be declared
abandoned.  Most of the "abandoned"  land was then allocated  to large coffee  growers.
Redistribution  attempts  in 1951-54  were reversed  following  a military  coup in 1954, when
virtually  all the land  which  had been  subject  to land  reform  was returned  to the old owner  and
farms expropriated  from foreigners  were allocated  in parcels  averaging  more than 3,000
hectares  (Brockett  1984).  Since  then, there has been a repeated  pattern  of suppressinn  and
radicalization  of resistance.  Suppression  of the cooperative  movements  of the 1960s  led to
formadon  of the guerrilla  army  of the poor (EGP)  in 1972, with Its main  base in Indian
highlands.  Peasants  responded  to a wave  of government-supported  assassinations  in 1976  with
the formation  of the committee  for peasant  union  (CUC)  in 1978. Government  massacres  of
protesting  peasants  followed  (Davis  1983).  Almost  40 years  after the first  attempt  at reform,
continuing  peasant  demonstrations  signal  the cost of failure.
*  Smatlholder  land in El Salvador  was similarly  appropriated.  A decree  of 1856  stated  that all
communal  land not at least two-thirds  planted  with coffee  would  be considered  underutilized
or idle, and would  revert to the state. Communal  land tenure  was abolished  in 1888. Sporadic
revolts  led to such  countermeasures  as the 1888  "security  tax" on exports  to finance  rural
police  forces, a 1907  ban on rural unions,  and the creation  of a National  Guard  in 1912
(McClintock  1985).  Areas where  land  pressutes  were particularly  severe emerged  as centers
of the revolt of 1932,  during  which  some 10,000  to 20,000  peasants  were killed  (Mason
1986).  Guerrillas  promising  land and other agricultural  reform  gained  considerable  support  in
rural areas in particular  following  tenant  evictions  in the cotton  growing  lowlands  during
1961-70.  Ihese evictions  led to a 77 percent  decline  in the houseplots  available  to tenants  as
the number  of tenants dropped  from 55,000  to 17,000.  Violence  continued  to escalate  until
1979, when reform-minded  officers  engineered  a coup and introduced  land reform  in an
attempt  to preempt  a shift in popular  support  to the FMLN-FDR  guerrilla  forces. Narrow
eligibility  rules sharply  limited  the number  of beneficiaries  of land reforms  and more than a
decade of civil war ensued.  'he  peace  accord  of 1992  mandates  additional  land reform.
*  Colombia  also demonstrates  the perils  of incomplete  land reform. Conflicts  over land  between
tenants  and large-scale  farmers  at the frontier  escalated  from isolated  local attacks  in the early
331920s  to more coordinated  tenant  actions  by the late 1920s.  While  various  kinds of reform
legislation  were considered  during  the 1930s,  the law finally  passed  in 1936  vested rights in
previously  public  lands  *ith large landlords  rather than the tenants  cultivating  the land (Le
Grand 1982).  A series of tenant  evictions  followed,  leading  to a quarter century  of violence
(1940-65)  during which  guerrillas  recruited  support  from peasant  groups. Land reform
legislation  in 1961  and 1968  regularized  previous  land invasions  but did nothing  to improve
the operational  distribution  of land  holdings  and far fewer  peasants  benefitted  from the
reforms  than had previously  been evicted  (Zni.osc 1989).  Peasant  land invasions  intensified
during  the early 1970s,  leading  to the declaration  of a state of emergency  after 1974. Regional
mobilizations,  strikes, and blockades  flared  up again in 1984, indicated  that the conflict  is not
yet resolved.
Much of the rural support  for the Shining  Path guerillas  in Peru can be traced  to the exclusion
of most of the highland  Indians  from agricultural  bUnefits  and the benefits  of agrarian  reform
of 1973  which  benefitted  primarily  the relatively  few workers  in the coastal  area. As a result,
more than half the departments  in  ae country  have become  virtually  inaccessible  to
government  forces (McClintock  1984),  and public  investment  in these  regions  halted, inducing
further economic  decline  and large-scale  migrations  to the cities, thus exacerbating  social
tensions  and conflicts.  Poor economic  management  during  the 1980s  and continued  activity  by
Shining  Path have  led to capital  flight  and economy  wide decline.
Other countries  that  have experienced  prolonged  conflicts  over land include  Angola,
ChUle,  and Nicaragua.  While  the policies  that created  and maintain  dual land  ownership  distributions
do not necessarily  lead to violent  struggle  - other intervening  factors  are likely to be important  - they
clearly  played  a significant  role in many  cases.
PART  U.: ANALYTIC  CONTROVERSIES
The first question  which  is central  to the analysis  of past and future  reforms  in
grculura  land relations  is: Are junker estates  and large mechanized  farms  economically  more
efficient  than smaller,  family-operated  holdings?  The answer  is important  because  if they are not,
34equalizing  the ownership  distribution  or breakig  up collective  or state farms Into  family  farms would
enhance  both efficiency  and equity. In examining  the relationship  between  farm size and
productivity,  we look first  at the sources  of economies  of scale: economies  of scaIe  in processing
plants  that are transmitted  to the farm and generate  wage  plantations,  lumpy  inputs  that cannot  be
used below  a certain  minimum  level such as farm  machinery  and management  skills, and advantages
in the credit  market  and in risk diffusion  arising  from larger ownership  holding  (section  4). We then
summarize  the empirical  findings  on scale economies  and diseconomies.
This leads  to the second  central  question  for land reform: if, as we find, large operational
holdings  are usually  inefficient,  why  do large landowners  in market  economies  not rent to family
farmers (section  6)? Tbe rental  market  has historically  been the most important  mechanism  to
circumvent  the diseconomies  of scale  associated  with large ownership  holdings  despite  the incentive
ssues  associated  with tenancy  and sharecropping  which  are reviewed  in Section  6.  Yet the history of
land reform  shows  that long-term  rental  of entire  farms  often implies  a high risk of loss of land to
tenants, and long term tenancy  is no longer  an option. Short-term  rental of parcels  of land cannot
create  small family-operated  holdings.  But if tenancy  is no longer an option,  what prevents  the land
sales markets  from bringing  ownership  holdings  in line with  the optimal  distribution  of operational
holdings? Our analysis  in Section  5 shows  that it is the result of imperfections  in other markets,
brought  about  by land-credit  likagtes and  policy  distortions.
4.  Fsrm  Size and Productivity
Economies  of scale In processing
Plantations  have historically  been  established  to produce  specialized  export crops in
areas of extreme  land-abundance  and therefore  have  had to import  slaves  or indentured  labor. But
even after the abolition  of slavery  or indentured  labor, wage  plantations  survived  in selected  crops as
highly  specialized  large ownership  holdings  using  hired labor to produce  a single cash crop. Most
workers  lived in labor camps  on these wage  plantations  and had no subsistence  plots of their own  to
cultivate.
35Labor is the largest  component  of total costs. Grigg (1974)  and Courtenay  (1980)
discuss  how  the ability to use labor nearly  year-round  favored  the organization  of production  of these
crops under  plantations,  rather than  with tenants  or outgrowers. Tree crops such as oil palm, rubber,
and tea have  the most even  demand  for labor. Labor demand  is more seasonal  for sugar and coffee,
although  irrigation  (for sugar) or specific  processing  (for coffee)  can help even out demand.
Wage-based  plantations  continue  to exist  for tne typical  plantatdon  crops - sugarcane,
bananas,  oil palm and tea because  of another  technical  characteristic.  Economies  of scale arise from
the processing  or marketing  stage rather than in the farming  operations  and are transmitted  to the
farm because  of the need to process  the crops within  hours  of harvesting  (Vnswanger  and
Rosenzweig  1986). Only  for these crops can wage  plantations  compete  with smallholders  without
relying  on coercion  to acquire  labor.
Economies  of scale in processing  alone  are not a sufficient  condition  for plantations.
The sensitivity  of the timing  between  harvesting  and processing  is crucial.  Easily  stored  products  such
as wheat or rice can be bought  at harvest  time in the open market  and stored for milling  throughout
the year. Therefore,  the economies  of scale  in milling  are irrelevant  for the organization  of the farm.
In the case of sugarcane,  by contrast,  harvesting  and processing  must be carefully  coordinated.  If cut
cane is left unprocessed  for more  than a day, much of the sugar is lost to fermentation. And to keep
the expensive  capital  stock  operating  throughout  most of the year processing  cane into sugar, cane
must be planted  at different  times of the year, even  at times when the sugar yield is not at its
maximum.  Independent  farmers  would  be unwilling  to plan cane during  those  times without
compensation.  One way  to circumvent  this problem  is for sugar factories  to run their own plantations,
with a single manager  who  decides  on the tradeoffs  between  harvesting  cane  at suboptimal  times and
leaving  the capital  stock  idle. Another  way  is contracfarming (Hayami  1992;  Glover 1990).
Contracting  with small farmers is widespread  throughout  India, Thailand,  and elsewhere  where
sugarcane  was introduced  into an existing  smallholder  system.
Production  of bananas  is another  ecample  of the coordination  problem.  Mature
bananas  must be put into a cold  boat within 24 hours  of harvest,  an immense  challenge  for the
plantation  and shipping  company.  Coordination  is required  to ensure  that the boat will arrive when the
bananas  are ready to be shipped  and that a boat can be flled when it arrives,  - for that reason, some
36of the world's largest  owner-operations  are banana  companies  whose  holdings  include  dozens  of
plantations  operated  by hired managers  and workers. In Central  America,  when  legislation  made it
more difficult  for multinationals  to own plantations,  the major  banana  companies  increased  their
supplies  by buying  from contract  farms.  These farms  typically  have  hundreds  of hectares  and their
contracts  are so tight that they virtually  remain  managed  by the multinationals  (Ellis 1985).
Similarly,  rapid deterioration  of the harvested  product  together  with economies  of
scale in processing  are the main  factors  leading  to the continued  cultivation  of tea and oil palm on
plantations.  Thus the superiority  of the plantation  depends  on a combination  of economies  of scale In
processing  with  a coordination  problem.  Plantations  do not arise  - or do not survive  once labor
coercion  is abolished  - unless  both these conditions  exist. Bananas  for local and national  markets,
which  are supplied  by individual  trucks  requiring  little coordination,  are supplied  by family  farms all
over the world. Similarly,  traditional  unrefined  forms  of sugar such as muscovado  in Central
America,  where  processing  did not involve  economies  of scale, were produced  by family  farms even
in economies  dominated  by sugar plantations.  In many  countries  coffee  and rubber are also cultivated
undaer  smallholder  systems.  They have  lower  capital  requirements  for processing  than do sugarcane,
tea, or oil palm, and therefore,  have  a smaller  optimal  cultivated  area associated  with a single
processing  unit. Despite  their even labor  demand  over the year,  the plantation  mode  of production
has therefore  declined  sharply  at the expense  of smallholder  production.
The different  outcomes  for plantations  following  the abolition  of slavery  also support
the combination  hypothesis.  United  States  cotton  and tobacco  plantations  which  had no coordination
problem,  abandoned  large-scale  cultivation  and rented  the land  out to their former  slaves, creating
landlord  estates  (arrow 17). The same  thing  happened  in Latin  America,  except  that some  farms
became  landlord  estates  and some  haciendas  (arrows 16 and 17). Slave-perated  sugar plantations  in
the Caribbean  and South America,  however,  converted  to wage  plantations  (arrow 15). There are, of
course, other factors  at work  as well determining  what  precise  pattern  of production  relations  results
after slavery  is abolished.  Klein and  Engerman  (1985)  distinguish  three patterns  according  to relative
lad  abundance  and the presence  of government  intervention.
Today,  wage  plantations  survive  in areas where  they  were first established  under
conditions  of low population  density  and with a large land grant. Where  the same  crops were
37Introduced  into existing  smallholder  systems,  contract  farming  prevails.  Processors  seem  not to have
found it profitable  to form plantations  by buying  out smallholders  and offering  them wage  contracts.
This suggests  either  that the coordination  problem  associated  with plantation  crops can be solved at a
relatively  low cost by contract  farming  or that imperfections  in land  sales markets  are so severe  that it
is prohibitively  expensive  to create  large ownership  holdings  by consolidating  small  farms (section  5).
Lumpy inputs
Draft animals  for plowing  were the first lumpy  input in agriculture.  Because  of the
difliculty  of farming  using rented  draft animals  (Binswanger  and Rosenzweig  1984),  smdl1  farmers
who lose their draft animals  frequently  rent out their land  until they can acquire  new animals  (Jodha
1984).  Farm  machinery  - threshers,  tractors, combine  harvester  - are much lumpier  than draft
animals.  Tractors and  harvesters  reach their lowest  cost of operation  per unit area at a much  larger
scale  than do draft animals,  so the optimum  operational  farm size rises with their introduction.  Karl
Marx and his followers  believed  that the economies  of scale associated  with agricultural
mechanization  were so large as to make  the family  farm obsolete.  Yet  small owners  can rent out their
land to larger operators  (consolidators)  rather than sell it, as the ejidatarios  in irrigated  areas  of
Mexico  have  often done. So the initial  economy  of scale  associated  with machines  does not imply that
reverse  land reform  is needed  in areas  with many small  ownership  holdings.
Machine  rental can permit  small farms to circumvent  the economies  of scale
advantage  associated  with machines  in all but the most time-bound  of operations,  such as seeding  in
dry climates  or harvesting  where climatic  risks are high, where  farmers  compete  for first service  and
therefore  prefer to own  their own  machines.  ' But threshing  can be done at any time of the year and
as in European  agriculture  in the late nineteenth  century,  the expansion  of stationary  threshers  in
developing  countries  today  reflects  a well  developed,  efficient  rental  market. Harvest  combines  are
often rented in the developed  and developing  world. Most Midwestern  U.S. farmers  rent them  from
operators  who foliow  the progress  of the harvest  season  from Oklahoma  to Canada.  Tractors  too are
widely  rented  out for plowing  to small farmers  in Asia, Africa, and Latin  America,  but the markets
14  BinsuwaWr  and  Rosenzweig  (1986)  discuss  the  limits  to  natal  markets  impsed by moa hazard  snd
msonality.
38are not as problem  free as those  for threshers  (World  Bank  1984).  Rao's (1975)  analysis  of India,
shows  that small  farms' productivity  advantage  over large farms  initially  disappeared  following  the
introduction  of tractors  in Northwest  India, but once  the size of operational  holdings  was adjusted
upwards,  the smaller  farms  re-emerged  with  higher  productivity  rates.
Tbus, the economies  of scale associated  with machines  increase  the minimum  efficient
farm size, but by less than expected  because  of rental  markets.  The use of draft animals  and machines
- lumpy  inputs  - leads to an initial segment  of the production  function  that exhibits  increasing  returns
with operational  scale, but these  technical  economies  would  vanish  when  farm size is increased  by
replicating  the optimal  scale  of lumpy inputs  or when rental  markets  make  the lumpiness  of machines
irrelevant.  Under  constant  technical  returns  to scale  and with perfect  markets  for land, capital,  and
labor,  the ownership-distribution  of land would  be irrelevant  for production  and would  only affect  the
distribution  of income.  Landowners  would  either  rent the necessary  factors  of production  (abor and
capital)  and make zero profits  operating  their own holding  or, if there were transaction  cost. in the
labor market,  rent in or rent out land to equalize  the size of operational  holdings.
Management  skUls  like  machines,  are an indivisible  and lumpy input, so the better the
manager,  the larger the optimal  farm size. Technical  change  strengthens  this tendency:  fertilizers  and
pesticides  - and arranging  the financing  to pay for them - require  modern  management  skills. So does
the marketing  of high-quality  produce.  In an environment  of rapid technical  change,  acquiring  and
processing  information  becomes  more and more important,  giving  managers  with more formal
schooling  and technical  education  a competitive  edge  in capturing  the innovator's  rents.
Therefore,  optimal  farm sizes tend to increase  with more rapid technical  change.
Some  management  and technical  skills, like machinery,  can be contacted from specialized  consultants
and advisory  services  or provided  by publicly  financed  extension  services. Contract  farming  often
involves  the provision  of technical  advice.  But key farming  decisions  and labor supervision  cannot  be
bought  in a market.  So limits  on management  skills  will lead  to an upward  sloping  segment  in the unit
cost curve as operational  holding  size increases.
Access  to credit and risk diffusion
39Land, because  of its immobility  and robustness,  has excellent  potential  as collateral,
making  access  to credit easier for the owner  of unencumbered  land (the issue is discussed  In detail in
section  5). Rural credit markets  are difficult  to develop  and sustain.  There is therefore  severe
rationing,  which  can be partly relieved  by the ability  to provide  land  as collateral.  The high
transaction  costs of providing  formal  credit  in rural markets  implies  that the unit costs of borrowing
and lending  decline  with loan size. Many  commercial  banks do not lend to small farmers  because  they
cannot  make a profit. Raising  interest  rates on small loans  does not overcome  this problem,  since it
eventually  leads to adverse  selection  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss 1981).  For a given  credit  value, therefore,
the cost of borrowing  in the formal  credit  market is a declining  function  of the amount  of owned  land.
Land ownership  may serve  as a sign of creditworthiness  in informal  credit  markets  as well.
Access  to credit is particularly  important  in developing  countries  because  they usually
lack other intertemporal  markets  to insure  against  crop or price risks. Insurance  is sometimes
available  for very narrowly  defined  specific  risks such as hail or frost, but only for very large farms.
Forward  markets  are often banned  or discouraged  by policy  intervention.  An interested  local insurer
would  have enough  information  to overcome  the moral hazard  problem,  but the covariance  of crop
yields  makes  the risk uninsurable  at the local level. A national  insurer could  overcome  the covariance
problem,  but lacks  the local information  to overcome  the moral hazard  problem.  The absence  of a
market  for multi-risk  crop insurmce is the result of the combination  of moral hazard  and the local
covariance  of production  risk. The absence  of crop insurance  and forward  markets  confers  special
importance  on access  to credit  as an insurance  substitute,  but the combination  of covariance  and moral
hazard  also sharply reduces  the potential  of financial  intermediation  in rural areas (Binswanger  and
Rosenzweig  1986).
Providing  funds to overcome  emergencies  is a common  function  of informal  rural
credit markets.  But the amounts  small farmers  can borrow  for consumption  are usually  tiny - and
often at high interest costs (Binswanger  1985;  Christensen  1989;  Morooka  and Hayami  1990;  Udry
1990;  Deaton  1991).  Investigations  into how  farmers  and workers  cope with disaster  show  that credit
finances  only a small fraction  of their consumption  in disaster  years (Jodha 1978).  Access  to formal
commercial  bank credit  therefore  gives  large modem  commercial  farms a considerable  advantage  in
risk diffusion  over small farmers  without  such access.
40Farmers  and workers  with little or no access  to credit can attempt  to diffuse  their risk
by relying  on accumulated  reserves  and wealth,  social relationships,  and risk-sharing  arrangements  in
land, labor, output and input markets  (Jodha 1978;  Bidinger  and others 1990;  Rosenzweig  1988;
Deaton  1990;  Sharp 1990).  Wealthy  individuals  can self-insure  much  more easily  than  the poor both
directly,  as a consequence  of their wealth,  and indirectly,  because  geographically  dispersed  social
networks  on which  they can rely in years  of (ocally covariate)  poor harvests.  Wealthy  farmers  should
therefore  be better able to accumulate  profit-maximizing  portfolios  than  poorer farmers,  giving  them
an allocative  efficiency  advantage." 5 In land-scarce  environments,  the bulk of a farmer's wealth  is in
the form of land, so large ownership  holdings  are correlated  with a better  ability  to diffuse  risks
through  the wealth  effect  and land's robustness  as collateral  for credit. Forescano  (1969)  suggests  that
in high risk environments,  the superior  ability  of land-rich  individuals  to diffuse  risk through  storage
and better access  to credit  markets  might  have been  an important  reason  that otherwise  unprofitable
demesne  cultivation  survival  in the face  of competition  from family  farms.
Evidence  on farm size - productivity  relationship
The literature  demonstrates  that imperfections  in a single  market  would  not  be
sufficient  to introduce  a systematic  relationship  between  farm  size and productivity  per unit of land.
For example,  if credit is rationed  according  to farm size, but all other markets  are perfect, land and
labor market  transactions  will produce  a farm  structure  that equalizes  yields  across  farms  of different
operational  size. But if there are imperfections  in two  markets,  land rental and insurance,  or credit
and labor, a systematic  relationship  can arise  between  farm  size and productivity.
Srinivasan  (1982)  has shown  that under conditions  of fixed  farm size (no land rental)  and no
insurance,  uncertainty  and risk aversion  can lead to an inverse  relationship  between  farm size and
productivity,  provided  that absolute  risk aversion  does not increase  and that relative  risk aversion  does
not decrease  with wealth.  With credit  and labor market  imperfections,  the relationship  is not
necessarily  inverse. For example,  Feder (1985)  and Carter  and Kalayan (1989)  demonstrate  that
with certain  model  parameters,  the combination  of credit  and labor market imperfections  can lead  to a
is  As explained  in Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig  (1986),  they  are  not  able  to provide  icsran  to small
farmers  bocause  covunance  of inome would  require  large  reserves  in order to be able to offer  craedible
conrct.
41U-shaped  relationship.  Eswaran  and Kotwal  (1985)  obtain  an inverse  relationship  by adding  a fixed
cost of production  to labor and credit  market imperfections.  Generally,  the presence  of multiple
market  failure  can explain  a variety  of farm  size distribution  and productivity  structures.
The implications  of imperfections  in labor, credit, and land markets  are illustrated  by
Feder (1985)  whose  model  is replicated  in Appendix  2. By assumption,  the efficiency  of hired labor
depends  on the intensity  of supervision  by family  labor, implying  that family  labor and hired labor are
complements  and that the amount  of labor effort  or 'efficiency' units supplied  increases  with
supervision.
If credit  and land  rental  markets  are perfect, the supervision  constraint  alone would
lead each household  to lease in or lease out the amount  of land required  to maintain  a uniform  ratio of
family  labor endowment  to operated  area. The ratio of effective  labor input  to operated  area would  be
constant  for all cultivators,  whatever  the distribution  of land ownership.  No farm size-productivity
relationship  would  exist.
But if there is a binding  constraint  in the credit  market whereby  the supply  of working
capital  depends  on the amount  of land owned,  the optimal  size of the operational  holding  would  vary
systematically  with size of the owned  holding  even if land rental  markets  were perfect. The magnitude
(and direction)  of this variation  would  depend  on the relative  elasticities  of output with respect  to
effective  labor and of labor effort  with respect  to supervision.
Now, if, in addition  to a supervision  constraint  and a credit constraint,  there are no
rental markets  for land - whether  by law or because  of the threat of land reform  - a negative  relation
between  farm size and land  productivity  is likely  to emerge.  Of course, the capital  cost advantage  of
large farms does not necessarily  lead to higher investments  on the farm if the capital  can be invested
elsewhere  in the economy  at higher returns than  in agriculture.
The Evidence  for Diseconomnes  of Scale
The discussion  thus far suggests  several  approaches  to the measurement  of the farm
size-productivity  relationship:
42*  Since  the supervision  costs  vary with  the operational  holding  size while  the capital  constraint
is related  to the ownership  holding  size, the separate  effects  of operational  and ownership
holdings  should  be distinguished  in any test of the farm  size-productivity  relationship.  To
eliminate  errors resulting  from the raw correlation  of farm size and  household  size,
regressions  of an efficiency  indicator  on operational  and ownership  holding  size should  also
include  the number  of adult  family  members  who can act as supervisors.  None of the existing
studies  has taken full account  of these distinctions.
*  Proper  measures  of relative  efficiency  are the difference  in totalfactor  productivity  between
small and large  farms and the diference in profits, net of the cost offamily labor,  per unit of
capital  Invested.  Using  market  prices  to measure  productivity  assesses  differences  in private
efficiency.  Using social  opportunity  costs  as a measure  eliminates  the impact  of distortion  and
measures  differences  in social  efficiency.  Few  studies  have  made  this distinction.
*  Most  of the literature  has analyzed  physical  yields of specific  crops or the value  of
agricultural  output  per unit of operated  area. These  are not relevant  measures  of overall
private  or social efficiency  since  they are but partial  productivity  indices  that do not take into
account  differences  in input  and labor use. Because  part of the adjustment  to incentive
problems  and other market  imperfections  is to  vary the output  mix so as to save  on the factors
with the highest  scarcity  value in the specific  farm, focusing  on a single  crop is inappropriate
except  in monocrop  farming  systems.  Individual  crop studies  are therefore  not relevant  to the
farm size-productivity  relationship  problem.
*  Normalizing  any productivity  measure  by total land area or regressing  it on land  area raises
severe measurement  problems  because  agroclimatic  potential  and land quality  differ  across
regions.  Ihe  same  problem  afflicts  any comparisons  that involve  pooled  data  or use the means
from several  regions (e.g., Thiesenhusen  1990;  Deolalikar  1981).  Land quality  differences
within  regions are often so large that adjustments  must be made for those  differences  if
productivity  is measured  per unit area rather than  per capital  invested  (Bhalla  and Roy 1988).
Only if there is no correlation  between  land  quality  and farm  size is such an adjustment
43unneeswary16  - or if the differences  arise from farmer  investments  in tubewells,  land
levelling,  drainage,  or the like.
The following  test of the farm size-productivity  relationship  is one way  to take these
considerations  into account  describing  not a causal  relationship  but a multiple  correlation:
PIK = g(OPOW,H,Z) with  exected signs  g8  <,g 2>  Ogy>O, (1)
Where  K is assets,  L is labor, P is private  or social  profits  net of private  or social cost of
family  labor, OP is operated  area or value of operated  land, OW is owned  area or value of
owned  land, H is the number  of household  workers,  and Z is a vector  of exogenous  land
quality,  distance  from infrastructure,  and exogenous  land improvement  variables. g, should
be negative  because  of rising supervision  costs. g2 should  be positive  because  ownership
provides  better  access  to credit. And & should  be positive  because  family  members  have
incentive  to work  and can supervise.
None of the studies  of the farm  size-productivity  relationships  have applied  this full
specifications  and few studies  have even looked  at total factor  productivity  or farm  profits  net
of the cost of family labor. So we must be content  to summarize  the findings  of farm-level
studies  within  small regions  that look at value of output  per operated  area. Typical  findings
are presented  in table 2, which  is extracted  from Berry  and Cline (1979)  and similar  results
are found in a range of other studies.' 7
"Both distress  sales  (Bhagwati  and  Chakravarty  1969)  and  differential  patterns  of invesmet (Sea  1964)
coud explain  theoretically  why  small  farmers  could  systematicaly  end  up with  higher  quality  land  within  a
given  villae. Few  empirical  studies  exist  at a sufficiently  disggregated  village  level  to confirm  this  asociation
For  six villages  in semi-arid  India,  Walker  and Ryan  (1990)  reject  the existence  of a systemtic  association
betwe  farm size and land  quality.
1  For SiX  Lain American  countries Lu and  YotopoUlos  1971,  and 1979,  Barralough  and  Collarte  1973;  for
nortesten  Brai  Kutcher  and Scandizzo  1981 ; for fifteen  countria  in Africa,  Asia, and Latin America
Comia  1985; for the  Indian  Punjab  Sen  1981;  for India  and  West  Bengal  Cater 1984;  and  for Ildia
disggrgated  into seventy-eight  agroclimatic  zones  Bhalla  and Roy 1988.  Dyer 1991  descnbes the army of
intument  used by large  produce in Egypt  to increase  their competitiveness  with small  farmers,
deostaing  that large  producers  can successlly  lobby  for meaure to counteact the inverse  fam-size
productivity  relationship.  Te  need for such rent-seelng implies  the coniued  validity  of this relationship
although  Dyer interpret it to mean  the  opposite.
44TABLE  2:  Farm-size  productivity  differences,  selected  countries
Fam  size  Northuat  Brazil  Punjab,  Pakistae  Muda,  MaLkydi
Small  farm  563  274  148
(heatr)  (10.0-49.9)  (5.1-10.1)  (0.7-1.0)
Larva  fm  100  100  100
(hectarft)  (SOO+)  (20+)  (5.7-11.3)
Note:  *100  - bqet  fam size  compared  with second  smallest  farm size. Second  smallest  fam size
used in calculations  to avoid  abnormal  productivity  results  often  recorded  for the smallet plots.
lable  4-1. Northeastern  Bazil, 1973;  Production  per Unit of Available  Land  Resource,  by
Farm Size  Group,  p.46.  Index  taken  using  average  gross receipts/areas  for size  group  2 (small)
and 6  arge), averaged  for all zones  excluding  zone  F, where sugarcane  and cocoa  plantations
skew  productivity  average  for argo farms.
able 4-29. Relative  Land  Productivity  by Farm Size: Agricultural  Census  and FABS  Survey-
based  Estimates  Compared,  (1968-9)  p. 84.  Index  taken  using  value  added  per cultivaed  acre for
second  smallest  size roup and luagest
'Table 4-48. Factor  Productivity  of Muda  River  Farms  by Size, Double  Croppers,  1972-3  p.
117. Index taken  from value  added  in agriculture/relong  (0.283  ha =  1 relong).
Soue:  Berry and Cline (1978)
Those studies support the following generalizations:
*  Ihe productivity  differential  favoring  small farms  over large  one increases  with  the differences
in size. That means  it is largest  where inequalities  in land holdings  are greatest,  in the
relatively  land-abundant  countries  of Latin  America  and Africa,  and smallest  in land-scarce
Asian countries  where  farm size distributions  are less  unequal.
*  The highest  output  per unit areas is often achieved  not by the smallest  subfamily  or part-time
farmers  but by the second-smallest  farm  size class, which  includes  the smallest  full-time
farmers.  This suggests  that the smallest  farms  may be the most severely  credit constrained.
*  Plantation  crops as represented  by sugarcane  production  in Brazil, do not exhibit  a negative
farm size-productivity  relationship  (Cline  1971;  Kutcher  and Scandizzo  1981).
*  When land is adjusted  for differences  in quality  using land  value or exogenous  land quality
measures,  the negative  productivity  relationship  weakens  but does not disappear,  especially
where it is very large.
45*  Introduction  of the green revolution  technology  in India led to a weakening  but no the
disappearance  of the raw productivity  differentials  (Bhalla  and Roy 1988).
Three studies  came  closer to the specification  in equation  1. For the Muda River region
of Malaysia,  Berry and Cline (1979)  found that value  added  per unit of invested  capital  for the second
smallest  farm size group exceeded  that of the largest  farm size group by 65 percent,  more than the
difference  in value  of output  reported  in table 2. The use of value  added adjusts  for costs of
purchased  inpUts,  but this  measure  is still likely  to bias the test in favor  of small farms to the degree
that small  farms use labor more intensively  than do large farms. But since the result  holds for raw
output,  the negative  relationship  would  probably  hold as well if the test were based  on net farm
profits. The results  suggest  that well-developed  rental  markets,  as in the Muda area for tractors  and
threshes,  enable  small farmers  to circumvent  the economies  of scale associated  with tractors, leaving
labor supervision  costs to dominate."
In the second  study,  Berry and aine (1979)  first  split the data for Northeast  Brazil (see
table 2) into agroclimatic  zones, which  sharply  reduced  the observed  negative  relationship.  'Social'
profits  were then calculated  by imputing  a real opportunity  cost of 15 percent  to capital  and valuing
family  labor at 0, 50 and 100  percent  of the minimum  wage, a wage  rarely paid in agriculture.  Even
when family  labor is valued  at the full opporuity  wage, social  profits  are dearly higher  by 23 to
150  percent for the second  smallest  farm size group (10 to 50 hectares)  than for the second  largest
and the largest  farm size groups  (200 to 500 hectares)  in four of six non-sugar  growing  zones. For
the two zones where the relationship  does not hold as clearly  (Bahla  and Sertao),  the weakness  of the
results appears  to be due to paucity  of obsvations  (Kutcher  and Scandizzo  1981).  The negative
'  Only a few studies  explicitly  test for the sepambility of fimily and hired labor. Pitt and Rosenzweig  (1986)
show  for  a sample  of Indonesian  fannmes  that  profits  are independent  of the short-tm health  status  of the
household  head,  but since  short-tem  illne  does  not  interfere  with  supervision  the result  says  little  about
whether  wage  labor  can  complement  family  labor  on a pmnet  bi  Deolaliar  and  Vijverberg  (1987)  reject
the  hypothesis  of perfect  substitutabiltybetween  family  and  hired  labor  based  on samples  from ndia  and
Maaysia,  but beas  they estime  a pduction  function  using  coss-ction  data,  atistical problems  vitate
their findings.  Benjamin  (1992)  estimates  a demand  fimction  for aegate  labor  services.  He rejects  the
hypothei  of nonseparability  for Indneian rice fam  aon  the basis  of the  joint lack of significane  of
demogaphic  variables.  Since  his model  includes  ar  havested  a  a dependet  variable,  it does  not  allow  for
adjustmens  of area operated  (via rt)  in response  to family  siz.  In effect,  then, the model  meures  only the
conditional  impact  of demographic  variables,  given  opeatod  ea, on the demad for hired labor. The fact that
ea opeated  (which,  has sigificant  influence on  labor  demand)  s correlated  with  family  composition  suggests
that a strong  supervsion  constraint  might  be found  if the unconditional  effect  were considered.
46productivity  relationship  still  holds in the technologically  advanced  Agrt  .. region,  where
mechanization  was most pronounced  if social  profits  are considered.
In the third study,  Rosenzweig  and Binswanger  (1993)  estimate  a profit function  similar
to equation  (1) which  include  total assets,  the composition  of the asset portfolio,  family  labor,
education,  age, and the onset  date  of the monsoon. They  use the complete  ICRISAT  panel data from
ten villages  in high-risk  semi-arid  India  to estimate  a model  that allows  for separate  testing  of
technical  economies  of scale on the one hand and the impact  of supervision  cost advantages  of poorer
farmers  relative  to the capital  cost and risk diffusion  advantages  of wealthier  farmers  on the other
hand. Fixed-effects  estimation  techniques  were used to eliminate  problems  of land  quality
differences.  The results  reject the hypothesis  that the composition  of investments  reflects  technical
scale economies.  They support  the hypothesis  that the asset portfolios  of farmers  are signifcantly
affect  by farmers' risk aversion,  wealth,  and the degree  of monsoon  onset  variability  (a measure  of
weather  risk). In an environment  of slowly  changing  technology,  the profitability  of the portfolio  is
not affected  by formal  schooling,  but it does rise with  age, a proxy for experience.  Profits  (net of
their wage  costs)  also increase  with the number  of adult  family  members,  suggesting  that  their
contribution  arises  from their management  and supervision  function.
Rosenzweig  and Binswanger  also estimate  the impact  of weather  risk and wealth  on the
risldness  and profitability  of farmers' asset portfolios.  Figure 3 plots the profit per unit of asset for
four wealth  classes  as a function  of rainfall  variability  (onset  of the monsoon).  The profit rate of
farmers at the eightieth  percentile  of wealth  is insensitive  to Increases  In weather  risk, suggesing that
they are confident  enough  in their ability  to diffuse  risk through  credit, savings,  or social  relationships
that they do not need  to choose  portfolios  that reduce  risk  up front at some cost in profits. Farmers  in
the 20th percentile,  however,  sharply  reduce  the profitability  of their portfolios  as rainfall  risk rises.
Despite  these  portfolio  adjustments,  this high risk environment  with relatively  little
mechanization  and slow  technical  change,  the smaller  farm size groups  have higher  profits  per unit of
wealth  at all levels of rainfill risk observed  in the data The supervision  and labor  cost advantages  of
family  labor are apparendy  greater  than the advantages  that the lumpiness  of management  skills  ad
machines  and the better access  to credit and other risk-diffusion  measures  confer on large farms. Only
in the most risky environments  does the advantage  of the poorer farmers  nearly  disappear.
47Figure  3.
Profit-Wealth  Ratios  and Weather
Variability, by Wealth and Class
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3. Profit-wealth  ratios and weather variability, by wealth class. Pcrcentiles:  ,  20
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Note:  The onset  date  of  4p.e  Monsoon  was  the single  most
powerful  of eight different  rainfall  characteristics  to explain
gross  value  of farm output.
48Using  a nonparametric  approach  to estimate  a production  function  for Wisconsin  farmers, Chavas  and
Allier (1993)  study farms  in a very modern  and dynamic  environment.  They flnd  virtually  no scale
economies  in dairy production  and only very limited  initial  scale  economies  due to lumpiness  of
Inputs.
Condusion
Most of the empirical  work  on the farm  size-productivity  relationship  has been  flawed  by
methodological  shortcomings,  and has failed  to deal adequately  with the complexity  of the issues
involved.  Studies  that come to grips with some  of the shortcomings  and use a more refined
measurement  of land quality  and a productivity  variable  Instead  of simple  yields  find  that even in
fairly technologically  advanced  and mechanized  areas, such as the Muda scheme  in Malaysia  or the
Agreste  region  of Northeast  Brazil, small  farms  retain a productivity  advantage  over large farms. This
finding  suggests  that rental markets  can substitute  to a certain  degree  for the indivisibility  of machines
and some  management  skills.  The methodologically  sounder  study  based  on the ICRISAT  data
confirms  both the mechanisms  leading  to differential  performance  by scale and the superiority  of
smaller  farms in an environment  with litde mechanization  and slow  technical  change.  While  there is
evidence  on the negative  relationship  between  farm size and production,  more work is needed  on this
subject. Such  work should  follow  the lines  sketched  out in equation  1, using recent  farm level data
for developing  coutry regions  with high quality  agroclimatic  and soil conditions,  substantial
mechanization,  and dynamic  technical  change.
S. The effects  of land-credit Unks  and policy  distortions on land sales markets
The farm-size  productivity  studies  indicate  that for given technology,  factor prices, land
quality,  and farming  sklUls  there is an optimal  operatdonal  holding  size at which  the disincentive  costs
of adding  more workers  filly offsets  the economies  of scale from lumpy  inputs, access  to credit  and
management  skills. Taking  into account  differences  in hrming skills  and land quality,  this finding
translates  into an optimal  distribution  of operational  sizes. For any given  distribution  of ownership
holdings,  one would  expect  tenancy  and land  rental markets  to bring  the distribution  of operational
holdin  close to that optimal  distribution. f incentive  problems  associated  with tenancy  are minor
49and can be ignored,  the distribution  of ownership  holdings  would  be Independent  of the distribution  of
operation  holdings,  since large landholders  would  simply  rent out their land with no loss in efficiency.
But if legal restrictions  on tenancy  make this option  infeasible  or unprofitable  we need to
ask whether  the sales market  will bring about  a more nearly  optimal  distribution  of ownership-
operational  holdings  - that is, whether  it will be profitable  for the owners  of large and relatively
unprofitable  farms  to split  them up and sell them  to small family  farmers.  Covariate  risk, imperfect
Intertemporal  markets,  and policy  distortions  affecting  the functioning  of the land  sales market will
prevent  this market  from achieving  a first-best  solution.  But increases  in efficiency  arekstill  likely  to
result from sales transactions  that transfer  land  from bad to better managers.
Covariate risks and Imperfect  credit markets
Land is often  a preferred  store of wealth, so with imperfect  inter-temporal  markets  the
utility derived  from landownership  will exceed  the utility  derived  from farm profits. Its immobility
makes land  a preferred  form of collateral  in credit  markets  which  confers additional  utility  from
landownership,  especially  in an environment  where  production  risk cannot  be insured.
'he  collateral  value of land and the high positive  correlation  of incomes  in a given area
imply that there would  be few land  sales in periods  of normal  weather."' Landowners  would  be
made better off by selling  land only if they could ear  a higher  return from the sales proceeds  than
from cultivating  or renting  out the land. So, where  non-agricultural  investment  opportunites  for ru
residents  are limited  and national  credit  markets  are underdeveloped  little land will be supplied  for
sale in normal  years. Tbe number  of bidders  for land is constrained  by the level of household  savings
since mortgaging  the land would  be unprofitable.  Because  land  has collateral  value, its equilibrium
price at given credit  costs will always  exceed  the present  discounted  value of the income  stream
produced  from the land. Mortgaged  land, however,  cannot  be used as collateral  for working  capital,
so the owner  does not reap the production  credit advantage  and thus will be unable  to repay the loan
out of increased  income  from the land. With  imperfect  insurance  markets,  only unmortgaged  land
1  Such  paucity  of lad sales  is also  observed  in developed  countres  where land  sales  makets  arn  usually
very  thin.The perete  of  rnmland  transfend an avemg each  year  is 3  % of the  total  in the US, 1-1.5%  in
Bditain,  1.5%  within  tho  white  sector  in South  Africa,  0.5%  i  Ireland  and  Kenya  (Moll  1988:354).
50yields  a flow  of income  or utility,  the present  value  of which  equals  the land  price. As discussed,  if
land ownership  provides  access  to credit  and helps in risk diffusion,  the buyer has to compensate  the
seller for the utility  derived  from these services  of land (Feder  and associates  1988).  Since  only
unmortgaged  land provides  these  services,  a buyer  relying  on credit cannot  pay for the land  out of
agricultural  profits  alone.  Thus land  sales are likely  to be fianced out of household  savings, so that
the purchased  land can be used as collateral  for working  capital.  This need  to purchase  land  out of
savings  tends  to make the distribution  of landholdings  more unequal,  despite  the greater utility  value
of land to smaller  owners  arising  from its insurance  value and their lower  labor costs.
Spatial  covariation  in yields  suggests  that in particularly  good crop years, when  savings
are high, there would  be few sellers  and many  potential  buyers  of land. Good years  are thus not good
times for land  purchases.  In bad crop years, farmers  would  have litdte  savings  with which  to finance
land purchases.  And in particularly  bad periods  - say after consecutive  harvest  failures  - moneylenders
would  be the only ones in the local rural economy  with assets  (their debt claims).  Moneylenders
would  prefer to take over rather than sell the landholdings  offered  as collateral  by defaulters  since the
price of land would  be lower  than  average  in bad years. So, in bad crop years  land would  be sold
mainly  to moneylenders  as distress  sales, or to individuals  with incomes  or assets  from outside  the
local rural economy.  We should  expect, then, that in areas with  poorly developed  insurance  and
capital  markets,  land sales would  be few and limited  mainly  to distress  sales. Results  from India and
Bangladesh  confirm  this hypothesis.  Farmers  in India experiencing  two consecutive  drought  years
have been  found to be 150  percent  more likely  than other farmers  to  sell their land (Rosenzweig  and
Wolpin  1985).
The implications  of different  mechanisms  to insure  against  risk on distress  sales and the land
ownership  distribution  are demonstrated  by a comparison  of the evolution  of ownership  holdings  from
about 1960  to 1980  for predominantly  agricultural  villages  in India  and Bangladesh  (Cain 1981).
These villages  faced very high environmental  risks but were characterized  by distinct  differences  in
mechanisms  of risk-insurance:  In Mharashtra, India, an employment  guarantee  scheme  operated
throughout  the period and attained  participation  rates of up to 97 percent  of all households  during
disasters.  Such schemes  were absent  after the major flood  episodes  in Bangladesh.  With other
Insurance-mechanisms  either absent  or exhauted, 60 percent  of land  sales in Bangladesh  were
undertaken  to obtain  food and medicine.  Downward  mobility  affected  large and small farmers  equally,
Slsuggesting  that even large farmers  had insufficient  possibilities  to diffuse  risks. 60 percent of the
currently  landless  had lost their land since 1960  and the Gini coefficient  of landownership  distribution
increased  from 0.6 to almost  0.7. This contrasts  sharply  with the Indian  villages  where  land sales for
consumption  purposes  accounted  only for 14 percent  and were incurred  mainly  by the rich to meet
social obligations.  64 percent  of land  sales were undertaken  in order to generate  capital  for productive
investment  (digging  of wells,  purchase  of pumpsets,  children's  education  and marriages),  leading  to
an equalization  of the land-ownership  distribution  in India, and suggesting  that the poor were not only
able to avoid  distress  sales, but actually  could  acquire  some  la,'  as rich households  liquidated
agricultural  assets to be able  to pursue  non-agricultural  investment.
Historically,  distress  sales have  played  a major role in the accumulation  of land  for large
manorial  estates  in China (Shih 1992)  and in early Japan (Takekoshi  1967)  and for large landlord
estates  in Punjab (Hamid  1983).  The abolition  of communal  tenure  and the associated  loss of
mechanisms  for diversifying  risk are among  the factors  underlying  the emergence  of large estates  In
Central America  (Brockett  1984).
Moral  hazard, covariance  of income,  and collateral  value  of land imply absent  insurance
and imperfect  credit  markets. In such environments,  land  sales markets  are likely  to become  a means
for large landowners  to accumulate  more land. Even where  markets  for labor, current  inputs, and
land sales and rentals  are perfectly  competitive,  weak  intertemporal  markets  for risk diffusion  may
therefore  prevent land sales markets  from bringing  about  pareto  improving  trades and an efficient
farm size distribution  - an illustration  of the theorem  of the second  best.
The Impact of policy distortions
The existence  of common  policy  distortions  intensifies  the failure  of the land sales
market  to distribute  land  optimally. Consider  an idealized  case  of competitive  and undistorted  land,
labor, risk and credit markets.  The value of land for agricultur  use would  equal the present  value of
agricultural  profits capitalized  at the opportunity  costs  of capital.  If the poor have  to borrow  to buy
land at its present  value,  the only income  stream  available  for consumption  is the imputed  value of
family  labor. The remaining  profits  go to pay for the loan. If the poor can get the same wage  in the
labor market,  they are no better off as landowners  than  they would  be as wage-laborers.  Ard this
52example  assumes  ideal conditions,  with the poor paying  the same interest  rate as most creditworthy
borrowers.
Anything  that drives  the price of land above  the capitalized  value  of the agricultural
income  stream  thus makes it impossible  for the poor to buy land without  reducing  their consumption
below  the level of their potential  earning  in the labor market.
The most important  factors  and distortions  are the following:
*  With  populations  growing  and urban demand  for land increasing,  the price of land is expected
to appreciate,  and  some  of this real appreciation  is capitalized  into the current  land  price.
Robinson  and associates  (1985)  find  much  higher  imp'icit  rates of return (cash  rents to land
values)  to farming  in predominant  agricultural  states  in the United  States  than in states  where
nonagricultural  land demand  is high. The impact  of closeness  to urban areas  on agricultural
land prices is  well known.  Since  these returns  are realized  only when the property  is sold, the
only way a poor person  could  tap into that income  stream  is by regularly  selling  off a small
parcel  of land to pay the interest  costs  - hardly a feasible  option  for small landowners.
*  In periods  of macroeconomic  instability,  nonagricultural  investors  may use land as an asset to
hedge  against  ination, so that an infation  premium  is incorporated  into the real land  price. If
epected inflation  is fully  reflected  in interest  rates, inflation  alone  will not affect  agricultural
land prices (Feldstein  1980).  But if inflation  is higher  than expected  interest  rates, and if land
is perceived  to be no riskier than alternative  assets, excess  demand  for land  will increase  the
price of land as a speculative  asset.  Inflation  and changes  in real reurns on alternative  uses of
capital  are the main  factors  explaining  changes  in land  prices for the United  States  (Just  and
Miranowsld  1989).  For Iowa, in addition  to fundamentals,  (the present  value of the discounted
future income  stream), an additive  fad term closely  associated  with expected  inflation  has a
significant  impact  on land  prices (Falk 1991). In a simulation  using results  of econometric
Although  overvaluation  due  to mispeetion  - bubbles  - would  lead to observationally  equivalent
predictions,  myopic  behavior  on the  part  of land  purchasers  seems  a more  satisfactory  explanation.  On  the
poubilities for rational  bubbles  see Asako  (1991)  and  Diba and Grossman  (1988).  Empirical  and experimental
evidee  an bubbles  is provided  buy DeLng and  Shlcifer  (1991),  Smith  and  associated  (1988),  and  Evans
(1986).
53estimation  for Brazil (1966-89)  Brandao  and Rezende  (1992)  find that six percent  of the
Increase  In land is attributable  to credit subsidies,  28 percent  to macroeconomic  instability
(inflation).
*  Credit  subsidies  are capitalized  into land values,  as shown  in the Brandao  and Rezenda  (1992)
study and by Feder and Associates  (1988). For the U.S., Shalit  and Schmitz  (1982),  show  that
most of the increasing  debt  on farm  real estate  during 1950-78  was translated  into higher land
prices, whereas  farm income  increases  had a much  smaller  impact. 21 Even where  there are
no credit  subsidies,  large landowners  have  a transactions  cost advantage  in securing  credit,
which  is capitalized  into land  values and  may even  block access  to mortgage  credit altogether
for small  borrowers  altogether.
a  Many  countries  exeempt  agricultural  income  from income  tax, and even where  there is no
general exemption,  agricultural  income  is de facto subject  to lower  tax rates. These preferences
will be partly or fully capitalized  into land  values.  Since  the poor, pay no taxes and so cannot
benefit  from the tax break, they  do not receive  the corresponding  income  stream. Any other
subsidies  or tax preferences  for large farms  similarly  increase  the difficulty  the poor have  in
buying land.
Where  any of these factors  push the price of land above  the price justified  by the
fundamentals  of expected  agricultural  profits  in the absence  of distortions  associated  with farm size,
the poor have difficulty  buying  land. Even If they are provided  with credit on market  terms that
difficulty  persists  unless  their productivity  advantage  from lower  supervision  cost is very large. Of
these factors,  nonagriculturl demand,  inflation,  credit  constraints,  and credit  subsidies  have  been
investigated  empirically;  income  tax preferences  for agriculture  have  noL Most  of the empirical
studies concentrate  on the United  States  since  the paucity  of land transactions  in developing  countries
21  Whiloe  tis  dem  ate the sgnificane  of the  polcy and  institutional  enirment  in aggregae models,
icroconomic  evidence  on the  impostnce of credit ratining  on land  prices  is limited. Carter (1989),  Carter
and Kalfaya (1989), and Cart  and WVibe  (1990)  use a roughly  calibrad  model  to determine  the reservation
price  of lnd as a function  of frm-sz  and obtain  a U-shaped  cumre.  Becase of the roughness  of their dat,
the  resuts indicate  orders  of magnitude  rather than  exact figpues,  but they  are certainly  in the  approprate
dirton.
54makes  research  difficult  (Melichar;  four other studies;  Hallan  et al; Barhema).  More work needs  to be
done.
6.  Incentives, land-credit Unks  and land rental markets
As long as there are imperfections  and/or distortions  in other markets,  land  sales
markets  are unlikely  to bring a skewed  distribution  of land ownership  holdings  closer to an optimal
distnrbution  of operational  holdings. The question,  then, is whether  land rental  markets  can increase
efficiency  by improving  the access  of the poor to land  under conditions  in which  they can not buy
land.
Land tenancy  markets  might  not increase  efficiency  if tenants  lack incentives  to invest  in land
improvements,  to work  hard, or to apply  sufficient  inputs. These  problems  will be particularly  severe
under sharecropping  aangements, with the tenant  receiving  only a share of the marginal  product  of
the inputs  (the Marshallian  inefficiency).  Quantitative  measurement  of the inefficiency  associated  with
share contracts  in different  environments  is nceay  to determine  the importance  of such
disincentives. The empirical  discussion  shows  that the inefficiencies  of share-cropping,  measured  at
the farm level, are not large.
Despite  the disincentives  associted with  tenancy  and sharecropping  their widespread  use
all over the world  suggests  that, in an enviroment, where  capital  constraints  and risk considerations
make fixed  rent tenancy  contracts  infeasible,  share rental  contracts  may in fact emerge  as efficiency
enhancing,  especially  if the incentive  problems  associated  with them  are low. Since both the
theoretical  literature  (Otsuka  and Hayami  1988;  Otsuka,  Chuma,  and Hayami  1992)  and the empirical
literature  (Bell 1988)  have  been reviewed  recenty, the discussion  here is brief.
Choice of contract and the inetive  problem
In the basic  model  of land-leasing,  renting  out land under a fixed-rent  or share coneract
or employing  wage  labor are substitutes  along  a continuum  on contractual  choices  (Otsuka,  Chuma
and Hayami 1992).  The landlord  maximizes  income  by choosing  the number  of tenants,  the fixed
55payment  and  the output-share  parameter  subject  to the constraint  that tenants  achieve  their
(exogenously  given)  reservation  utility.  The tenant  determines  the level of effort  that will maximize
utility,  yielding  an effort-reaction  function.
The basic model  consists  of a constant  returns  to scale  production  function  Q =  OF(e,h)
where Q is output, e is effort,  h is number  of tenants, and 0 is a stochastic  element.  The landlord's
income  is y = h[l-&)Q  - pl, and the representative  tenant's income  is Y=caQ + p. The  fixed  rent
contract  is obtained  for (ar=  1,p<O), the pure wage  contract  for (a=O,0>O); and {0<a<<  11 with
arbitrary  p (often assumed  to equal  zero for simplicity)  characterizes  the share contract  (Otsuka  and
Hayami 1988).
Under conditions  of certainty  and the rather unrealistic  assumption  of perfect
enforceability  of effort, all contracts  lead  to equivalent  outcomes  and the choice  of contract  type does
not matter (Cheung  1967).  If the assumption  of perfect effort  enforceability  is dropped,  the tenant
receives  only a fadicn  a of their marginal  product  for all but the pure cash rental  contract.
Therefore,  with effort  unobservable  and under conditons  of certainty  (or equivalent,  risk neutrality),
the fixed-rent  contract  clearly  dominates  the fixed-wage  and the share contract and will always  be
chosen  in equflibrium  (Otsuka,  Chuma,  and Hayami  1992).  Given  supervision  costs for workers  or
sharecroppers  any type of contract  other than fixed  rent would  result in an undersupply  of effort  by
the tenant  or worker, which  would  lead to lower  total production.
With risk aversion  and uncerinty,  a share contract  provides  the possibility  of pardy
insuring  the tenant against  fucations  in output.  Where intertemporal  markets  are weak  or
unavailablo,  there would  then  be a trade-off  between  the risk-sharing  properties  of the fixed-wage
contract  under which  the worker's residual  risk is zero, and the incentive  effects  of the fixed-rent
contract,  which is associated  with the optimal  supply  of effort. (Note  that with effort  as the only
variable  input, effort  supply  completely  determines  total production.)  Under  these empirically  relevant
conditions  of risk aversion  and uncertainty,  the one-period  contract  can achieve  only a second-best
solution  since increases  in the output  share  parameter  above  the second-best  equilibrium  value, while
increasing  expected  production,  are no longer  Pareto superior  since they lower  the risk-averse  tenant's
utility by exposing  him to greater uncertminty.
56Recasting  the problem  in a multiperiod  context  and allowing  for reputation  effects,
however,  provides  options  for bringing  this second-best  opdmum  closer  to the firstbest outcome.
Otsuka,  Chuma,  and Hayami  (1992)  discuss  the conditions  under which, In a multiperiod  context,  the
threat of loss of reputation  will prevent  the landlord  from cheating,  and so the fixed-rent  contract  will
tend to dominate  the fixed-wage  contract  as it does in the certainty  case  just described.  They argue
that in relatively  closed  villages,  such Implicit  enforcement  by the community  may  be strong  enough
to bring the inefficient  outcome  under  the unenforceable  contract  closer  to the first-best  outcome  even
if risk is present.  This conclusion  is consistent  with  the empirical  observation  that fixed-wage
contracts  are found only where  the institutional  environment  discriminates  against  tenancy  contracts
(see section  3 and below)  but is inconsistent  with the overwhelming  prevalence  of share-cropping
relative  to fixed-rent  tenancies.
Choice of contracts and factor market constraints
There is considerable  theoretical  justification  and evidence  (Bliss  and Stern 1982;  Pant
1983;  Nabi 1985;  Binswanger  and Rosenzweig  1986;  Skouflas  1991;  Shaban 1991)  that where
markets  for lumpy  inputs  such as management  skills  and draft animals  are imperfect,  households  seek
to achieve  the optimal  operational  holding  size through  land tenancy  contracts.  Given  the nontradable
factor endowment,  land rental  would  be expected  to increase  efficiency  if a fixed-rent  contract  is
chosen.  The relevant  question  is whether  share contracts  would  increase  efficiency  as well.
A limit on the working  capital  available  to the tenant  (or to landlord  and tenant)  because
of imperfection  in the credit  market,  can lead  to the adoption  of a share contract  as the optimal
solution  to the bargaining  problem.  Laffont  and Matoussi  (1981)  show  that a worldng  capital
constant  imposes  limits  on the share  parameter  a that may make  the first-best  fixed-rent  contract
unfeasible.  Their model  implies  positive  correladon  between  the tenants' working  capital  and his
output share a.  A positive  correlation  between  working  capital  and output  in the share  contract  but
the absence  of such an effect  in the fixed  rent contract  would  indicate  presence  of an incentive
problem. Consideration  of the joint working  capital  available  to tenant  and landlord  does imply a
negative  relationship  between  the landlord's  working  capital  and the tenant's share. All of these
predictions  are confirmed  empirically  for a set of data  from Tunisia.  his direct  dependence  of the
opdmal  choice  of contract  on the working  capital  available  to both landlord  and tenant  may account
57for the coexistence  of a variety  of contracts  in the same  environment  among  parties with roughly
similar risk aversion  but different  endowments  of working  capital.
Thus the main  reason  that nterlinked  contracts  and cost-sharing  arrangements  are so
common  may  be that they implicitly  provide  the credit  or insurance  a tenant needs  in an environment
where  credit  and insurance  markets  are imperfect  (Otsuka,  Chuma  and Hayami  1992).  The traditional
interpretation  that these interlinkages  are devices  used by landlords  to bring the second-best
equilibrium  closer  to the first-best  outcome  by increasing  the tenant's supply  of effort  (Braverman  and
Stiglitz  1982;  Mitra 1983;  Braverman  and Srinivasan  1981)  requires  strong  assumptions  that are
generally  not satisfied  in developing  countries  (Otsuka,  Chuma,  and Hayami  1992).
A tenant  may  be able to meet only part of his (working)  capital  requirements  in the
credit market  because  of the limited  suitability  of unharvested  crops as collateral  - and at higher
interest  rates than  the landlord  would  get by offering  land as collateral.  The landlord  is in a better
position  than other financial  intermediaries  to provide  a tenant  with implicit  credit and actuarially  fair
insurance  because  of economies  of scope  in supervision  and informational  advantages  concerning  the
value of the tenant's unharvested  crop. Since  the amount  of credit  provided  will be related  to the
tenant's expected  future income,  the landlord  can set the contractual  fixed  payment  to zero and stfll  be
free to adjust  the interest  rate, or accept  the customary  interest  rate and adjust  the fixed  payment  and
share parameter,  to realize  an optimal  outcome  (Otsuka,  Chuma,  and Hayami  1992).
A popular  form of implicit  credit  is the landlord's  provision  of inputs  to the tenant  under
a cost-sharig arrangement.  Providing  inputs  this way is formally  Identical  to an implicit  production
loan which, like interlinked  contracts,  would  be adopted  where  credit  markets  are imperfect.  Static
analysis  of costsharing a  em  may  thus be inpropriate  if credit constraints  are to be taken
filly into account.  Calculating  the implicit  interest  rate charged for such production  loans  would  help
determine  the equity  and efficiency  consequences  of share-cropping  arrangements.  Tbe few empirical
studies  that have  been done suggest  that the interest  rates may  not be significandy  different  from those
charged  by moneylenders,  rates reaching  as high as 50 percent  (Fujimoto  1986)  or even  more
(Morooka  and Hayami 1986). Where  there are imperfections  in credit  markets,  it is possible  to
derive the precise  conditions  for share contracts  under which  the benefits  from overcoming  the credit
58market  Imperfections  would  be greater  than the loss resulting  from the Marshallian  inefficiency
(Shaban  1991).
If tenants  are assumed  to be willing  to bear  greater risk as their wealth  rises (decreasing
absolute  risk aversion)  then both working  capital  constraint  with imperfect  credit  markets  and risk
aversion  by tenants  would  generate  observationally  equivalent  outcomes.  For a sample  of Tunisian
farmers,  Laffont  and Matoussi  (1988)  found  that a credit  constraint  rather than  risk aversion  led
farmers  to prefer share  over fixed-rent  contracts.  Since  credit  and insurance  are at least partly
substitutable,  it is likely  that improvements  in financial  markets  and in the insurability  of risk will
lead to a decrease  in share contracts  in favor  of fixed  rent contracts.  Such  a shift should  result in a
gain in overall  efficiency  since  fixed-rent  contracts  have  superior  incentive  properties.
None of the land rental  models  discussed  here, or even Marxian-inspired  models  of
semifeudalism  (Bhaduri's  1986)  considers  the tenant's reservation  utility - usually  the market  wage  -
to  be endogenously  determined.  Instead  they  explain  inefficiency  and inequities  as consequences  of the
contracts  themselves,  despite  the fact that such contracts  are entered  voluntarily  by both parties (see
epilogue). But in light of the discussion  in section  2, it would  be surprising  indeed  if landlords  with
some  political  power  did not try to find ways  to reduce  the reservation  utility  of potential  tenants  and
workers.
Governments  the world  over have  been  concerned  about  the efficiency  and distributional
implications  of such tenancy  arrangements,  which  in essence  depend  on the relative  bargaining  power
of each of the contractig partners. Tenancy  and sharecropping  have  therefore  been heavily
regulated.  The empirical  evidence  suggests  that government  interventions  into these have  had little
success  in achieving  their stated objective  of protecting  tenants, which  is hardly  surprising  given  the
market imperfections  leading  to the emergence  of share  tenancy,  and the design  difficulty  to welfare-
improving  interventons.  Historically,  land reform  that resulted  in establishing  owner-operated  farms
appears  to have been a far more successful  way of addressing  the equity  question.
Evidence  on efflidency  of tenancy arrangenents
59and draft animals  were significantly  lower  on sharecropped  plots than on owned  parcels. No
statistically  significant  differences  in efficiency  were found between  owned  plots and plots rented  on a
fixed-rent  basis, supporting  the hypothesis  of the productive  efficiency  of fixed-rent  contracts.  Other
results  point in the same direction  (Sen 1981),  and Otsuka  and Hayaml's  (1988)  review  of the
literature  finds, at most, small efficiency  losses  associated  with  tenancy.
Government  interventions  have  given  rise to efficiency-reducing  share  contracts  in a
number  of countries.  Otsuka,  Chuma,  and Hayami  (1992)  argue  that in India, where  the Bell  and
Shaban  studies  were conducted,  there were a number  of government  constraints  on long-term  fixed
rent contracts.  That implies  that the 16 percent  in production  losses adjusted  for land quality  derived
by Shaban  are likely  to constitute  an upper  bound.
L  transactions  to circumvent  imperfections  in credit  markets  have  been important  in
West  Africa in the past (Robertson  1985),  and continue  to be observed  in a number  of developing
countries  where  credit markets  are absent  or credit is highly rationed.  Usufruct  mortgage  is still
reported  to be common  in Bangladesh  (Cain 1981),  Java (Morooka  and Hayami  1986),  and Tbailand
(Fujimoto  1988).  In the Philippines,  tenancy  transactions  emerged  as a credit  substitute  in response  to
limitations  on the transferability  of land (Nagarajan  and associates,  1991).
Where  there is imperfect  information,  on tenant' unobservable  characterisics,  landlords
may  inpret  the tenants' acceptance  of certin types  of contracts  as a signal  that can be used as a
self- selecing screening  device  (Newberry  and Stiglitz  1979).  The preference  for tenants  who already
possess  some  land and draft animals,  which  is well documented  in the literature  (Quibria  and Rashid
1986;  Shaban  1991)  points  in the same  direcdon.
Tenancy  has often been  described  as a rung on the 'agricultural  ladder' that rises from
worker  to share  tenant, to fixed  rate tenant, to owner  and permits  farmers  to acquire  capital  and
gricultural  knowledge.  In a static  firamework  this has been  modeled  by making  production  a fimction
of tenats'  effort  and the landlord's  provision  of management  skills  (Eswaran  and Kotwal  1985).
Aldtough  quantitative  evidence  is limited,  Reid (1973)  argues  that this function  of tenancy  played  an
important  role in the U.S. South after  the abolition  of slavery.  Lehman  (1986)  noted  the importance
of tency  in facilitating  capital  accumulation  in the intergenerational  transfer of farm holdings  in
61Ecuador.  Tenancy  would  be expected  to facilitate  capital  accumulation  where land is abundant  relative
to labor and where rents or owners' shares  are low. Longitudinal  studies  of changes  in tenancy
pans  and capital  accumulation  over the life cycle  of tenants  would  help shed more  light on the
relative  importance  of this phenomenon  in different  environments.
Condusion
Because  of the productivity  advantage  of small over large farms, it is more  profitable  for
large landowners  to rent out land under fixed-rent  contracts  than to work it using hired labor, if
markets  and information  are perfect. If effort  is unobservable  and credit  is rationed  or insurance
markets  are imperfect  and tenants  risk averse,  the first best fixed-rate  tenancy  contract  may no longer
be attainable  and a second-best  share contract  would  be adopted  instead.
Empirical  investigations  show  that share  tenancy  arrangements  under a wide variety  of
conditions  are a highly flexible  tool for adjusting  to such constraints  with relatively  modest  losses.
Since effort  is not fully enforceable  and even limited  enforcement  is likely  to be associated  with some
cost, the adoption  of share tenancy  (or wage  labor)  contracts  would  still be associated  with some  loss
of efficiency.  Removing  the conditions  that prompt  the emergence  of share tenancy  are likely  to lead
to modest  efficiency  gains and will be more effective  than legal prohibition  of such contracts  (see Part
II).  Greater  efficiency  gains  may be associated  with the removal  of the distortions  that lead to the
adoption  and perpetation of wage  labor contracts,  and large commercial  farms rather than fixed-rent
or share contracts.
PART  m:  LAND  POUCY
Many institutional  arrangements  in land markets  emerge  as a result  of attempts  by the
contracting  parties  to overcome  problems  of asymmetric  information,  moral hazard, and covariance  of
risk. Other  types  of institutional  aangements represent  interventions  by the government  or
community  intended  to produce  outcomes  that are more congruent  with the society's  objectives  than
those  that would  be generated  by market  forces  alone. Here, we wI  define  efficiency  and equity  as
the main objectives  underlying  intventions  in land markets,  although  equity  can be considered  a tool
62for achieving  the more encompassing  objective  of minimizing  social  tensions.  The two objectives  are
not always  compatible;  in some  situations  interventions  that facilitate  greater equity  would  reduce
efficiency,  and vice versa. But not always.
Four broad  types of land  distribution  and production  relations  remain  today (figure  1),
each with its own characteristic  policy  problems. Family  farm systems  under freehold  or communal
tenure  face problems  of access  to credit, land  registration  and titling, tenancy  regulation,
fragmentation,  and taxation.  Communities  in which  communal  tenure  prevails  face decisions  about
allowing  sales to outsiders.  Where  large scale  mechanized  commercial  farms  coexist  with low wages
and unemployment,  governments  have  to consider  ways,  such as the elimination  of tenancy
regulation,  the elimination  of agricultural  subsidies  and/or land reform,  to make farm size
distributions  more compatible  with equity  and efficiency  objectives.  In wage  plantation  systems,
contract  farming  and taxation  are the important  issues.  For collective  and state farms systems  the key
concern  is whether  decollectivization  or privatization  should  aim to establish  large commercial  farms
or small  family  farms.
7.  Land  registration and titling
The issues
Land dtles an registation reduce  the problems  of asymmetric  information  and thus
provide  the instittional framework  to facilitate  land  sales. Such  transfers  can enhance  efficiency  by
transferring  land from bad managers  to better  farmers  and by facilitating  the use of land as collateral
in the credit  market. Transfers  of land, which  are facilitated  by land tides may  negatively  impact
equity  as well  as efficiency  if economic  and insdtutional  distortions  encourages  accumulation  of land
by influential  or wealthy  individuals.  As establishment  and maintenance  of land tidies  is not costless,
whether  to introduce  titding  has to be based  on a comparison  of the benefits  of land  tites over and
above  existng arrangements  to regulate  land  transactions  and the likely  cost of such arrgemes.
In the early stages  of agricultural  development,  transactions  in land take place  mainly  among
individuals  who are members  of the same  community  and who  generally  share information  about  the
63rights enjoyed  by a renter or a seller, and about  rights to specific  tracts of land. With more advanced
agriculture  and increased  mobility,  communal  constraints  on sales to outsiders  are abandoned  and
transactions  are increasingly  with individuals  who  are not members  of the same  community.  The
scope  for asymmetric  information  increases,  generating  inefficiencies  in the land  market since the
price of land may no longer reflect  its true social value  and the extent  of land transactions  becomes
less than optimal.  To reduce  these informational  inefficiencies  and the associated  welfare  losses,
societies  develop  institutional  arrangements  to reduce  risk, such as the requirement  in the Arthsastra
(4th Century  B.C. in India)  that land transactions  be conducted  in public  with witnesses  or the
establishment  of a centralized  public  register  that  tracks land plots and those  who have  rights  over
these plots. As early as 600 B.C., the Bible  describes  a land  transaction  between  the prophet
Jeremiah  and a relative in which  a written  record of the transaction  was kept in two copies with a
certain  priest in Jerusalem.
Public registers  provide  potential  buyers  or renters  of land with a way  to verify that the
rights  they are about  to purchase  belong  to the seller. A functioning  legal system  and effective
enforcement  mechanisms  are other institutional  arrangements  designed  to reduce  the uncertainty
related  to land  transactions.  Without  such arrangements  to reduce  the risk of challenges  to land rights,
the incentives  to invest  and to work  hard are weakened.  It is often more efficient  to reduce  the risk
through  the provision  of public  goods (and records,  police,  judiciary),  than trough the private
individual  allocation  of resources  (guards,  elaborate  fences).2
Asymmetric  Information  and risk are at their extremes  in frontier  areas, where  specific
plots have no previous  owners,  though  the government  usually  claims  formal  ownership.  While often
the land is subject  to a general  claim  by trbal groups  who  have  been using it for hunting,  gathering,
horticulture  or livestock  grazing, some  of it is also claimed  by individuals  who  have migrated  from
other areas. Since  there Is no culturally  unified  community  from which  to ubtain  knowledge,  the
administrative  infrastructure  Oand  record, offices,  courts, police) typically  becomes  overloaded  by
claims  and counter  claims. It is not uncommon  then to find private  (and necessarily  segmented)
institutions  protecting  property  rights  over land (gunmen,  fortified  property).  And  because  the
2  In Ugand and COte  d'Ivoie, Ind privuiiaon significandy  decreased  rids and rdacon  coss
associated  with  transferng  lnd relt  in inasd  land  trasfr,  a factor  commonly  associated  with  higher
productivity  in agrculture  (Barrows  and  Roth  1990;  Atwood  1990).
64Institutions  for recording  property  are not well  developed,  land claims  based  on forest  clearing  can
lead  to excessive  deforestation  (Southgate,  Sierra  and Brown 1991).
Institutional  arrangements  for land records  and title documents  also have  beneficial
implications  for credit  markets.  In lending,  asymmetric  information  provides  ample  scope  for moral
hazard. Collateral  has long served  as a means  of minimizing  the efficiency  losses  associated  with
asymmetric  information  and moral  hazare  nnd  land has traditionally  been viewed  as an ideal
collateral  asset in areas where  land  is scarce  (Binswanger  and Rosenzweig  1986).  For land  to be
useful  as collateral,  however,  the lender  needs  to be assured  that the borrower-operator  has the right
to dispose  of the land by sale or the transfer  of use rights.  Thus the documentation  of land  rights
makes  land a form of credible  collateral,  affects  the willingness  of lenders  to make  loans  and may
make credit  markets  more efficient  (Feder,  Onchan,  and Raparla, 1988).  Where  the inability  to use
untited land as collateral  for credit  is the relevant  constraint,  the issuance  of titles can provide  a
solution  in the long term. But  other constraints  such as small  farm size prevent the operation  of a
credit  markets,  land titles may fail to be useful  until  these obstacles  are not removed  (Atwood  1990).
Under  ideal conditions  government  intervention  in land registration  is theoretically
neutral  in its effect  on equity.  In practice,  however,  titling  c3n  lead to greater concentration  of land
and to the dispossession  of groups  that have  enjoyed  land  rights  under a customary  system  that
predated  the formal  system.  When titling  is introduced,  wealthier  and beter connected  individuals
may  use their information  advantages  to claim  land  over which  other, less informed,  individuals  have
customary  rights. Even when there are no information  advantages,  titling based  on the on-demand
principle  involves  fixed  and relatively  high transacton costs for surveys  and bureaucratic  processing
that put smallholders  at a disadvantage.  The equity-reducing  impacts  of titing on this basis are well-
known.  The introduction  of selective  dtling  on demand  greatly  facilitated  the emergency  of haciendas
in Central  Luzon (Hayami  and Kikuchi  1984),  Guatemala  (Cambranes  1985),  El Salvador  (Lindo-
Fuentes 1990),  and Nicaragua  (Newson  1987).  In Bolivia  during  the 1980s,  the tiding agency  granted
titles to very large farms  in the Eastern  Lowlands  within  one to two years, while  applications  from
smallbolders  without  the benefit  of helpful  lawyers  have  an average  processing  time of 12 years.
Bruce (1988)  notes  that land  grabbing  by influential  individuals  during  tiding programs  who are able
to use the rules in their favor  did more to facilitate  land concentration  than transactions  in the land
market following  the issuance  of tides. The profitability  of consolidating  several  small untitled
65holdings  and geting a single  title provides  incentives  for w'althy individuals  to buy out smalholders
and to concentrate  their own  holdings. Titled land  also provides  advantages  in the credit market
(Feder, Onchan  and Raparla  1988)  that are likely  to increase  income  disparity.
The policy implications
To avoid  these  undesirable  effects,  titling  programs  should  be accompanied  by publicity
campaigns  to ensure widespread  lnowledge  of the rules and procedures.  Both equity  and efficiency
considerations  argue that  titling programs  by systematic  rather than  on demand.  Efficiency  is
increased  through  economies  of scale and equity  by the fact that all claims  in an area are registered  at
the same  time. The ryorwari  sys.  a introduced  by the British  system  In Southern  India around 1820
and similar  systematic  ttling progrmns  elsewhere  show  that conflicting  claims  can be dealt with
dhrough  a relatively  quick  administative  procedure  rather than through  lengthy  and costly  legal
channels.
Because  dtling programs  can be expensive,  the issue of optimal  expenditure  is relevant
(see Malik  and Schwab  1991).  Feder and Feeny (1992)  have  demonstrated  that when individual
wilingness to pay for tidtling  determines  the aggregate  public  expenditure,  there may  be a tendency  for
over-investment  from a social  wdfare perspective.  Frequenty, some  less costly  arrangement  than
foral  titling may  significantly  lessen  the problem  of asymmetry  of information.  In Rwanda,  the local
municipality  issues  affidavits  that attest  to he ownership  rights  of specific  individuals  over specific
tracts of land but are not based  on precise  surveys  (Blarel  and associates  1992).  A lower cost system
was also used in Thailand  prior to the inrduction  of formal  dtling (Siamwalla  et. al. 1990, Feeney
1988).
Communal  systems  constitute  a special  case. Communal  land is not considered  adequate
collateral  In formal  credit  systems  because  of constraints  on sales to outsiders.  Issuing  individual  titles
in communities  that maintain  such constraints  may  improve  neither  the security  if tenure  nor access to
credit, although  indib  ±ual tides would  be helpful  to avoid  barriers  to the emergence  of rental markets
within the community.  Until  the restrictions  on trnsfers  to outsiders  are eliminated,  a community tle
could be issued  to ensure the community's  security  of ownership  against  well-connected  outsiders.
Paeu  (1992)  advocates  registering  land as  corporate  property  as a wa, of decreasing  the costs
04.!associated  with tiding while  reaping  many  related  benefits  such as insurance,  flexibility  of land
allocation,  and the utilization  of genuine  scale  economies  in subsidiary  activities.  Experience  with
group ranches  in Kenya  suggests  that imposing  group titles from above  is unlikely  to be successful
while issuing  individual  tides does  not prevent  farmers  from taking  advantage  of scale where  they
exist (Grandin  1989).
Another  case  for community  titles concerns  common  property  resources,  such as
communal  pastures, forests,  or other marginal  lands. Such areas  constitute  an important  safety  net for
the poor that may be particularly  important  in high-risk  environments  where  alternative  means of
insurance  are unavailable.  Community  mechanisms  for managing  common  property resources  have
tended  to weaken  with economic  development  (Lawry 1991;  Jodha 1986  and 1990),  and privatization
of such resources  in India has led to significant  increases  in yields.  But the preservation  of common
property  resources  could  be desirable  from an equity  perspective  since privatizing  these  lands  takes
away  a part of the social safety  net for the rural poor. Providing  a community  tidtle  for these lands  can
protect communal  rights from outside  encroachment  and prevent  the poor from being  excluded  from
communal  property.  We need  to learn more about  the management  and the relative  importance  of
such areas to specific  social groups.
Assessments  of the impact  of individual  titling  on efficiency  vary. Atwood  emphasizes
that in a distorted  environment,  introduction  of land  titles may  decrease  equity  and efficiency.  Feder,
Onchan,  and Raparla  (1988)  find  that in Thailand,  where  possession  of a tide can be considered
exogenous' output is 14 to 25 percent  higher on titled land  than  on untitled  land  of equal quality.
The market  value is also much  higher  for tidtled  land than  for untitled  land of similar quality.  Less
rigorous evidence  is provided  for Costa  Rica by Sals  and associates  (1970),  who estimate  a positive
correlation  of .53 between  farm income  and title security.  Studies  in Brazil  and Ecuador  also suggest
a positive  association  between  farm income  and tidtles  (IDB 1986).  But several  studies  have
demonstrated  that the credit market  advantages  of titles account  for the lion's share of their effects
and that ownership  security  does not significantly  affect  demand  for tiding (Adholla  and associated
1991).  rTtling  may have  no significant  effect  at all when  legal or customary  rules limit  land
>  If the  decision  to acquire  title  is endogenous,  estimation  of the  effects  of tiling  using  crosssectiol da
is subject  to simultaneity  bias  (Boldt  1989;  Stanfield  1990).
67asactions and credit markets  are weak. In Latin  America  where credit  markets  are more devdoped,
recent  land dding programs  appear  generally  to have led to increases  in the value of land, without
encouraging  increased  concentration  - at least in the short term - (Stanfield  1990).
688. Land  Tax
The issues
In most developing  countries,  land  taxes  have evolved  from tribute  payments  to feudal
lords or to a colonizing  power. Because  the taxes  went to central  government  budgets,  local
willingness  to pay depended  on strong  enforcement  by tax collectors,  who  shared in the revenues.
Inflation  and the difficulty  of centralized  collection  eventually  led to the erosion  or complete
disappearance  of such taxes. Today,  the policy  question  is whether  to reinstate  land  taxes and,
perhaps  to use them  to finance  investments  and serviced  in local  jurisdictions,  as is done successfully
in the United  States.  In theory,  a tax on land  has three main advantages  over a tax on agricultural
output  or exports:  (1) if a land  tax is based  on the potential  monetary  yield of a certain  plot under
normal  conditions,  a land  tax has minimal  disincentive  effects;  (2) it facilitates  taxation  of the
domestic  agricultural  sector  while  being  much  less regressive  than  poll taxes; and (3) if the tax basis
is changed  infrequendy,  a land tax does  not discourage  investment  in land improvements.
If risk is high and insurance  markets  are unavailable  or imperfect,  introducing  a
significant  land  tax (based  on average  incomes)  can lead to increasing  land concentration  as Hamid
(1983)  has shown  for India. Under  these conditions,  a tax based  on actual  output,  which  acts as an
insurance  mechanism  in the same way  as sharecropping  does, might  be preferable  to a lump-sum  tax
on land (Hoff 1991).  It can be shown,  however,  that  for realistic  values  of risk aversion,  income
variation,  and export  taxes, producers  would  prefer a land  tax, balanced  by an equivalent  reduction  of
export  taxes (Skinner  1991).
Administering a tax on land effectively  and equitably  requires  having  an official  record,
or cadastre,  of the size, value, and ownership  status  of each  tract of land, its productive  capacity  and
information  on the costs  of outputs  and inputs.  Land tax administration  also requires  a property  tax
law that assigns  property rights  and tax obligations  and an administrative  organization  that keeps  the
register  up to date and assess, collects,  and enforces  the tax (Bird 1974).  Even in the few developing
countries  able  to meet these  conditions,  land  taxes are relatively  unimportant,  suggesting  that the
administrative  or political  costs  may  be higher  than the incentive  advantages  associated  with a land
tax.
69Progressive  land taxes are often  advocated  as a means  of making  land speculation  less
attractive  and inducing  large landowners  to sell out or use their land more intensively  (see Hayami,
Quisumbing,  and Adriano  1991  on the Philippines).  Landowners  often find  ways  around such taxes,
however,  from establishing  dummy  divisions  of their holdings  to lobbying  for exemptions  from
progressive  rates associated  with effective  use of the land (as in Brazil),  which  sharply  diminish  the
effectiveness  of progressive  land  taxes in breaking  up large commercial  farms. Such  an approach  was
applied  and failed in Argentina,  Bangladesh,  Brazil,  Colombia,  and Jamaica  (Strasma,  Aism, and
Woldstein  1987;  Bird 1974);  Carter  (1992)  in a simulation  model  calibrated  to Nicaragua  finds  that a
progressive  land tax is unlikely  to significantly  alter the distribution  of land. And  even if such taxes
did work, it is not obvious  why such  an indirect  approach  would  be politically  more acceptable  than
direct redistribution  of land. Progressive  land taxes  are also likely  to be associated  with higher
administrative  costs  and protracted  litigation.
Plicy  implications
Where  the administrative  requirements  - an up-to-date  cadastre  plus administrative
organization  - are lacking,  flat or mildly  progressive  land taxes  based  on rough classification  of
holdings  may still  be useful for raising  revenue  and providing  some  modest  incentives  for owners  to
sell off poorly utilized  land. The United  States  has found success  by assigning  the administration  of
land taxes  to local authorities  and earmarking  tax revenues  for local infrastructure  and local
government  services.  By increasing  the local  visibility  of the benefits  fianced with the tax revenue,
this approach  may  increase  willingness  to pay a land tax. It may also reduce  adminisrative  costs since
local governmens  should  be better able to assess  land  values  and land ownership.
9. Regulations  dmiting  land sales
Governments  and local authorities  have  often placed  restrictions  on land transactions.
Restrictions  are typically  placed  on land sales and rentals  when major changes  are introduced  to alter
the land  ownership  pattern (redistnbutive  land reform  or settling  programs).  The restrictions  are
designed  to prevent an increase  in the number  of landless  and in the social tensions  that accompany
landlessness.  Since these restrictions  also prevent  some  transfers  of land from worse to better farmers
70or managers,  there is likely  to be some  efficiency  loss. Such restrictions  are frequently  evaded,
however,  through  disguised  sales and rentls,  which  are likely  to involve  transaction  costs that
constitute  a loss to society.
Restrictions  on the rights of land reform  beneficiaries  or settlers  on state-owned  land to sell the
land also reduce  their access  to credit. Often  new owners  are forbidden  to mortgage  their land during
an initial  probation  period.  Since  that period  coincides  with the establishment  phase,  when their need
for credit is most urgent,  the efficiency  losses  may  be considerable.  Land  rental contracts  (usufruct-
mortgaging  and kasugpong  contracts  ) that  have arisen  as credit  substitutes,  in some  places, such as
the Philippines  (Nagarajan,  Quisumbing  and Otsuka  1991)  involve  considerable  efficiency  losses.
Sometimes  restrictions  on sales are not total, as in communal  systems  that  permit sales
only among  members  of the community.  The welfare  losses  from the sales restrictions  are less than in
the case  of a total ban, but they are not completely  eliminated.
In the early years after a redistributive  land  reform in areas where  land markets  are thin
and accurate  information  may  not be available  on the expected  stream  of incomes  from the land, it
may be reasonable  to impose  a temporary  restriction  on sales of say, three to four years.  That would
allow  sufficient  time to acquire  lnowledge  about  a farm's potential  and to avoid  sales at prices below
the real value of the land, which  would  run counter  to efficiency  and equity  objectves. Such
restrictions  would  not be needed,  however,  in areas  where former  tenants  receive  land  they have  been
tilling since  they can be assumed  to have adequate  knowledge  of the land. In the case  of partial
restrictions  under communal  systems,  the ban on sales to outsiders  may  serve a protective  role in
environments  where  outsiders  with strong  political  connections  may  attempt  to take over land in the
community.  Where  appropriate  institons  for inragroup decNsion-making  are available  (Libecap
1986),  permitting  the community  to limit sales and giving  it the right to decide  whether  to eventually
allow  sales  tD outsiders  may be an acceptable  compromise  between  equity  and efficiency  concerns  (see
Barrows  and Roth 1990).  As traditional  social  ties loosen  or the efficiency  loss from the sales
restriction  becomes  too high, groups  are likely  to allow  sales to outsiders.  The recent  constitutional
reform  of the land rights  system  In Mexico  allows  for free sales and rental within  all efidos and for
decision-making  by majority  vote on whether  to eliminate  the restriction  on sales to outsiders.
71The most common  means  of restricting  land sales are upper and lower  bound size
restrictions  and zoning  regulations.  Land ownership  ceilings  have  often been imposed  in an attempt  to
break up large estates  or to prevent  their reconcentration.  Among  countries  that  have imposed  ceiling
are Bangladesh  (Abdullah  1974),  India  (King 1977),  Indonesia,  Japan, Korea, Pakistan,  South
Vietnam,  Taiwan,  Egypt, Ethiopia,  Iran, Iraq, Zimbabwe,  Bolivia,  Cuba, El Salvador,  Guatemala,
Mexico,  and Peru. While  such ceilings  can theoretically  increase  efficiency  where  a negative
relationship  exists  between  size an,. vroductivity,  in practice  the ceilings  have  been evaded  through
fictitious  subdivisions  or have  become  superfluous  over time through  inheritance.  Ceilings  were often
commodity  specific  providing  much  larger limits  for sugarcane,  bananas  or livestock  ranching.
Therefore,  they encouraged  inefficient  conversion  to products  with the highest  ceilings.  Rarely  did
ceilings  alone enable  the poor landless  or extremely  small  farmers  to vurchase  land; rather, they
enabled  farmers  with medium-sized  holdings,  who  had already  acquired  some  equity,  to enlarge  their
holdings  (Chile).
Despite  these flaws  and loopholes  in practice,  several  studies  do credit land  ownership
ceilings  with a major role in preventing  new large consolidations  after land reform  (Cain 1981;
Mahmood  1990).  In Japan and Korea,  success  in preventing  the reaggregation  of land may  be
attributed  as much  to the availability  of attractive  investment  opportunities  outside  agriculture  and to
noneconomic  factors  sucL  as attachment  to land as to the ceilings  on land  holdings.  Ceilings  imposed
foLlowing  a land reform  that results in fairly homogenous  holdings  might  be effective  and less
disortionary in preventing  massive  reconcentration  of land.
At the opposite  end, resricdons on minmwn holding  size are intended  to prevent
excessive  frgentation  of farms. While it is not clear that  fragmentation  is always  a negative
phenomenon  (see below)  a floor on farm size might provide  a useful  countervailing  effect  in a society
where  inheritance  customs  lead to extremely  small farms. Whether  the intervention  improves
efficiency  depends  on the specific  circumstances.  Also  to be considered  is that many restrictions  on
subdivision  of land or minimum  holding  size have  historically  been  used to prevent ex-slaves,  tenants,
/  and  other powerless  groups  from acquiring  ownership  rights  to land and thus eventually  competing
with fanm established  by the rling  group.  Restrictions  on the subdivisions  of large farms  in Kenya
and Zimbabwe  have limited  the prospects  for land  resettlement  schemes  (Leys 1974)  and in these
circumstancs clearly  reduced  efficiency.
72Governments  often adopt  zoning  regulations,  .e. assign  specific  uses  to certain  lands  to
overcome  environmental  externalities  rather than allowing  market  forces  to determine  land usage.  In
urban areas, the objective  of zoning  is to prevent  commercia  or industrial  activities  from locating  in
residential  areas and creating  noise and  pollution.  In rural areas zoning  of land  for agricultural  use
provides  benefits  such as tax credits, exemption  from assessments  for urban  type services, eligibility
for soil conservation  programs,  and proteceion  from nuisance  suits, but forecloses  the option  of selling
the land as a residential  property.? In general,  zoning  is  justified  if negative  externalities  need  to be
reduced  by more than  the cost of zoning  enforcement.
Zoning  laws established  for social or environmental  reasons  may run counter  to
economic  incentives.  Zoning  may  then  need to be supported  by some  type of incentive  mechanism,
and political  support  for implementation  of the regulations  becomes  essential  to their enforcement
(Barrows  and Neuman  1990).  If there are sharp conflicts  between  private  profitability  of land uses
and zoning  regulations  in a country  with weak  institutional  infrastructure,  and little popular  support
for the zoning  measures,  zoning  may  lead to excessive  rent-seeking  and corruption.  If zoning  results
in the emergence  of extensive  rent-seeking  the benefits  may  greatly  decrease  or even become  negative
(Mills 1989).  Zoning  laws affect  supply  and demand  for land and may  lead to consumer  mobility  in
response  to zoning  Mfebout  effects).  The attempt  to counteract  production  or agglomeration
externalities  through  zoning  laws also generates  the potential  for rent seeking  behavior  by landowners
who either  try to evade  existing  zoning  regulations  or lobby  for the imposition  of a set of laws  which
would  provide  them with a differential  advantage.  All of these issues  have  been analyzed  largely  in
isolation  of each other and a comprehensive  analytical  treatment  is not yet available  (Pogodzinsi and
Sass 1990).
X  Hmabeny and Barrows  (1990)  find that parcel  caterics  in geneal ddemine whvetr agicultusb
zoni  has  positive  or neptive pnce effects,  in paicular  parcl  i  and ditance from  urban  areas.  (For a
toview  of the  effects  of urbanizaioD  on agnculture,  swe  Bhadra  and  Brmndao  1992.)
7310.  Fragmentation and consolidatlon
The Issues
While  governments  often  intervene  to prevent  fragmentation  of farm land, such
intervention  is not always  economically  justified.  Tbat requires  that inheritance  customs  or other
exogenous  forces  be responsible  for most of the fragmentation,  that losses from fragmentation  be
substantial,  and that existing  markets  be unable  to counter  fragmentation.
While inheritance  customs  probably  explain  much of the fragmentation  ^f.arm  land, it
may also reflect  conscious  decisions  by farmers  seeking  to reduce  their risk by diversifying  their farm
land and thus  their crops (McCloskey  1975).  'Ibis factor is likely  to be important  where  other risk-
diffusion  mechanisms  such as insurance,  storage,  or credit  are unavailable  or are associated  with
higher costs  than fragmentation.  Fragmentation  may also help  to smooth  out labor requirements  over
time where  labor requirements  are highly seasonal  (Fenoaltea  1976).
Among  the disadvantages  associated  with fragmentation  are physical  problems  (increased
labor time, land loss, need for fencing,  transportation  costs, and limitations  to access);  operational
difficulties  (unsuitability  of certain  equipment,  greater difficulty  with pest control  and management
and supervision,  foregone  improvements  such as irrigation,  drainage,  and soil conservation);  and
social externalities  (need  for extensive  road and irrigation  networks;  Simons  1987).  The few studies
which  quantify  losses  fom  fragmentation  developing  countries  suggest  that the losses  involved  are
modest,  although  further  studies  of the efflciency  of farms  or losses  from fragmentation  are clearly
needed.  Indeed, Heston  and Kumar  claim  that in Asia *it is hard to find  instances  where
fragmentation  had involved  high losses  in output' (1983:211),  and in Ghana  and Rwanda,  Blarel and
associates  (1992)  find  fragmentation  does not seem to hurt productivity  and does improve  risk
diversification  and the allocation  of family  labor over time.
Policy impllcatIons
Relying  on the market  to eliminate  tation is liklcy  to involve  high transaction
costs to coordinte transfers  among  large mumbers  of landowers. Transaction  costs are much  lower
74under goverament  programs,  which  are normally  coercive  and include  a range of other development
initiatives,  and returns  can be high - Simons  (1987)  finds  returns of 40 percent for France. However,
if the forces  that led to fragmentation  remain  unchanged,  land consolidation  programs  are unlikely  to
have  any long-term  effect  (Simons  1987;  Elder 1962).
When  should  something  be done about  fragmentation?  Experience  in industrialized
countries  shows  that fragmentation  becomes  a serious  constraint  requiring  intervention  once it impedes
the ability  to use machinery  on a large scale in areas with a rapidly  decreasing  agricultural  population
(Bentley  1987).  This is rarely the case  in developing  countries,  with their high population  densities.  In
addition,  consolidation  programs  are likely  to take a long time to complete,  and they require
considerable  human  capital  and well-developed  cadastres  and land  titles. Immediate  government  action
to consolidate  holdings  does not appear  to be a high priority  in most developing  countries,  considering
the high costs and the potential  reduction  of interest  in fragmentation  as rural credit and insurance
markets  improve.
11. Restrictions  on land rentals
The !ssues
Governments  have  often introduced  tenure  securhy  and rent control  legisladon  to protect
tenants  from arbitrary  eviction  or to limit  the amount  of rent landlords  can changc.  The unintended
result has often been  the eviction  of tenants  at the first hint of such  legislation  and the landlords'
resumption  of self-cultivation  on the home farm, resulting  eventually  in the formation  of Junker
estates.  In India, atempts to pwvide greater land  security  for tenants  could  be enforced  only in stes
that imposed  land ownership  ceilings  (King 1977),  and even  there, landlords  found  ways  to evade  the
legislation  by signing  tenants  to short-term  contracts  which  were exempt  from protection,  or by
rotating  tenants  from plot to plot.
Where  rent controls  have  been  effectively  implemented  and combined  with protection
from eviction  as in the Philippines  or Taiwan,  they do increase  tenants' income,  but since  there Is no
transfer  of ownership,  they are still likely  to result  in dynamic  efficiency  losses. In the longer  term,
75unless  landowners  find ways  to circumvent  the restriction  on rents, such policies  are likely  to reduce
incendves  for renting  out land, resulting  in efficiency  losses  from constraints  on adjustments  in
operational  farm  sizes. Investment  is also likely  to fall on farms on which  tenants  have a protected
status  since landlords  are unlikely  to invest  heavily  in land  from which  they are prevented  from
evicting  tenants  while tenants' incentives  to invest  are weakened  by uncertainty  about  the inheritability
of the protected  status.
Bans on share  tenancy  or low ceUings  on the landlord's  share are widespread  even
where  other forms of land rental  are allowed,  such as the Philippines  (Otsuka,  Chuma  and Hayami
1992),  Brazil (Estatuta  da Tierra 1964),  Zimbabwe  (Palmer  1979),  South Africa (Bundy  1985),
Honduras,  and Nicaragua  (Dorner 1992).  These restrictions  are motivated  in part by the common
belief  that share  tenancy  is exploitative  (because,  under conditions  of land  scarcity,  tenants  are likely
to receive  incomes  close  to their reservation  wage)  and in part by efforts  to eliminate  the Marshallian
inefficiency  associated  with share  contracts.  But if the choice  of contract  is endogenous  and if share
contracts  provide  efficiency  gains  under circumstances  of credit constraints  and high risk and
supervision  costs, simply  prohibiting  share contracts  without  changing  the underlying  framework  of
market imperfections  is likely  to result in very slight  gains  in efficiency  (Otsuka  and Hayami  1988).
More likely,  the bans will be ignored,  giving  way  to disguised  transactions  or less efficient  wage
labor contracs that improve  neither  equity  nor efficiency.  Tenancy  has long been an important
transitional  stage  allowing  peasants  to accumulate  capital  and gain agriculural experience,  so
elimination  of sharecropping  as a rung  on the agrarian  ladder  will certainly  not contribute  to equity  in
the long run. And considerable  inefficiency  in production  may be associated  with the absence  of
sharecropping  as an option,  especially  where  restrictions  on private  ownership  of land impede  the
functioning  of fixed-rent  markets  (Noronha  1985).  Collier (1989)  estimates  static  efficiency  losses  of
more than ten percent associated  with unavailability  of share  contracts  in Kenya. From al
perspectives  then, bans on sharecropping  and  low ceiling  on landlord's  share  have no merit.
7612. Redlstributive land reform
The Issues
Most redistributive  land reform  is motivated  by public  concern  about  the rising tensions
brought  about  by an unequal  land  distribution.  The common  pattern is concentration  of landownership
among  relatively  few large owners  in an economy  where  labor is abundant  and land is scarce. Thus
the masses  of landless  laborers  and tenants  who  derive  their livelihoods  from agriculture  receive
relatively  less income  because  their only asset is labor. Redistributive  land  reform  can also increase
efficiency,  by transferring  land  from less  productive  large units to more  productive  small,  family-
based  units (section  4).X6  Yet, because  of other market  imperfection,  land markets  will not typically
effect  such transformations  of ownership  patterns.  The value  of the land to large owners  may  exceed
the discounted  sum of agricultural  income  smallholders  can expect  to receive  despite  their productivity
advantages  from lower  supervision  costs if there are policy  distortions  favoring  large owners  or if the
access  of small farmers  to long-term  credit  haz already  been exhausted  by mortgage-based  land
acquisition.
Market  values  of land  are determined  in a way  that  prevents  small  farmers  who lack
equity  from building  up viable  farms  and improving  their standard  of living while  repaying  their land
mortgage.  Land reform  schemes  that require  payment  of the full market  value  of the land are likely  to
fall unless  special  arrangements  are made.  In the simplest  case, beneficiaries  soon default  and the
program ends. Many ambitious  land  reform  programs  simply  run out of steam because  full
compensation  of old owners  at market  prices imposes  fiscal  requirements  that the political  forces  are
unwilling  to meet - that was the fate  of programs  in Brazil, the Philippines,  and Venezuela.  Some
programs  attempt  to avoid  this problem  by compensating  landowners  (with  bonds)  whose  real value
erodes  over time. Not surprisingly,  landowners  oppose  this thinly disguised  confiscation,  and such
programs  are politically  feasible  only in circumstances  of political  upheaval  (Cuba,  Japan, Korea,
Taiwan  or Vietnam).  Another  approach  is to finance  land purchases  through  foreign  grants  or from
intal  tax revenues  or inflationary  monetary  expansion  - or some  combination.
X  Under  circuma  of extem  poverty  and  lsndo  redistribution  of land  can  also  enhance  efficiency
by iprovng  t  nutnritional  wllbeig and  thus  the  productve  capacity  of the population  (Dasgupta  and  Ray
1986  and 1987,  Mon.  1992).
77Polley implications
Before  any land redistribution  program  is ihtroduced,  the implicit  and explicit  distortions
which  drive land prices above  the capitalized  value of agricultural  profits  need  to be eliminated.
Otherwise,  small farmers  will continue  to have  an incentive  to sell out to larger farmers  since the
eavironment  would  still favor  large ownership  holdings.  In Brazil, the emergence  of an agricultural
structure  dominated  by large farms  owes much  to the policy  bias in favor of large farms (Binswanger
1987).  The poor must be provided  with either  the land or a grant to help them buy it to compensate
for their lack of equity. Credit  to beneficiaries  for land purchases  can only play a subsidiary  role."'
The macro-economic  and political  environment  also strongly  affect  the outcome  of land  reform
policies.  In Chile, substantial  increases  in output  followed  the expropriation  and redistribution  of
almost  20 percent  of the total agricultural  land in 1964-70,  much  of it due to the increase  in
investment  induced  by the favorable  macroeconomic  and political  conditions  (Jarvis 1985, 1989).  In
contrast,  output  failed  to increase  significantly  during  the decollectivization  and breakup  irzo fawrily
farms in 1975-83,  a period  of extremely  unfavorable  government  policies.  Not  until some  of the debts
incurred to pay for the land  had been  forgiven  and structural  impediments  affecting  small farmers  had
been eliminated  did the program  become  fully  effective.  Removing  distortions  also lowers  the amount
of grant assistance  needed  by small  farmers  to support  their acquisition  of land.
The type  of manorial  estate  has a substantial  bearing  on the gains  to be expected  from
land reform. On landlord  estates,  would-be  beneficiaries  are already  managing  operational  units so
land reform addresses  primarily  the equity  concerns  of society,  transferring  the entidtlement  to land
rents while  leaving  operational  farm structure  largely  unchanged.  Potential  efficiency  gains  are
associated  with improved  investment  incentives  and increased  security  of tenure (section  3). With
haciendas,  the threat  of land reform  legislation  often  leads to the eviction  of tenants  and reductions  in
the resident  work force. The large commercial  farms  that result are more difficult  to subdivide  than
landlord estates  or haciendas  (de Janvry 1981, Castllo and Lehman  1983;  de Janvry  and Sadoulet
7 Organizations  such  as the  Penny  Foundation  is Guatemaa  have  been  able  to buy  land  from  owners  and
distbute  it to small  faer.v with itle appan government  subsidies  (Foer  1992).  These  ca  usually
mvolve  mome  grnt elemet or subidy  the  credit  provnded  to the  smallholders,  or the  purchase  of the  land
below  market  prices  on account  of liabilities  of the  fomr  ownr to govenment  insituion or the  worers
which  ar  forgiven  as pat of the  dea.
781989).  Land reforms  of Junker  estates  and large mechanized  farms involve  major changes  in the
organization  of production.  The resident  labor  force and external  workers  have  little or no
independent  farming  experience,  and in many  cases, neither  the infrastructure  nor the investments  in
physical  capital  provide  an appropriate  basis for smallholder  cultivation.
The availability  of technology  and of competitive  input  and output  markets  thus becomes
a crucial  determinant  for the potential  of land  reform  to increase  efficiency.  Appropriate  institutional
arrangements  are needed  to ensure  access  to extension  services,  credit, and markets.  Such  institutions
are especially  important  where  land reform  involves  resettling  beneficiaries  on former  Junker  estates
or large mechanized  commercial  farms. To reap  the efficiency  gains  of family  farming  under  these
conditions  seems  to require  increasing  the density  of family  labor, and that may require  resetding
landless  workers  from outside.2  Reform  of these  systems  is likely  to be difficult,  but where  the
alternative  to reform  is the perpetuation  of large economic  and social  costs, including  the possibility
of revolt and civil war, the cost of failing  to reform  may  be enormous.
Opinions  are divided  on redistributive  reform  of wage  plantations  in the classic
plantation  crops: banana,  sugar, tea and oil palm. The fact that contract  farming  in these plantation
crops is practiced  successfully  in many  parts of the developing  world  indicates  that convertng
plantations  to contract  farming  is feasible.  Indeed,  Hayami,  Quisumbing,  and Adriano  describe  the
successfil conversion  of even  a banana  plantation  into a contract  farming  system  in the Philippines,
and strongly  argue for bringing  about  more such conversations  through  a progressive  land tax. The
efficiency  gains  from lower  supervision  costs associated  with such a step are likely  to be offset,
however,  because  of the genuine  economies  of scale in plantation  crops.
Tryig  to replace  plantations  with collectives  rather than contract  farming  has been
unsuccessful.  In Peru, the failure  of collectivized  sugar plantations  to invest  and their increased
esploitation  of external  workers  who  were denied  membership  rights led to strikes  by collective
members  that were put down  by military  intervention.  Continuing  losses  - in part due to falling  world
X  To  oomm  extent,  credit  and  other  public  support  can sbtute for the  advantage  of mmily  labor  per
hocae  Loys  (1978)  found  for  Kenya  that  there  ws8  very  little  difference  in economic  peformance  between
high  density hm,  with  smal  p!ots  and  low  public  investmen,  and  low  denst sms  with arg  plots
and  subal  publc uppoft
79sugar prices - provoked  increased  government  intervention  and the effective  transformation  of the
collectives  into state farms  (Kay 1952).  In Malaysia rubber  plantations  which  had been established  on
a collective  basis were split up and allocated  to individual  farmers  at maturity  to ensure  proper
tapping  (Pickett  1988).
13. Decollectlvization
The poor performance  of collectives  and state farms  the world over is so obvious  that
the question  facing  the liberalizing  economies  of Eastern  Europe  and the Commonwealth  of
Independent  States  is not whether  to privatize  but rather how  quicldy  and in what form - as large
commercial  farms or family  farms.
Policy implications
The discussiotns  in this paper imply  that four issues  appear  to be of overriding
importance  in determining  this policy  choice:
*  The small farm option is viable  only if there are competitive  input  and output markets.
Otherwise  the land rent ai4 the entrepreneurial  rents from agriculture  would  be captured  by the
monopolistic  output  marketers  and input  suppliers  rather than by the new farm owners. Risk
diffusion  mechanisms  also need  to be functioning  adequatly else covariate  weather  or price
shocks  can force distresc  sales by new  landowners,  who  do not have  other assets or income
streams. Work  on creating  competitive  input  and output marketing  systems  and a viable
financial  system  therefore  has to start before  large farms are split up ino individual
landhchlings.
Experience  from China, Vietnam,  and East  Germany  shows  that inputs  and machinery  services,
which  have previously  been  supplied  by the cooperative,  are more efficiently  provided  by
private contractors  who lease or buy the machinery  stock  from the cooperative  in a competitive
process (Nolan 1988, Pingali  and Xuan 1992, Pryor 1992).  The Chinese  experience  also
suggests  that farmers  and machinery  suppliers  respond  to the changes  in operational  holding
80size by adopting  a difference  and  generally  more  efficient  pattern of mechanization  (Ling
1991).  TIhs  suggests  that tne excessive  lumpiness  of the existing  machine  stock is not a serious
constraint  to smaller  scale farming.
Agriculture  research,  extension,  and other production  support  services  take on special
importance  since  many farm  workers  are likely  to lack the skills  needed  to manage  their own
farms. Some  of the structures  that served  quasi-governmental  functions  on collective  and state
farms  particularly  by providing  education  and health  services  could  be retained  as well.  They
might also eventually  develop  into independent  cooperatives  for supplying  machinery,  custwr
plowing  machine  rentals  or for inputs  and possibly  credit  - all in competition  with the private
sector (see Nolan 1988;  Pryor 1992).
*  Where  capital  skills, technology,  infrastructure,  or competitive  markets  for inputs  and outputs
are lacking,  enthusiasm  for independent  farming  may  be lacking  as well. If only a few
entrepreneurs  are willing  to farm, the resulting  farms  are then likely  to be too large for the cost
advantage  associated  with the use of family  labor, and large commercial  farms, heavily
mechanized  or dependent  on large numbers  of hired workers,  will emerge  in their stead. Most
likely  such large farms  would  continue  to press for subsidies,  emerge  as rent-seekers  from the
rest of society  and, if successfiu,  generate  insufficient  employment.  Therefore,  countries  may
need  to find  temporary  arrangements,  including  long-term  land  leases, that will provide  a
greater number  of households  with opporunities  to acquire  the necessary  skills  needed  to allow
the emergence  of a structure  of smaller  family  farms  more consistent  with the income  and wage
levels and rural labor forces  that can be expected  for these  economies  in the next few  decades.
EPILOGUE  ON METHODOLOGY
Scholars  of various ideological  persuasiveness  and methodological  commitments  have
attempted  to explain  the great variations  in land relations  over space  and over time which  have  been
the topic of this paper. Much of the discordance  among  these  scholars  is closely  associated  with their
choice  of modeling  strategies  and assumptions.  This epilogue  relates  the analytical  results  and the
81observed  variations  in land relations  discussed  in this paper  to the minimum  set of assumptions  needed
to derive  the results or explain  the variations. We distinguish  several  levels of assumptions.
Lewl A assumes  se:.-mterested  behavior,  such as expected  utility  maximization  or other
forms of purposive  behavior,  of all actors, who compete  on a level playing  field  in an environment
with risk using voluntary  transactions,  with symmetrically  distributed  information  and exogenously
given  endowments  of land, capital, and skills. Technology  is characterized  by constant  or diminishing
returns  to scale. Virtually  none of the variations  in land relations  discussed  in this paper can be
explained  with these assumptions  alone.
Lewl B adds constraints  in the credit  market  cr assumes  that market  is entirely  absent.
Formal  models  of surplus  value  from Marx to the generalized  version  of Roemer  (1982)  use this
approach  to explain  capitalist  exploitation  and the endogenous  differentiation  of maximizing  individual
economic  agents - who operate  in a competitive  environment  with voluntary  transactions  - into
economic  classes  as the consequence  of differences  in their exogenous  endowments  of physical  capital
and absent credit  markets.  Eswaran  and Kotwal  (1985)  apply  Roemer's  approach  to agriculture,
imposing  in addition  constant  costs (section  4).
Lewl C adds asymmetric  information,  moral  hazard, and incentive  problems,  arriving  at
the analytical  apparatus  of agency  theory.  As Stiglitz  (1986)  summarizes,  these assumptions  are
sufficient  to explain  credit rationing,  thereby  giving an analytical  underpinning  to level B models.
They also explain  various combinations  of reasons  for sharecropping  and interlinked  credit (section
6). Ihese assumptions  are also sufficient  to establish  the superiority  of family  farms, as discussed  in
the mathematical  model  of Feder (section  4 and appendix  2) and the historically  widespread  use of
teona  by large owners  of land at moderate  to high population  density  to circumvent  the diseconomy
of rale (section  2). Incentives  issues  of collectives  are also analyzed  with this analytical  apparatus
(section  4).
Level C models  provide  little insight  into the process  by which  large landownership
holdings  could accumulate  or be perpetuated  in systems  characterized  by voluntary  transactions  and
competition,  and with constant  or diminishing  returns.
82Level  D adds  several  material  conditions  relating  specifically  to agricultural  production,
generating  the analytical  apparatus  used by Meillassoux  (1981)  or Binswanger,  Rosenzweig,  and
McIntire  (1986, 1987).  The material  conditions  most frequently  used in this paper are covariance  of
risk and returns among  farmers  and workers  in a given  agricultural  region,  the immobility  of land,
which  - when it is scarce  - makes  it Into a preferred  store of wealth  (relative  to stocks  and livestock,
for example)  and of collateral,  and exogenously  given  population  density  and processing
characteristics  of specific  agricultural  commodities.
Covariance  creates  enormous  difficulties  for intertemporal  markets  for crop insurance
and credit.  Because  of land's preferred  role as store of wealth  and as collateral,  an insurance  and
collateral  benefit  is associated  with landownership.  Together  with the failure of intertemporal  markets
this preferred  role explains  the prevalence  of distress  sales and the accumulation  of large
landownership  holdings  even in a competitive  environment  with strictly  voluntary  contracts  and
diseconomies  of scale (section  5). Ihe potential  failure  of land sales markets  to improve  efficiency  in
an environment  with missing  or imperfect  intertemporal  markets  is a powerful  and historically
relevant  illustration  of the theorem  of second  best (Lipsey  and Lancaster  1957)  of neoclassical
economics.
The explanation  of variations  over time and space  of property  rights  to specific  plots of
land (sections  1 and 2) requires  the introduction  of population  density  and its association  with the
farming  systems  and the farm technologies,  as explained  by Boserup  (1965).  The seasonality  of
production,  the timeliness  requirements  of specific  crops, and the economies  of scale  of the
processing  plants or transport facilities  required  for them are necessary  material  conditions  to explain
the survival,  in only a few specific  plantatio'%  crops, of wage  plantations  in the absence  of slavery  or
indentured  labor (section  4). Note that anthropologists,  like  Marvin Harris, who use behavioral-
materialist  approaches  also carefully  specifying  their detailed  material  assumptions,  although  their
themes  extend  well  beyond  those  discussed  in this paper.
Level E partly abandons  the assumption  of voluntary  contracts  (for the case of slavery
and bondage)  and extends  the analysis  beyond  individualistic  approaches  and transactions  by
introducing  rent seeking,  coalition  building,  and the coercive  power  of the state to enforce  laws.
Ihese additions  facilitate  the explanation  of the use of bondage  and slavery,  tribute systems,  state
83allocations  of preferential  land rights and enforcement  powers  to ruling groups, distortions  in
commodity  and fctor  markets,  and distortions  In public  expenditures  specifically  intended  to extract
rent and make large ownership  or operational  holdings  competitive  with independent  family  farms
(section  2 and 3). The historical  literature  has sharply  differentiated  between  coercive  and noncoercive
methods  of rent extraction  and has often equated  the elimination  of coercive  means with the leveling
of the playing  field. While  there are certainly  important  qualitative  differences  between  coercive  and
noncoercive  means,  the differentiation  seems  to have  obscured  the continuity  of rent seeking  or
surplus  extraction  along alternative  paths  such as taxation  of the free peasant  sector, land allocation,
monopoly  marketing,  and the allocation  of public  spending.
Level E explains  the emergence  and persistence  over time of highly  dualistic  farms size
structures  as the result primarily  of a rarely broken chain  of rent seeking  (sections  2 and 3). It
explains  the poor economic  performance  of many such  systems  as the result of a dissipation  of rents
into the cost of competition  for them among  zent-seeking  groups.20  Within  the chain of rent-seeking,
the officially  sanctioned  set of legitimate  instruments  of rent seeking  may  be progressively  reduced  by
gradually  eliminating  slavery  and serfdom,  tribute and corvde,  and land  rental, until  only output and
factor market  distortions  and differential  allocation  of public expenditure  remain.  With exogenous
variation  in the set of instruments  available  for rent seeking,  this framework  of analysis  can explain  a
substantial  proportion  of the variation  over space and time in the level of use of each of the available
instruments.  For given instruments,  modeling  at level  D can also, in principle,  investigate  the income
distributions  and efficiency  costs associated  with the resulting  distortions,  while  the theory of rent
seeking  behavior  (Tollison  1982)  can be used to investigate  the extent  to which  rents are dissipated  in
the process  of competing  for them.
reBner  (1975,  198S)  argues  tt  under  faudalism  the  rents  extmcted  from  pents  by luoded  elites  were
almost  completely  dissipated  and  that  tho esult  failure  by  peasants  and  landlords  to rnvest in land
imwovem  and  drft animals  wa responsible  for the  extension  of arble farming  to marginal  lands  and  the
declining  productivity  asocited with  pwuin  gwth  in feudl European  aiulre.  Thus  it was  th  nt
oekigg  itself  that  led  to the  Neo-Malthusian  or Ricardian  subsistenco  cises of the  twelfth  and  thinteth
centuries, daer  than  to popuation-induced  positive  Boserup-succes of investment, age  in technique,
inresed  divsion  of labor,  and  agiculura productivity  growth.  This  explansion  of sagnant  or declining
prductivity  is smilar to tht documented  by Kreger, Sdhiff,  and  Valdes  (1992)  to explain  trecet  stgata
of agrulture and  limited  technical  change  in much  of Africa  as  a cosqun  of the  extrdinry  high
taxaion  of (mosty  smallholder)  agriculte in my  Africn counties  by urbn-domatd  stes.
84Finally,  level F asks  questions  that are touched  on only lighdy  in this paper about  what
determines  endogenously  the changes  in the set of instruments  available  for rent seeking  or surplus
extraction  in a given  country  at a given  time. Population  density  and its distribution  over space
becomes  and endogenous  variable.  The questions  include  the extensively  debated  issues  of the demise
of feudalism  and bondage  (Marx;  Dobb 1977;  Brenner 1985);  the abolition  of slavery  (Fogel  and
Engerman  1977;  Meillassoux  1991);  the elimination  of corvee,  tribute, and debt peonage;  the power
to monopolize  output and input  markets  (Anderson  and Hayami  1986);  elimination  of the land rental
option;  and land reform  (de Janvry 1981).  The questions  analyzed  also include  why  revolt and
revolution  are necessary  in some  cases,  while in others  a change  in the set of instruments  available  is
successfully  accomplished  by reform,  and why some  reforms  lead to stable and efficient  production
relations,  while others  result in institutions  that are unsuccessful  in either equity  or efficiency.
These are the grand  themes  of historians,  classical  economists,  and Marxist  historical
materialist  analysis.  These issues  usually  involve  coalitions  (or their breakdown)  that, except  in purely
agrarian  societies,  extend  beyond  opposing  rural groups  to include  manufacturing,  trading, financial,
bureaucratic,  or foreign  interests.  Therefore  additional  exogenous  elements  (including  material  ones)
from outside  agriculture  must be factored  into the exploratory  framework.  Much  of the work  on these
themes  that we have come  across  neither  explicidy  specifies  assumptions  about  the distribution  of
information  (level  C) nor formally  includes  into the analysis  specific  material  conditions  of agriculture
(introduced  in level D) or other sectors  of the economy.  And while  rent seeking  of level E is implicit
in the questions  asked, and coalitions  or their breakdown  are discussed,  the coalition  building
associated  with rent seeking  is rarely modeled  explicitly.  There may be some  gains  to be had from
more formal considerations  of these  omitted  elements  and their incorporation  into the structure  of the
andysis of these grand  themes.
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Interventions to Establish and Support Large Farms
The literature  on emergence  and evolution  of manorial  estates  and the production  relations
prevailing  within  such estates  has focussed  largely  on examples  from Europe  (mainly  Britain,  France,
Germany,  and Eastern Europe).  This appendix,  which  explains  table 1 in the text, provides  evidence
on the establishment  and evolution  of large farm systems  from a wider  range  of setdngs  and covers  a
longer time period.
The examples  discussed  here all suggest  that neither  the establishment  nor the continued
existence  of large farms were due to their superior  economic  efficiency  and/or the presence  of
economies  of scale in agricultural  production.  The establishment  of large farms  was due to
government  intervention  in favor  of large landholders  via land  grants  and differential  taxation.
Withdrawal  of these privileges  led either  to their disintegration  into landlord  estates  or to a shift
towards  rent seeking  and more subtle  forms  of support  for large farms.
Asia
India (North)
Land  market  interventions.  The hacienda  system  is already  described  in the Arthshastra  from
the 4th century  BC. In the first century,  land  grants  comprising  some  ten or more villages  each were
made to priests and to a few members  of the ruling family  and high officers  of the state (Sharma
1965).  This process  of land  grants 'culminated  in the 11th  and 12th  centuries,  when Northern  India
was parcelled  into numerous  political  units largely  held  by secular  and religious  donees  who enjoyed
the gift villages  as little  better than  manors' (Sharma  1965:273).
DifWerendal  waton and  labor  levies.  Corvee  labor emerged  in the second  century  and
remained  prevalent  until the tenth century.  Between  the fifth  and tenth centuries,  where  population
density  was high enough,  as in Gujarat,  Rajasstan,  and Maharastra,  permanent  tenants  were reduced
to tenants  at will. Where  population  density  was low, tenants  and artisans  were tied  to the soil in the
same manner  as serfs in medieval  Europe  (Sharma  1965).
China (South)
Diferend  tation  and  labor  kvies. The equitable  land  allotment  system  introduced  around
600 under conditions  of land  abundance  allocated  land equally  among  all members  of the commTunity
in return for tax payments.  Slaves  received  the standard  size of plot but had to pay only half the taxes
demanded  from free men (Chao 1986).  Peasants,  however,  could  not escape  the tax burden since
farmers  who fled to uncultivated  lands  were returned  to their village  by the authorities.  DeFrancis
(1956)  quotes  reports  of 600,000 "refugees having  been  collected  in a single  year (544).  To escape
the tax, many  cultivators  presented  themselves  as serfs  or "bondservants"  to large landholders  or
monasteries,  leading  to the emergence  of large estates. In a major  land reform  in 1369  under the
Ming  dynasty,  the estates  were broken  up into small  freehold  farms (Eastman  1988).  Following  the
land reform, tax captains  were installed  to administer  tax collection  from units of 110  households  each
and to deliver  grain taxes to government  warehouses.  Using corvee  labor and bondservants,  they were
also active in land clearing  to expand  their revenue  base (Shih 1992).  They accumulated  modest
86estates  of their own thanks  to their ability  to provide  credit. Increasingly  heavy  tax demands  (to
finance  wars)  left many  tax captains  in a desperate  situation.
The new  gentry class that  began to emerge  in the fourteenth  century  was exempt  from both
taxes  and labor services. Since  gentry landlords  did not pay taxes, they were able  to reap  higher
returs  from land and accumulate  wealth. They were able to further  increase  their holdings  after
periods  of disaster  by foreclosing  on lands  they had accepted  as collateral  for credit (Shih 1992).
These advantages  made it easy for members  of the gentry to accumulate  land, decrease  the tax
captains'  revenue  base, and finally  buy out bankrupt  tax captains,  who by the end of the century  had
lost most of their land  to gentry landlords.  As gentry landlords  increased  their moneylending
activities,  small owners  in financial  difficulties  had to resort  to selling  their land or selling  themselves
to gentry  landlords  as serfs or bondservants,  thereby  obtaining  partial exemptions  from their tax
obligations.  Gentry  estates  grew to several  thousands  of hectares  in size, with a labor force of over
10,000.  The estates  were often split  up into smaller farms  of about  500 hectares,  managed  by
specially  educated  bondservants  (Shih 1992).
Following  the change  from the Ming to the Qing  dynasty  in 1644,  gentry landlords  lost their
tax privileges.  Declining  population  and greater opportunities  for off-farm  employment  during 1630-
50 increased  the amount  of land available  and, as in Westem  Europe, improved  the position  of
peasants  (Shih 1992).  In the second  half of the seventeenth  century,  the heritability  of serf status  was
repealed, and serfs were fully  emancipated  in 1728. Operation  of a large home  farm using wage  labor
was no longer profitable,  and landlord  estates  emerged  (Wiens  1980),  considerably  improving  the
position  of tenants. Tenancy  allowed  operational  holdings  to adjust  to household  size and led to very
labor-intensive  cultivation  and high yields  (Feuerwerker  1980).
Japan
Land market  interventions.  To provide  incentives  to make  the investments  required  to transform
wasteland  into paddy  land, the land reclamation  bill of 723 made such land  the heritable  personal
property  of the developer.  This provision  led to the emergence  of a separate  category  of private  land
that was tax exempt  and excluded  from the communal  tenure  system  in which  land  was redistributed
every six years among  all members  of the community  (Takekoshi  1967).
DWrerental  taxes and labor levies. In return for such land allotments,  farmers  had to pay
tribute in kind as well as special  labor services  of up to 140  days a year (Takekoshi  1967).  Cleared
and temple  lands, as well as land belonging  to the nobility,  were exempt  frota all tribute
requirements.  In order to obtain  immunity  from tributes, many  landowners  transferred  their lands  to
temples  or members  of the nobility.  While  they had to give up the heritable  right  to the land, original
landholders  did in most cases  continue  to manage  the land and home  farm cultivation  remained
minimal.  Higher officials  could accumulate  manors  of enormous  size, but in turn had to commend
their properties  to higher-ranking  individuals  to protect  the immunity  of their manor from tribute
requirements,  leading  to a complex  tenure-hierarchy  in which  shares  of manors  and associated  rights
to income  were traded (Sato 1977).  Around  the end of the fourteenth  century  increasing  land scarcity,
as evidenced  by physical  fragmentation  of fields  due to intergenerational  transfers,  led to a gradual
conversion  to landlord estates  (Keirstead  1985),  which  remained  in place  until the nineteenth  and
twentieth  centuries.
Java and Sumtra
87Land market  intervendons.  The Agrarian  Land  Law of 1870  declared  all uncultivated  land
inalienable  state  property and leased  it to European  companies  which  established  large scale
plantations.
Dferendal taxes and labor  leves. These  plantations  were operated  almost  exclusively  using
indentured  labor (Breman  1989).  Laws such as the 'coolie ordinance'  from 1880  imposed  severe
penalties  on indentured  workers  who absconded  and prison  terms  on anybody  employing  such
runaway  workers,  thus indicating  the scarcity  of labor (Stoler  1985).  Large scale cultivation  was
limited  to these  plantations.  Where  individual  peasant  holdings  prevailed  at the beginning  of colonial
rule, authorities  used the "cultivation  system' (1820)  to appropriate  surplus  without  expending
resources  for capital  investment,  and relying  on traditional  land  tenure  and labor  exchange
arrangements.  Ihis system  required  farmers  to grow cash crops (predominantly  coffee  or sugar)  for
the government  on one-fifth  of village  lands  in lieu of a land  tax (Hart 1985).  Both of these crops
were integrated  into the local systems  of rice or upland  cultivation  (Geertz 1963).
PhiHlppines
Land market  Interventions.  Land grants were given  to private  individuals  and religious  orders
after 1571  (Roth  1977)  and by 1700  all of the best land  was under the control  of large estates
(Cushner,  1976).
Dfferential taxation  and labor  levkes.  The Philippines,  like countries  in Ladn America,  had
both encomlenda-the right to tribute  in labor, cash, or kind  from a particular  region-and
repanlmlnto-which  distributed  workers  for public  works  and private  Spanish  businesses.  The
systems  differed  from those in Latin  America,  however,  in that the right  to labor services  was
hereditary  and often included  whole  villages.  Workers  on European  haciendas  were exempted  from
heavy  public  works  and from taxes, making  hacienda  employment  highly  attractive.  Despite  this
advantage,  the lack of economies  of scale led to almost  immediate  disintegration  of rice-cultivating
haciendas  into landlord  estates. Moreover,  by the nineteenth  century,  sugar  production  as well as
processing  were controlled  by tenants  as well (Roth 1977).
Sri Lanka
Land market  Interventions.  Upland  areas where  slash and  burn cultivation  was practiced  were
declared  crown  land in 1840  (Bandarage  1983)  and sold to private  cultivators,  mainly  British,  who
established  coffee  plantations.
D&Terentlal  taxation  and iabor levies. Corvee  labor was abolished  on public  lands  in 1818  and
replaced  by a grain tax amounting  to 10 percent  of gross  produce.  Export  agriculture  -all  land  under
coffee,  cotton, sugar, indigo,  opium  poppies,  and silk-  was exempted  from the tribute (Bandarage
1983).
While  landed  interests  had successfully  opposed  the imposition  of a general  land  tax, the
opportuniy to  arn income  from coffee  cultivation,  together  with the absence  of a totally landless
labor caste, severely  limited  the willingness  of local people  to supply  labor  to estates.  Thus almost  the
entire agricultural  work force on coffee  estates  had to be imported:  Census  figures  indicate  that in
1871  and 1881, 97 percent  of some  200,000  plantation  workers  were indentured  Tamils,  mainly  from
India. The 3 percent of Singhalese  plantation  workers  were mostly  low-country  artisans  who were




Land market  interventions.  Land grants  in Prussia  date from the thirteenth  century  and were
made to knights  and nobles  who were to colonize  the largely  unpopulated  territory  and provide
military  services  to the king. Initially,  population  density  was so low that very favorable  terms were
required  to attract  peasants:  peasants  received  hereditary  usufruct  leases  to about  32 hectares  of land
each. Noble  knights  operated  modestly  sized  demesnes  of about  two to three times the size which  was
provided  to settlers  (Hagen  1985)  to supplement  the rents they received  from peasants. They  were
'not the master  but the neighbor"  of the farmer, and in economic  terms they often  fared worse  than
full peasants  (Luitge  1979).  Depopulation  caused  by the Black  Death  increased  the amount  of land
available  to the nobility  who  became  'land rich but labor poor". Productive  use of this land could  be
maintained  only by attracting  and settling  new farmers,  often  on terms which  were quite favorable  to
the settlers.
Diferential taxation  and labor  levies. While  settler  farmers  had a legal right to leave  without
the lords' consent  as late as 1484  (Hagen  1985),  the Landesverordnung  of 1526  no longer mentioned
the right of the farmer  to take legal action  against  a landlord  who  would  not allow  him to leave  (Abel
1978),  indicating  landlords'  increased  bargaining  power  (due to higher  population  density). Such
restrictions  on peasants'  mobility  facilitated  more widespread  adoption  of labor rents and an increase
in labor requirements  from two days  of service  a week  for full peasants  in 1560  to three days around
1600  (Hagen  1985).  Still, landlords  had to rely on hired workers  in addition  to compulsory  labor
services, estates  were relatively  small:  In 1624,  Junkers' demesne  took up only 18 percent  of the
cultivated  land (Hagen 1985).  The main  benefit  of labor services  for landlords  was the obligation  of
full peasants  to supply  a pair of oxen or horses  and a driver  rather than  the contributions  made  by
non-&ll  peasants  (nicht sparMlhge Bauern)  to demesne  cultivation.
Although  landowners  increased  the size of their demesne  by adding  the land of families  who
died during  the plague  years  of the fourteenth  century  and the Thirty  Years War of 161848, large
farms began to dominate  in Prussia  only after  the land reform  in 1807-50  (tge  1979).  Three aspects
of the reform  contributed  to the emergence  of large farms: the terms  of separation  requiring  farmers
with hereditary  or nonhereditary  lifetime  leases  to cede one-third  or one half their land to the Junkers
in return for freedom;  the initial  limitation  of reform  benefits  to "full  peasants*  and its extension  to
other peasants  without  long-term  lease  rights only in 1850  when,  most people  agree, it was "already
too late" (Dickler 1975);  and repeal  of tenancy  protection  laws, which  had been in place  since 1750.
These factors  allowed  Junkers  to vastly  increase  their demesnes  and to draw on an increased  pool of
wage  labor. The typical  Junker style  of cultivation  with permanent  laborers  residing  on house  plots
emerged  as the predominant  form of production  organization  (Ltltge  1979).  After  farm workers
became  free to migrate  in 1868  and began  moving  westward  (Wunderlich  1961),  they were gradually
replaced  by salaried  and migratory  seasonal  workers,  especially  from Poland,  where population
density  was high and landlessness  was widespread  (Diclder 1975).
Input  and output  market Iterventions.  From the earliest  settlement  days, knights  had certain
rights  of jurisdiction  and monopolies  on milling  and on the manufacture  and sale of alcohol.
89However,  the fact that they were willing  to cede  a good  deal of their trade-related  privileges  to
entrepreneurs  who  engaged  in land-clearing  and attracting  settlers  from the west illustrates  just how
pressing  the labor scarcity  was.
Russia
Land market intervendons.  In the fourteenth  century,  princes,  considering  all land in their
princedom  as their patrimony  (votchina),  granted  land to nobles  who could  provide  the labor force
necessary  to cultivate  the land  and pay taxes.  These landlords  in turn had to attract  peasants  with very
favorable  terms. In-kind  payments  (obrok)  remained  the predominant  type of peasant  obligation,  and,
due to the limited  ability  to impose  labor rents (barshchina),  home  farm cultivation  was almost
nonexistent  (Blum  1961).
In 1565,  Ivan IV confiscated  the property  (votchina)  of almost  all the old princedoms,
converting  it into state land (oprichnina)  and then  using it for land grants  to reward  servitors.
Servitors  did not receive  freehold  title, acquiring  only usufruct  rights  under  service  tenure (pomestye)
which  became  the dominant  form of lay seignorial  tenure. As a result, 'the personal  possession  of
landed  property  became  a monopoly  of a single class of Russian  society-the servitors  of the tsar'
(Blum  1961:169).  As land  rights could  be terminated  at will by the tsar, continued  possession  of the
land was conditional  on the performance  of service  to the state. Indeed,  landlords  who  could  not
provide  payment  in service  or money  were evicted,  and the class of servitors  was subject  to high
fluctuations,  competition  for labor was fierce,  and home  farm cultivation  remained  very limited.  The
economic  situation  of the servitor  was often  precarious  until tenures  gradually  became  heritable  in the
seventeenth  century  (Blum 1961).
Restrictions  on Jabor  mobility  and dWerenata  ta.taon. The extent  of labor scarcity  is
illustrated  by continuous!y  more  severe restrictions  on peasant  cultivators'  mobility.  Between  1400
and 1450, the right of peasants  to terminate  leases  and move  on to another  landlord  was restricted  to
two weeks  each year. Even then peasants  were required  to pay formidable  "exit fees" (equivalent  to
300  bushels  of oats or 120  bushels  of wheat;  Blum 1961)  before leaving.  Landlords  competed  fiercely
for labor and resorted  to 'labor pirating",  i.e. attracting  workers  from other estates  by promises.  In
fact, such labor pirating  became  "the principal  lawful  way  by which  renters  transferred  from one lord
to the other", though  illegal  means  were often  resorted  to as well (Blum  1961).  The intduction  in
1588  of "forbidden  years" during  which  the peasants'  right to move  was temporarily  suspended  did
not prevent  labor pirating  because  the law could  not be enforced.  Decrees  in 1597  and again in 1607
bound  all peasants  to the place  they were residing  at the time of the census  of 1592, which  facilitated
enforcement  of the law. The Assembly  Code  of 1649, which  remained  valid untfl  about 1850,
abolished  statutes  of limitation  on the return  of fugitive  peasants  to their original  landlord.  It also
made serfdom  heritable  by prohibiting  the peasant's  wife and progeny  from moving  as well. After
1661, fines for peasant  raiding  had to be paid 'in serfs": for every iUlegal  peasant  found on a
landlord's  holding,  the landlord  had to give  up one of his own  serf families.  Serfs could  be freely
sold; restrictions  prohibiting  the sale of serfs without  land were unsuccessful.  Serfs  were also used as
collateral,  to be auctioned  off if their landlord  went bankrupt.  In 1859, two-thirds  of all serfs were
mortgaged.  After 1719, the privileges  of peasants-mainly  at the frontiers-who had escaped  serfdom
were successively  eliminated.  They became  serf-like  state  peasants,  subject  to taxes, quitrent,  and
conscription.  By 1850  more than  90 percent  of the male population  were serfs (Blum 1961).
90In 1580, landlords'  home farms (demesnes)  were exempted  from taxaticn.  With revenue
requirements  also rising, the tax burden on peasants  increased  substantially,  significantly  lowering  the
potential  return from cultivation  (Blum  1961).  Peasants  responded  by running  off to the frontiers
where  landlords  were keen  to attract  labor and, because  of temporary  exemptions  from taxes, were
able  to offer better conditions.
Landlords  attempted  to tie peasants  to their holdings  through  debt peonage.  Under  laws  passed
between 1586  and 1597, a debtor automatically  fell into debt servitude  if he was unable  to repay  the
loan  on time. He then had to work continuously  for the creditor  just to pay the recurrent  interest.
Without  any possibility  of repaying  the principal,  debt servitors' only advantage  over slaves  was that
they were to be freed following  the creditor's  death (Blum  1961).
Input and output  market Interventions.  Since  neither  serfs nor state peasants  were allowed  to
engage  in independent  business  until the 1820s  or 1830s,  landlords  enjoyed  a de facto  monopoly  over
commerce  in their area, in addition  to their formal  monopoly  on alcohol  manufacture  and sale.
Latin America
Chile
Lnd  market Interventions.  In the mid-sixteenth  century,  town councils,  free of the central
supervision  by a viceroy  or governor  that was common  in Mexico  and Peru, handed  out land to
settlers 'with utmost  generosity  and ... in the face of royal  legislation  to the contrary"  (Bauer
1980:4).  In contrast  to other Latin  American  countries,  where  the right to tribute was legally
distinguished  from land  grants, and the de jure protection  of Indian communal  land was enforced  by
central  authorities,  encomenderos  in Chile  received  land grants in the middle  of "their"  Indians'
communal  lands  early on. The encomenderos  were thus provided  with cheap  and abundant  labor
services  such that 'by the 1650s  landownership  and encomienda  were filly integrated  ...[andJ the
encomlenda  was absorbed  by the land' (Bauer  1980:8).
Dfferentlal taxation  and  labor levies. Ihe main means  to provide  labor to the mines was the
mta which  required all Indian settlements  to supply  a certain  proportion  of their labor force for
agriculture  or public  works, but in most cases  the mines. Hacienda  workers  were exempt  from the
mfta and many  Indians  sought  refuge from the cruel forced  labor requirements  by joining the ranks of
the yanaconas,  a group which  had given  up all ties, including  land rights, to their original
communities  and, living in total dependence  on individual  Spaniards,  formed  the nuclear  labor force
of the Spanish  estates.
A rise in demand  for wheat  from Lima  in 1687  led to a considerable  increase  in such labor
requirements  with landowners  relying  on either reconstituted  encomlenda  or on yanaconas  who  were
virtually  enslaved  and only given 3 days off a year to tend their house-plots  (Pearse 1975).  As on the
Eastern  European  Junker estates,  able tenants  were used as "labor brokers" and obliged  to supply  the
hacienda  with workers  (veones  obligados  or reemplazantes)  nearly  year-round  (Kay 1977).
Input and ouwput  market  Interventions.  Large wheat  grownng  farms in the Central  region could
not compete  against  wheat  produced  on the more dynamic  (and smaller  sized)  farms in the South and
were converted  into livestock  ranches.  In order to protect  them from competition  from Argentina  they
91lobbied  successfully  for the imposition  of import  taxes  on beef at the end of the 19th  century.  Such
taxes were maintained  despite  consumer  riots caused  by high food  prices in 1905  (Kay 1992).
In this century,  large landowners  received  special  treatment  to reduce  the cost of mechanization.  They
received  exemptions  from import  tariffs  and low interest  rate loans; real interest  rates  on
mechanization  loans  in most of Latin  America  during  the 1950s  and early 1960s  were actually
negative.  Farmers  in Chile, Argentina,  Brazil,  and Venezuela  paid back  only 50 to 80 percent  of their
equipment  loans (Abercombie  1972).
El Salvador
Land market Intervendons.  Public  land was granted  to anybody  who  was planting  it at least two
third with coffee  from 1857  (Lindo-Fuentes  1990).  A large land  titling  program, initiated  in 1882,
which was intended  to speed  up the growth  of coffee  production,  is thought  to have  directly  affected
up to 40% of the territory  of the country  (Lindo-Fuentes  1990)  and led to extraordinary  concentration
of land ownership.  The 1882  law required  all occupants  of ejido lands  to register  their claiLs (i.e.
prove that they were cultivating  the land and pay the titling  fee) within  a period of six month.  All
lands  not claimed  in this way was to be sold at public  auctions.  Illiterate  Indians,  were often  not
aware  of these  requirements  and well-connected  individuals  could  take considerable  advantage  of the
legislation.  The goal of establishing  a successful  export agriculture  could  have  been achieved  by
modernizing  the credit  system  and providing  education  to Indians  as well, in particular  as Indians  had
proven to be responsive  to market  incentives  before. Choice  of the land market  as the instrument  to
achieve  the trnsformation illustrates  the administrative  difficulties  as well as the power  of the elites
who would  benefit  from such legislation  (Lindo-Fuentes  1990).
DIferental  taxation and labor levies. In 1825  vagrancy  laws were passed  requiring  Indians  to
carry work cards  certifying  their employment  (Lindo-Fuentes  1990).  The penalty  for vagrancy  was
Imprisonment.  In 1847, landowners  planting  more than 15 000 coffee  trees obtained  exemption  from
public  and military  services  for themselves  and all their workers.
Guatemala
Land market  lntervenlons.  While  the Spanish  made some  land  grants in Guatemala  in the early
sixteenth  century,  their main land market  intervention  was resettlement  of the Indian  population  in
centalized villages  to facilitate  tax administration  and conversion  of Indians  to Christianity.  They
limited  their activities  to ranching  for which  no land  title was required  (MacLeod  1973).  Titles, which
were issued  to Spaniards  through  land  grants, became  important  only in 1590-1630,  following  a shift
to culdvation  of indigo.
Dferential taxaton and labor kWes. Initially,  Spaniards  had little interest  in establishing
intensive  agriculture  and collected  tribute instead  (such  Indian  tribute contributed  more than 80
percent of royal government  revenue;  Brockett  1990).  From 1540, tribute assessments  were made in
cash, and the need for cash income  was an important  force inducing  Indians  from the highlands  to
migrate  to plantation  areas 'MacLeod 1973).  By the 1560s  and 1570s,  Indians  who  had migrated  from
the highlands  in this way constituted  the majority  of the coastal  Indian  population.
Beginig  around 1600, Idian  headmen  were required  to provide  labor  contingents
(mandamlento)-which  could  be as high as a quarter  of the work  force-for tasks  of public  interest
(MacLeod  295). Mandamlento  labor was ideally  suited  to the seasonal  demands  of indigo  processing.
92Employment  of Indians  in indigo  factories  was widespread,  despite  its legal prohibition  to prevent
futher decline  of the decimated  Indian population  (Lindo-Fuentes  i090). The  mandamiento system
survived  well into the 1880s,  when it was used to provide  cheap  labor for European  coffee  plantations
(Cambranes  1985).
Debt peonage  was legalized  in 1877, and by forcing  debtors to work  off their debts, provided
landowners  with official  means  of enforcing  the continuation  of a flow  of cheap  labor. Following  the'
abolition  of debt peonage,  vagrancy  laws were adopted  in 1933  in response  to the severe labor
shortage.  All Indians who  could not prove  owner-operatorship  of a minimum  of 1.1 to 2.8 hectares  of
land were forced to work-mainly on plantations-for 100  to 150  days  a year to discharge  their "debt
to society."  The requirement  to carry work cards  facilitated  enforcement  (Pearse 1975).
Mexdco
Land  market interventions. Resettlement  of Indians  beginning  in 1540  deprived  them of their
traditional  lands  and placed  them on smaller,  less productive  holdings.  While  the intention  of the
resettlement  program  was primarily  to raise money  for the crown  by selling  the Indians' land to
Europeans,  the expropriations  seriously  reduced  the productive  basis of the Indian  agricultural
economy  (Gibson  1965;  Taylor 1988).
Communal  lands  were expropriated  in the 1850s,  and as land  became  increasingly  scarce,
fewer alternative  opportunities  were open to potential  tenants. "The  expropriation  of communal
villages  brought  about  two contradictory  tendencies.  On the one hand, cheap  temporary  labor became
more readily available  than  before. This made It economically  less and less necessary  for the hacienda
in central  Mexico  to rely on forced  labor. On the other hand, as the haciendas  acquired  more and
more land, much  of it of mediocre  quality,  they preferred  not to work it themselves  but to shift the
risk to sharecroppers  and tenants. The condition  of these  occupants  was so precarious  that many  of
them ... inevitably  incurred  debts  with the hacienda  which  they could  not repay" (Katz 1974:41).
DferentoJ  taxation  and labor  levies. Spanish  settlers  received,  after  1490,  encomlendas,  i.e.
rights  to Indian villages  from which  they could  etrac  tribute in kind and labor services.  Restrictions
limiting  the use of tribute labor in agriculture  were imposed  in some  regions,  in order to secure labor
supply  for public  works.
In 1542, the original  encomlendas were restricted  to the right to collect  tribute and the system
of repartinento was used to distribute  Indian  labor, supposedly  in a more equitable  way.  While this
restricted  the power of the original  beneficiaries  of the encomlenda,  it worsened  the lot of Indians
who  still had to pay tribute to encomenderos  and to render labor services  under repartimientio.
Tribute requirements  remained  in place  but could  be avoided  by working  on haciendas  (the
hacienda  paid the tribute).  Tribute was often required  to be paid in cash, forcing  many  highland
Indians  to migrate  to lowland  areas to obtain  the necessary  cash income  (Moerner 1978).
Debt peonage  was not significant  in the early period of colonization,  but it later acquired
importance  as a means  of tying  laborers  to the hacienda  and lowering  their wages.  In 1790, 80
percent of peons in one area had a wtal  debt higher than the legal limit; their average  debt was
equivalent  to eleven months'  wages  (Taylor  1972).  As landlords  let debt accumulate  up to the point of
the expected  future  value of work performed,  the system  came  very close  to slavery  (debt peons were
93even  being  traded  by redeeming  the debt to their current  employer).  A law enacted  in 1843  secured
not only state enfocement  to Ocollect*  debts  incurfed  to haciendas  but also made it illegal  to hire
laborers  who  had left their hacienda  without  paying  their debts  and required  that they  be returned
(Katz 1974).  Vagrancy  laws passed  in 1877  and strictly  enforced  led to a considerable  increase  in the
employment  of deportees  and 'criminals" (Katz 1974).
Viceroyality  of Peru (present  day Peru, Bolivia,  and Ecuador)
Land market  interventiois.  Beginning  in 1540, land  grants  became  common  in this region, with
grants  of 120-800  hectares  being  relatively  easy  to obtain.  lhe  main beneficiaries  were the
encomenderos,  i.e. Spaniards  who  had received  rights  to labor services  from whole  villages  (see
below),  since  without  Indian  tribute  labor  to work the land, the latter  was virtually  worthless.  Once,
all the land set aside  for this purpose  had been  exhausted,  around 1557, "private' Indian land  was
expropriated  and distributed  among  Spaniards  (Gonzales  1985;  Dav.es 1984).
In the coastal  areas, resetement under  Viceroy  Toledo  in 1570  moved  Indians  into newly
establisbed  town-q  where  they were assigned  farmlands  of often  inferior  quality.  Programs  to review
existing  Spanish  land  titles under which  'Spaniards  could  legally  acquire  land that they  had previously
stolen from Indians  by paying  a fee to the Crown"  (Gonzales  1985:15)  were introduced  in 1589. In
1641  the same  pattern  was applied  even  more rigorously  to improve  the financial  position  of the
Spanish  crown:  there were large-scale  expropriations  of Indian  land, and all surplus  land  was sold  to
Europeans.  Indians 'suffered  a considerable  reduction  in their holdings;  they now  possessed  some  of
the worst farmland  in the valley" (Davies  1984:130).  In the Arequipa  Valley,  adult  married  men were
allotted  an area of only about  half a hectare.
Diferentlal taxaton and labor levies. Beginning  around 1530,  the encomlenda  conferred  rights
to tribute  (in labor, cash, or kind)  from a particular  region  to Europeans,  who replaced  local
overlords.  Holders  of this privilege  (encomenderos)  were, at least at the beginning,  completely
unregulated  as to how much  or what form of tribute  to assess(Ramirez  1986).  While  many  used lnbor
tributes  to cultivate  large farms, assessment  of tributes in cash did reportedly  force Indians  to borrow
funds and sell off abandoned  lands  to repay  their debt (Davies  1984).  The right of individual
encomendwros  to the exclusive  use of Indian  tribute  labor for personal  services  was abolished  about
1550, mainly  to free labor for public  works  and the mines.  The other benefits  of encomlenda
remained,  however.
With  the abolition  of encomienda,  the Spaniards  transformed  the mita, an Incan  institution  for
recruitng labor for public  works  projects,  into a permanent  labor-recruitment  arrangement  for the
mines. In addition  to paying  tribute  to the encomendero,  each  village  had to supply  a percentage  of is
work force for "public  works," which  mostly  meant  work  in the mines. As work for Spanish
haciendas  exempted  from the mlta and tribute  requirements,  many workers  in the aldplano  are
reported  to have  accepted  work  on haciendas.  The class of yanaconas,  who were resident  on
haciendas  and had completely  abandoned  their tribal  identities,  emerged  (Pearse 1975).
Slavery  was extensive  after 1580  in the coastal  valleys  for the production  of sugar, cotton,  and
wine (Davies  1984).  When  slavery  was abolished,  sugar  plantations  resorted  to indentured  labor from
China and Japan, which  comprised  more  than 90 percent  of the work force on some estates  (Gonzales
941985).  Oth&r  crops, predominantly  cotton  were, however  produced  under tenancy  contracts  (Gonzales
1991)  after slavery  was no longer  availble, suggesting  that this form of labor was more profitable
thar.  farmnng  the area under large farms.
Africa
Algeria
Land market  Interventions.  With  the French  occupation,  all state, religious,  and tribal land
became  state  property;  uncultivated  and waste  land  was subject  to titling  which  allowed  settlers  to
acquire  land at no price and 'amounted  to little short than robbery' (Ageron  1991).  In some  cases,
such titling left the Muslims  with slightly  more  than 5% of the land area and much of the land
declared  waste  included  land  grazed  by nomads  in the course  of their migrations.  Since the number  of
setlers remained  limited,  various forms  of settlement  (mcludin, establishment  of native  villages)  weie
tried to make the colony  economically  viable.
Ihe desire to impose  French rule in Algeria  after the 1870171  rebellion  led to initiation  of a
large colonization  and setlement program  between  1871  and 1882.  At a huge cost to government,
settlers  were provided  free ?and  and infrastructure  but either sold  out or farmed  their land with native
sharecroppers  (Ageron  1991).  The so-called  'settlers' law' from 1873  allowed  Europeans  to acquire
rights  to vast amounts  of community  land by purchasing  a small share  thereof  and led to the
accumulation  of vast estates  at little cost (Ageron 1991).
D,fferenIa taxes and labor  levies. Beginning  In 1849,  all Arabs  had to pay head  taxes from
which those  working  as sharecroppers  or wage  laborers  on European  farms  were exempt (Bennoune
1988).  Still, while 'they had always  been willing  to cultivate  for the French as khammes  or
sharecroppers",  at the beginning  of the 20th century  only about 12%  of Arabs were working  as farm
laborers. French  viticulturalists  relied  on foreign,  immigrant  labor  from mediterranean  countries.
Differential  provision  of credit  to Europeans,  led to rapid growth  of vine cultivation.  Market
fluctuations,  together  with additional  land  grants to te.a  newly-rich  settlers, led to the consolidation  of
large estates  of between  4000 and 5000  ha.
Angola
Land market  lnterw'ons.  In 1838  and again in 1865  all "unoccupied'  land could  be given  as
concessions  to Europeans.  "The  settlers  were given lands, seAs, tools, and slaves  by the government,
and measures  were taken to ensure  that their products  could  be sold" (Clarence-Smith  1979, 15).
From 1907  to 1932,  98 square  miles were set aside for native  reserves,  4 square miles  were given  to
Africans  along  with land  titles, and about 1,800 square miles  of the best land was given  to Portuguese
settlers  and other foreigners  (Bender  1978).
Dfferentla taxation  and labor leves. After  the abolition  of domestic  slavery  in 1875, slavery
continued  in a variety  of forms but due to tremendous  demand  for labor from the cocoa  plantations  of
Sao  Tome, prices for slaves  increased  steadily,  making  it more profitable  to export worker: than to
use them on inefficien'  settler farms (Clarence-Smith  1979).  Vagrancy  laws  passed in 1875  subjected
all "nonproductive"  Africans  to nonrmunerated  labor contracts  (Bender  1978).  The laws were
replaced in 1926  by native  laws, which  provided  for payments  of wages  but retained  the provision
95that all Africans  bh-' to work  for European  landlords  or could  be contracted  oy the state (Henderson
1980).
Egypt
Land market  interventons.  Land grants  of the 1840s  gave  some  40 percent  of the land  to
Turko-Egyptian  landlords  and facilitated  the formation  of large estates  (Richards  1982).  Expropriation
of communal  lands  which  took place  in 1850-70,  exacerbated  this trend. Land taxes in 1856 (per
acre) were four to six times higher  for smallholders  than for the large land holdings  (Richards  1982)
and in many  cases  large landowners  did not pay taxes  at all (Owen  1986).
Dtfferential  taxation  and labor levies.  In contrast  to their usual  practice,  the Ottomans  in the
sixteenth  century  did not distribute  Egypdan  lands  to military  leaders  but assessed  collective  tribute.
They wished  to avoid  disrupting  agricultural  production  in Egypt, 'the granary  of the Otte-man
Empire"  (Richards  1983:7).  Corv6e  laborers  were recruited  initially  for public  works  to set up an
extensive  irrigation  system  and later for cotton  production  on the ruler's home  farm. Following  the
large land  grants  made in the 1840s,  'large landowners  arranged  to have corvee  !aborers  work  on
their estates  and to get their peasants  exempted  from the corv6e*  (Richards  1982:23),  thus closely
paralleling  events  on the Latin  American  hacienda.
Large landowners  obtained  coniiderable  direct  government  subsidies  for cotton-price
stabilization  programs  in the early 1920s  and 1930s,  supplemented  by an official  limitation  of the
amount  to be planted  to cotton  and financial  support  to lower  interest  rates for large landowners
which,  by the 1930s,  were heavily  indebted.  Similarly,  imposition  of tariffs  on imported  flour  in 1932
and 1934  and protection  of the market  for domestically  produced  sugar, directly  supported  large
landowners  (Owen  1986).
Kenya
Land  market  Intervendotos.  With the arrival  of Europeans,  all vacant  land was declared  to be
Crown  land and sold to European  setders at extremely  favorable  conditions.  Much  of the land
continued  to be farmed  by African  tenants,  which  were called  squatters  (Mosley  1983).  Africans' land
rights  were limited  to reserves  and a formal  prohibition  of African  land  purchases  outside  the reserves
was codified  in 1926.
Djfferentl  taxation  and labor levies.  The British  introduced  a number  of regressive  hut and
poll taxes in order to 'increase the native's cost of living (Bernan 1990:509).  To pay these  taxes,
Africans  initially  did not seek wage  labor but increased  production,  mainly  on tenanted  land. Despite
repeated  requests  from settlers  to grant tax-exempt  status  to Africans  working  on European  farms,
such taxes  had to be paid by workers  as well, thus large estates  based  on wage  labor remained
relatively  unprofitable  as compa. 4 to tenancy.
The squatter  law from 1918  required  tenants  to provide  at least 180  days a year in labor
services  to their landlord  at a wage  not to exceed  two-thirds  of the wage  for unskilled  labor. This
ordinance  was amended  twice (in 1926  and 1939),  both times increasing  the minimum  amount  of
3F  For more  detail  on Kenya,  South  Afiica,  and  Zimbabwe,  see  Deminiger  and  Binsa%nger  (1992).
96labor services  (to 270 days por year in 1939),  limiting  the area sllowed  to be cultivated  as well  as the
amount  of stock  owned  per tenant, and making  eviction  of tenants  easier.  Labor passes, which  had
beet introduced  in 1908,  limited  the mobility  of Africans;  leaving  without  the employer's  consent  was
a criminal  offense  (Berman  1990).
Input and Qowput market  lrervendons. A dual price system  for maize, adopted  in the 1930s,
reduced  the returns African  farmers  could  obtain  for the same  produce  as supplied  by their European
counterparts  and, in addition,  unloaded  most of the price risk on Africans  (Mosley  1983).
Grower  associations  that excluded  Africans  were formed  for most of the important  cash crops.
High licensing  fees kept  Africans  out of pyrethrum  production,  and they were prohibited  outright
from cultivating  coffee  (Berman  1990).
During  World  War II, European  farmers  received  direct subsidies  to mechanize  their farms
(Cone and Lipscomb  1972).
Sokotho-Callphate  (present  day Burkina  Faso, Cameroon,  Niger, and northeri Nig,ria)
Land market  Imeventons. After 1804, land  was granted  to settlers  by tile caliphate
government  in the areas around  defensive  centers, the amount  of land  depending  on the number  of
slaves  owned.  Thus "anyone  with slaves  could  obtain  enough  land  to start a plantation' (Lovejoy
1980).  ITere were about 100-200  slaves  per plantation,  although  there are reports of officials  who
managed  to obtain  holdings  of morr than 1,000 slaves  (Lovejoy  1978).
Dterenti  taxaton and labor leves. The pattern  of 'slavery' in the area, which  was
populated  by Hausa  and Fulani, was characteristic  of many  parts of Africa in the nineteenth  century
(Lovejoy  1980).21  Slaves  which  made up some  50 to 75 percent  of the local population  were
acquired  by warfare,  direct seizure,  or as tribute  from subjected  trtbes. Limited  export markets  and
the relatively  low price of slaves  Oandowners  could  replenish  their bonded  work  force through
independent  raids; Lovejoy  1980)  allowed  relatively  lenient  treatment  of slaves  who enjoyed  more
rights e.g. the possession  of heritable  house-plots  (Hogendorn  1977)  and the right  to self-redemption
often  using fimds  acquired  by cultivating  surplus  land (Hill 1978)  than the slaves acquired  for cash by
market-oriented  plantations  in the Americas. Land and the absence  of economies  of scale meant,
however,  that slave owners  had to take measures  to prevent  slaves  from escaping  and establishing
their own  operations  (Hogendorn  1977).  Eventually,  these factors  led to the demise  of the large
holdings  (Hopkins  1973).
Malawi
Land market lntervendons.  In 1894, Europeans  were allotted  more than 1.5 million  hectares,  or
about 15 percent  of total arable  land.
"h  IS  is some  diswsion in the littur  an the  approprite  nomelatue  for this  system,  which  combines
e  _mnt  of  avauy ud sefdom.
97Dferenial  taxadon  and labor  levies.  Attempts  to introduce  labor tenancy  on European-owned
cotton  lands  were unsuccessful  as farmers  abandoned  the land and fled to uncultivated  crown  land.
The situation  improved  only as a law was introduced  in 1908  which  allowed  Africans  to gain a
significant  reduction  in the head tax they  had to pay by working  for European  cotton  growers  for at
least one month  a year. Africans'  possibility  to gain a similar  reduction  of the head tax by producing
cotton  on tenanted  land, was, due to landowners'  pressure,  eliminated  (Mandala  1990).
Mozambique
Land  market  Intervendons.  Exclusive  property  rights  in land and quasi-governmental  authority,
were in the early 19th  century,  granted  to lessees  (often  companies)  for a period of three generations
under  the institution  of pra.o. The prazo-holder  had to piovide  minimal  public  services,  cultivate  part
of the property,  pay quitrent  and tithe, but could  levy annual  tributes  (in cash, kind,  or labor) on the
local population  and (see below)  was endowed  with a complete  monopoly  on all trade within  and
outside  the area (Vail  and White 1980).
DigerentIa taxation  and labor levies. HIut  taxes were established  in 1854. After 1880,  at least
ha!f of die tax hid to be paid to the local  prazo-holder  in the form of labor services  (Vail  and White
1980).
Under the vagrancy  law of 1899,  all male Africans  between  fourteen  and sixty years old were
legally  obliged  to work. The area of crops  to be grown  or the wage-employment  required  to satisfy
this obligation  could  be varied  by local  prazo-holders,  providing  them with ample  instruments  to
increase  the supply  of labor. Contingents  of migratory  labor were often 'sold" to other areas (such  as
South  Africa)  where  labor was relatively  scarce  (Vail  and White 1980).  Vagrancy  laws were repealed
in 1926  - at about  the time many  prazos were expiring- and the use of forced labor for 'private
purposes"  (i.e. non-quota  production) was banned.  The labor code  of 1942  instituted  an obligatory
labor requirement  of six months  for all African  men.
Input  and output  market  Inerventions.  In 1892  all itinerant  African  trade within  prazos was
abolished,  conferring  a monopoly  onprazo-holders  of all commerce  in their prazw  (Vail  and White
1980:132).  Prazos  turned into a kind of mini-state,  each with its own closed  economy  and unlimited
freedom  for the prazo-holder  to determine  the terms of trade. Deprived  traders  to provide  outlets  for
their produce 'that had made  peasaat  production  so attractive  to the local people' Africans  almost
completely  withdrew  from cash-crop  productions  and the prazos became  'private labor  pools from
which  the companies,  by direct force or by indirect  manipulation  of the economy,  could  compel  the
labor they required"  (Vail  and White 1980:132).  Following  their expiration  about 1930,  prazos were
replaced  by a 'concession  system".  Concession  holders  received  monopoly  rights  to purchase  cotton
and rice at state-administered  low  prices from African  growers  in return for enforcing  Africans' work
obligations  and providing  inputs  and supervision  (Isaacman  1992).  Although  exactions  from Africans
were still high, (forced)  cultivation  of all but sugar reverted  to smaller  scale units rather than  large
scale farms.
South Africa
Land market Intervendons.  Native  reserves  were firmly  established  at the end of the 19th
century  although  they  were legally  defined  only in 1912. For example  in Transvaal  in 1870, the area
allocated  to African  reserves  was less than a hundredth  of the area available  to whites  (Bundy  1985).
98The Glen Grey Act (1894)  restricted  African  land  ownership  in the reserves  to a parcel of no more
than about  3 hectares  and instituted  a perverted  form of "communal  tenure' which  banned  the sale,
rental, and subdivision  of land in order to prevent  the emergence  of a class of independent  African
smallholders  (Hendricks  1990).  The inability  to sell land in the reserves,  which  persists  up to this
day, is recognized  to be major reason for the low productivity  of agriculture  in the homelands  (Lyno
and Nieuwodt  1991).
Various  legal measures  to discourage  tenancy  on European  farms such as a limit on the amount
of tenants  per farm in 1895  and assessment  of license  fees for tenants  in 1896 4id  not lead  to the
desired  results. The Native  Lands  Act (1912),  circumscribed  the extent  of African  reserves  and
declared  real tenancy  on European  farms  illegal,  forcing  all African  tenants  to either  become  wage
laborers  or labor tenants  on European  farms  or to move  to the reserves.
D,ferentda taxes and labor levies.  Prior to state intervention  on their behalf, very limited
market  produc.aon  by European  farmers  was based  on slaves  or, after the prohibition  of slavery  in
1834, indentured  labor.
Masters  and Servants  Laws and the Mines  and Workers  Au (1911)  restricted  Africans'
occupational  mobility  and excluded  them  from skilled  occupations  in all sectors  except  agriculture
(Lipton 1985).  Restrictions  on mobility  were reinforced  and tightened  by pass laws (influx  controls)
from 1922  and the establishment  of labor  bureaus  to enforce  the legislation  from 1951  (Lipton  1985).
I  addition  to restricting  Africans'  ability  the obtain  jobs outside  agriculture,  more rigid pass
laws and rigorous enforcement  of such laws also provided  a flow  of cheap labor for white
agriculturalists.  It is estimated  that, in 1949,  about  40 000 pass-law  offenders  were supplied  to fas
as prison laborers  (Wilson  1971).
Input  and output market  nterventions. European farmers were assisted by a large array of
monopolistic  commodity  marketing  boards  and direct credit  subsidies.  In 1967,  the amount  spent  on
subsidizing  about 100,000  white  farms  was almost  double  the amount  spent  on education  for more
than 10 million  Africans  (Wilson  1971).
Tanganyika (part of present  day Tanzania)
Land market Inervendons.  From the late 1890s  until 1904  it was common  practice to allocate
several  villages  apiece  to incoming  German  settlers.
Dfferendal taaton  and labor levies. A hut tax, to be paid in cash  or labor services, was
imposed  in 1896 'not so much  for the revenue  which  resulted  but as a means  of propelling  them into
the labor market" (Rodney  1979, 131)  although  half of the hut-tax  income  went direcdy to settlers'
District  Councils.  Vi'llage  headmen  were required  to provide  a fixed  number  of workers  each day to
provide  labor for the settlers  to cultivate  their rubber and sisal plantations.  Every African  was issued
a work card that obligated  him to render services  to an employer  for 120  days a year at a fixed  wage
or else  to work on public  projects (Illife 1979).  In 1902, the Germans  introduced  compulsory  cotton
production  in certain  coastal  areas; it is widely  accepted  that this scheme  was one of the main causes
leading  to the outbreak  of the Maji Maji  revolt in 1905  (Coulson  1982).
99Africans  were excluded  frtm credit  by the Credit  to Natives  Ordinance  of 1931  which  required
that an Afican have specific  government  permission  before  he could  even  request  a bank to lend  him
money  (Coulson  1982).  Attempts  by Africans  to set up  a marketing  cooperative  for coffee  led to the
attemp t to outlaw  traditional  practices  of coffee  growing  in 1937, which  led to riots. Settler-dominated
marketng monopolies  for African-grown  crops were set up in the 1940s  and creamed  off most of the
profits  from those  crops (Coulson  1982).
Zimbabwe
Land market  Interventons.  Reserves  for Africans  in remote  areas  of often  low fertility  were
established  in 1896  although  their boundaries  underwent  some changes  until 1931  (Palmer  1977),
when African  land  purchases  outside  the reserves  mnd  specifically  designed  'African Purchase  Areas"
were declared  illegal.
D&erendad  taxadon  and labor  levies  While  all Africans  were subject  to poll and  hut taxes,
specific  taxes discriminated  against  cash rental  an;' share  tenancy  contracts  fom  1909  (Palmer  1979).
The prospect  of (temporarily)  easing  the tax load  led to large-scale  migration  of Africans  into the
reserves  when commodity  prices were extremely  low in the early 1920s  (Arrighi  1970).
Input and output  market  Interwntions.  Volatility  and downturns  in output  markets  were
smoothed  by government  interventions  such as increased  land bank loans,  debt moratoria  (especially
during the depression  in 1930)  and, after  protracted  lobbying  by European  producers,  the
establishment  of monopoly  marketdng  boards (for  tobacco,  dairy, pigs, and cotton)in  selected  crops
and the establishment  of export  subsidies.
African  maize and livestock  producers  were discriminated  against  by dual  price systems.
Pressure  by European  miners  who  were interested  in cheap  supplies  of maize  limited  the extent  of
price discrimination  against  African  producers  in maize. Quarantine-based  restrictions  on Ailcan
livestock  sales initially  led to the buildup  of large herds and the associated  soil degradation  in the
reserves. To ease  this problem,  in 1939, compulsory  destocking  was mandated;  prices paid fer
African  cattle were between  one third anWi  one sith  of the prices  fetched  for comparable  European
stock (Mosley 1983).
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Now Market Imperfections  Affect  the Farm Size  - Productivity  Relation
Conrider  a region  wh  ewh farm  houehold conmsits  of E fmiy  membaer  capable  of
conducting  farm opertons as wel as supevising hie  work of hired laborers." The household  owns  y  acres
of land, but the size of farm it actually  operates,  denoted  by A,,  is determined  through  renting  in or
renting  out land  at the going  rental  rate & Output  depends  on effective  labor  lid and land M.
Effective  labor is defined  as the product  of the number  of individuals  employ  -d and the effort  i1  they
exert. While  family  members  can be expected  to perform  farm tasks with maximum  effort, say i,
hired laborers' work effort  depends  on the intensity  of supervision.  The intensity  of supervision  is
represented  by the ratio of household  members  to operational  farm size (M/0).  It is assumed  that the
marginal  returns to supervision  intensity  are diminishing,
e = e(FIA), e'>  0,  e'  <  0,  lim  e=1  (1)
FIA -_oo
With  N hired laborers  per operated  acre and a total of E  household  members,  the
effective  labor input is given  by
L = F.e+A  N-e(FIA).  (2)
Output  is determined  by a neoclassical  production  function  that depends  on effective
labor and land,
Q=Q(L,  A).  (3)
Assuming  constant  rets  to scale, and substituting  equation  2 in eciation 3, output
per operated  acre is given  by
q=Q[1.(FIA)+N*e(FIA);lJIq[I- (FIA)+N e(FIA)J,  (4)
1/ This ppeadix  is based  an Feder  (1985).
101where  q-Q/A and  q'>0, q'  <0.
A simple  but  realhitc  way  to introduce  a credit  market  Imperfecdon  to the present




With  $*  wage  rate denoted  by w, Intermediate  input  costs  per acre  by c, and cash
consumption  expenditures  per family  member  during  the season  by 0, the cash  requirements  of a
family  wih an opwational  holding  of size  A are w.N.A+c  -A+R.(A  - V)+ U*F,  and  the working
capital  constaint  fced by the farm  Is:
w.N.A+c.A+R  (A - v)+eOF-sF  v).  (6)
T7he  aumr's objective  is to maximize  end-of-season  profits  (accounting  for interest
charges per dollar  borrowed),  subject  to the working  capital  constn.  Formally,
max 1  =-q[e  U(F/A) +  Ne(F/A)l
A,N
4w.N.A  + c.A  i  R.(A-VJ(l+O,
subject  to inequality  (6)  and  20,  N20.
Detingto  lU  an  tficda  [+k*  S(1  w*N.A-c.A-R.-(AV)4.F1,  whA  is
ft  shaow przm  of ft creit cons_ant,  t  Kuhn-Tcice  cod  for opmid,on  iply:




A  cIN  -W  li§  )O
N  N4  (8b)
a8N
(9a)
"1-S(v)-w  *AJf  -c'A -Rv-P)-B&  (9a)
kA  1  -0,  (9b)
AkO,>N20,120,  (10)
We  stai with Iho  co  in which  the credit coaint  is not binding(  X-0);  solving st-order








Equat  (11)  implies  tot  in to  absc  of biwng  redit constraints,  te  elucity  of fth
opta  opeaonal  uize  with repect to houhold  size s unity,  i.e., thr  is a fixet  tiop  nl  holding  to
householdsize  rtio.  Mm  amount  of owd  land  dos not affect  the optimal  ratio. This outocom  is intuitively
expected  in a situation  of constt  rturn  to scale  with prfect  ntal d capital  marts.
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Equation  (12) implies  that the optimal  number  of hirnd laborers  per acre is not affected  by
household  size (neither  is it affected  by the size  of the owned  holding).  Since  the earlier  roLults  imply that the
operational  holding  is proportional  to household  size, it folows that the number  of hired leborers  per acre is
identical  on ull farms, whatever  the size  of the operational  hutding  (a. 4 that the ratio of family to hired labor
declines  with operational  holding  size). A trivial  extension  of thes  rslts  is the observation  that the level of
effective  labor  per acre is identical  on all farms  (since  the ratioZ/A is fixed  and  A is the sam  on  all farms),
assuming  all other farm and farmer  attributes  are identical.  It therefre follows  that output  per unit of land
operated  is uot affected  by the size  of the operational  fann or by the amount  of land  owned.
The analysis  and the  presentation  in the case  where the credit constraint  is binding  Q\>0) are
greatly  simplified  by assuming  that the finctions q(  *  ) and e(  *  ) are of  lxed  elasticity  with respect  to their
arguments,  that is, that (q'he,)  *  (LIA) *  il, the elasticity  of outut with rspect to effective  labor,  and (e'/e)
(FIA) *  i,  the elasicity of effort  with respect  to upesion,  and where
dA  WR  <-
dV  [  w  e
a  and V are parmet  within  the intew'l (0,1). Th&  stadard treatment  of labor  in the literaure - the
assuption  that hired labor  is not affected  by family  supervision  -is then the special  case  n0  in the presnt
model.
Differeiation of equations  (7a), (8a), (9a), under the assnuption  of an intmal solution,
yields  after some manipulaton
(13)
d4  -(1  -1  -11  wF. _  w
dV  Ils  u  (c +  R)  Is -(  ZcF
w  eA
The denominator  ow be dwsw to be positive  if second-ord  conditions  hold.  It follows  that
th  sig  of equation  (13) is detmined  by the sip  of (I-" ,  j),  which  is the limit value  of total output
elasticity  with  Lrespect  to land as the share of family  labor  tends to zero.
To demonstrate  that the relation  between  per-hectars  yields  and openrional  holding  size can
follow different pattns  within the frmnework  of the preset  Laodel,  we use te  definition of effective labor and
the fist-order  conditions to calculate the optimal per-ectare  input  of labor:
104(IJA)*-v  f[c+R) ./wa  JIaJS  F/AJ(1(I-" 1 *  .).  (14)
Diffrentiation  of  quaton 14 with respect  to owned  holding  sie y yields
d(14A)  ;*  e di
dV  e A  w  At(1I1iL)
(1S)
Clarlny,  if the labor  mart  is pedfect  (a.0),  labor  per hectao of land  dos not vay  with
fam style. Ibspection  of equaton 13 verifies  that a  and the sig  of equaton 1S thus depends  an th  term in
.squr  brwket.
In the cas  where 17-7i  * I  0, the relafion  between  the offecive labor  iput  per hecta  and
owned  holding  size can be negative  or positive.  Consider,  for instance,  tho cas  wher  the output Iasticitv  i
equals  '.  Firt-orde  conditions  imply  [(1-  *  (Ig)**A)-[(  I  <1Jc0,  hec,  in t  ca  where i-'A, it
follows  tdat  d(/)Idi/<O,  i.e., tho effective  labor  input  (and  yieds) declin  with owned  holding  size. Mhm
ame result  can be obtaned for aiwll  <.  By an avWment  of coStinuity  since  in the  cuo (l-1p-0  it holds
that  dl&4/)I_>0  (in that  ca  the  is a final  c.mional  fam sa  of weth),  ther mustexis
some low (but positive)  values  of the tem (1-""-  it) for which  d(ld)l/d_>0  holds.  The conclusion  is,
therefore,  that one may  observe  a posiiive  or a negative  reaton  betwee opetional  holding  siz  and per-
hect  yields,  dep&udig  on the relafive  magnitudes  of ti and p. In tho  case (1-t  *p)-0 ther wiUl  be no
oetion  betw  operational  holding  size and per-hwetac  yields.
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